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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Professor Amy Kastely published her article entitled An Essay in
Family Law: Property Division, Alimony, Child Support, and Child Custody.'
Kastely reviewed decisions of Hawai'i's appellate courts to paint the evolving
landscape of family law in this state. Her review went beyond a still-life
portrayal of the law as it existed in the early-1980's. It also presented a
joyride of ideas, a few of which have been recited so often in the intervening
thirteen years that younger family law practitioners today might take them for
granted.
One such idea is that marriage is "a joint effort, to which each party
contributes his financial resources and personal efforts."2  The concept
envisions marriage as a partnership in which each spouse contributes both
services and property.3 It also provides a premise for distributing property
should the partnership dissolve.4
' See 6 U. HAw. L. REv. 381 (1984). I first came across Professor Kastely's article on the
eve of my first contested custody case in 1986. A copy of the essay was left in the top drawer
of the desk I inherited from another Legal Aid attorney. The discovery was entirely fortuitous
and at the time I considered the article to be a godsend. I have since reread it a number of times
and continue to find guidance eleven years later.
2 Id. at 391.
' See id. at 390.
4 See id. at 390. Professor Kastely tied the marital partnership model to community
property states. See id at 390 n.52. Community property states begin with the presumption that
all earnings from spousal labor during the marriage are the property of the marital "community"
or partnership in which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest. Consistent with this
notion, property acquired with spousal earnings is also owned equally by both spouses
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An egalitarianism underlies this concept of partnership.5 It assumes that all
spousal contributions, whether they come in the form of earning wages,
maintaining the household, or providing care to children or other dependent
family members, are equally valuable to the vitality of the marital
partnership.6 It promotes a gender neutral assignment and sharing of roles and
responsibilities. It recognizes that contributions not only have their own
inherent value, but also gain value in how they allow the other spouse to
pursue activities that enhance the partnership.7 It promotes a conceptualiza-
regardless of whose earnings were responsible for the acquisition. See LENORE J. WErZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REvoLuIToN 53-55 (1985). Professor Kastely also noted that commentators for
equitable distribution systems, like Hawai'i, were already endorsing the partnership model. See
Kastely, supra note 1, at 390 n.52.
' See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing
With Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 119
(1993). One could argue that the concept of partnership has been with us for a long time
although this may not be obvious at first blush. At the start of this country's history, for
example, it was still widely held that upon marriage, the legal identity of the woman dissolved
into her husband's. Further, the property brought into marriage by the woman belonged to and
came under the control of her husband. The "disappearance" of a legal identity, however, belied
the fact that women continued to have a vital role in both the marital unit and family, and could
expect certain important obligations from her husband. While it was clear she was chiefly
responsible for maintaining the domicile and that her role was to provide service, she and her
children could expect financial support. Each spouse had clearly defined de facto roles: he
supported, she served, and it was a division of labor upon which the function of the family, and
even the community-at-large depended.
This could be characterized as a partnership in which each spouse made contributions and
reaped benefits. The difference between our present day concept of a marital partnership and
the earlier concept is that the latter was not equal and sought no ideal of equality. Earlier
marital partnerships could generally be considered "symmetrical" (i.e., "he supported, she
served") at best.
6 See Sally Burnett Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable
Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195, 199 (1987).
7 See id. See also Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of
Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L. Q. 93, 104 (1997). For example, in a marital partner-
ship where the couple agrees that the husband works while the wife remains at home to care for
the home and children, no one could dispute the inherent value of the wife's in-home
contributions. But another dimension to the value of such contributions is in how they give the
husband the freedom to work and flourish in the marketplace. By developing the expertise and
track record to advance, the husband is in a position to bring even greater contributions to the
marital partnership and family unit. Some commentators label this enhanced ability to earn
higher incomes and seek advancement as "human capital" attributable to the marital enterprise.
See, e.g., Cynthia Starnes, Applications of a Contemporary Partnership Model for Divorce, 8
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 107, 112 (1993),
This idea is usually given much more attention during divorce proceedings when the stay-at-
home spouse seeks to recapture her "investment" in the course of seeking an equitable property
division and support award. See, e.g., Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 716 P.2d 1133
(1986), a pivotal Hawai'i case in which the wife sought an award that adequately reflected the
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tion of marriage in which each spouse seeks to contribute to the communal
good with the goal of securing joint comfort, safety, and prosperity. It also
entitles each spouse to an equitable, if not equal, sharing of the benefits of the
marital partnership.'
Prior to Kastely's 1984 essay, Hawai'i's Intermediate Court of Appeals
("ICA") had already begun writing opinions on property division incident to
divorce, which reflected more than an inkling that it understood and endorsed
the partnership concept as described in Kastely's article.9 Aiming to give trial
judges and law practitioners a level of uniformity, stability, clarity or
predictability to guide negotiations and structure decisions regarding property
division, the ICA began to set forth a number of "general rules" that were
consistent with a partnership model of marriage.10 After the Kastely article,
the ICA continued to give shape and structure to the division and distribution
of marital assets, ultimately devising a system of "uniform starting points" to
direct decisionmaking." In all its decisions, the court applied a model of
equal partnership to the marital unit without actually stating so.
Ironically, it took two striking reversals from the Hawai'i Supreme Court,
first Cassiday v. Cassiday12 in 1987, then Gussin v. Gussin" in 1992, to bring
"partnership" into the vocabulary of reported decisions. In both decisions, the
high court referred specifically to marriage as a partnership and recognized
how the ICA had used this analogy to promulgate its rules. However, troubled
value of her contributions as the supportive stay-at-home spouse. This case will be discussed
later in this article. See infra notes 256-58, 262-79 and accompanying text.
8 See Sharp, supra note 6, at 199.
' In fact, Professor Kastely noted that at the time of her article, numerous commentators
had already endorsed the partnership model for equitable distribution states. See Kastely, supra
note 1, at 390 n.52.
'0 An example of these rules may be found in Raupp v. Raupp, 3 Haw. App. 602, 658 P.2d
329 (1983), in which the Intermediate Court of Appeals announced its first two general rules.
The first stated that "it [was] equitable to award each divorcing party the DOM [date of
marriage] net value of his or her premarital property." Id. at 610, 658 P.2d at 335. The second
stated that "it [was] equitable to award each divorcing party the date of acquisition net value of
gifts and inheritances which he or she received during the marriage." Id. at 611, 658 P.2d at
336. These rules were intended to guide all lower courts in its treatment of property at divorce.
" As will be discussed later in this article, the Intermediate Court of Appeals devised a
system of uniform starting points to give practitioners and trial judges a uniform place to begin
their analysis of how to divide different categories of net market values. See discussion infra
Part III.A. For example, the uniform starting point for dividing the date-of-marriage net market
value of all property owned separately by each spouse at the start of the marriage was 100% to
the owner spouse and 0% for the non-owner spouse. See Hashimoto v. Hashimoto, 6 Haw. App.
424, 428-29, 725 P.2d 520, 524 (1986).
12 6 Haw. App. 207, 716 P.2d 1145 (1986), cert. granted, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781
(1985) aff'd in part, rev'd inpart, 68 Haw. 383,716 P.2d 1133 (1986).
"3 9 Haw. App. 279,836 P.2d 498 (Haw. App. 1991), cert. granted, 72 Haw. 618, 838 P.2d
860 (1991), vacated, 73 Haw. 470, 836 P.2d 484 (1992).
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that the ICA's "fixed" rules had diminished the discretion of the family court
to grant "just and equitable" decisions as required by statute, the high court
rejected the ICA's attempts to bring uniformity, stability, certainty and
predictability into family court decisions.' 4
While disagreeing with the ICA's methods, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
acknowledged the ICA's desire to provide structure and guidance to trial
judges. To answer the ICA's concern, the high court, first in Gussin then two
years later in Tougas v. Tougas,15 offered the partnership model as the
conceptual framework for dividing property at divorce. 6 The high court
wrote, "our acceptance of the 'partnership model of marriage' provides the
necessary guidance to the family courts in exercising their discretion and to
facilitate appellate review."'
17
Not satisfied, the ICA responded. Just a few months after Tougas, the ICA
issued a decision in Hussey v. Hussey,' in which it created a new framework
of guiding principles for dividing property at divorce, drawing partly from the
state's commercial partnership statute under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section
425-118(a). 9 These principles are by and large similar to the ICA's earlier
efforts which is not surprising in light of the ICA's general adherence to
partnership principles long before its Hussey decision. At this writing, Hussey
remains unreversed, and the ICA continues to use it as the launching point for
its decisions.2'
Analogizing marriage to a partnership, more specifically a commercial
partnership, was a legal construct largely necessitated by a nationwide turn
toward no-fault divorces. The disappearance of fault-based divorces meant
easier access to divorces and thus, for dependent homemaker spouses, a loss
14 As discussed later in this article, the high court held that any attempt to dictate the
division of property by a defined set of rules directly violated the statutory mandate set forth in
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47(a). See discussion infra Part III.B. This section
directs courts to make a "just and equitable" division. The supreme court determined that the
ICA's construction of rules, both pre-Cassiday and pre-Gussin, had the effect of restricting the
discretion of trial judges to fashion just and equitable distributions.
" 76 Hawai'i 19, 868 P.2d 437 (1994).
16 See generally Lori L. Yamauchi, Gussin v. Gussin: Appellate Courts Powerless to
Mandate Uniform Starting Points in Divorce Proceedings, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 423 (1993).
17 836 P.2d 498 (Haw. App. 1991), cert. granted, 72 Haw. 618, 838 P.2d 860 (1991),
vacated, 73 Haw. 470, 486, 836 P.2d 484 (1992).
'8 77 Hawai'i 202, 881 P.2d 1270 (Haw. App. 1994).
'9 See infra note 258.
20 At this writing, the ICA has authored four post-Hussey decisions dealing with property
division: Epp v. Epp, 80 Hawai'i 79, 905 P.2d 54 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995), Markham v.
Markham, 80 Hawai'i 274,909 P.2d 602 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996), Kreytak v. Kreytak, 82 Hawai'i
543, 923 P.2d 960 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996), and Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai'i 319, 933 P.2d
1353 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997). See also infra note 433.
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of the financial security that had been part of the promise of marriage.2 The
partnership analogy helped courts, legislatures, and legal scholars reconcep-
tualize the marital unit to justify an equal award of property to the dependent
spouse, even if that spouse neither made direct financial contributions to the
acquisition of property nor appeared on title.22 It was also intended to create
a sufficiently large award of property to divorcing spouses so as diminish the
need for alimony, which had previously been the primary source of post-
divorce support, and to facilitate a "clean break" between the parties.23
In Hawai'i, modem appellate decisions have tended to support this
remedial' or redistributive character without specifically stating so. In aggre-
gate, these decisions have maintained a relatively large reservoir of theoreti-
cally divisible property,' favored categorization of property as "marital," and
provided rules, modeled after Hawai'i's commercial partnership statute, that
mandate an equal distribution of the marital profits absent valid and relevant
circumstances to justify a deviation. Thus, a spouse who chose to remain at
home or whose marketplace work opportunities were somehow limited by the
rigors of household management and familial caregiving, could still expect to
share equally in the financial profits of the marriage.
In recent ICA cases, however, the ICA's response to Gussin and Tougas
have begun to read like "partnership with a vengeance," with an increasing
tendency to stay close to the partnership template even where facts might
justify some deviation. This article seeks to temper the partnership fervor
without extinguishing it, and suggests pausing to see where the model is
taking us. The partnership model is seductive in the ideal it holds up to us, but
21 See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-injecting Responsibility in
Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 615 (1996).
22 See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAw IN
THE UNITED STATES 118 (1988).
23 See Starnes, supra note 5, at 97.
24 Being "remedial" or "redistributive" means moving away from the former practice of
distributing property at divorce based on who held title to property and toward a distribution
which reflected the important economic and non-economic ways in which both husbands and
wives contributed to the marital unit. See Sharp, supra note 6, at 198.
' A hotchpot approach to property division contemplates a melding of all property,
separate, marital and otherwise, into a single pot followed by an equal doling out of the pot's
contents to awaiting recipients. While Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47 authorizes
Hawai'i courts to divide and distribute "the estate of the parties, real, personal, or mixed,
whether community, joint or separate," HawaiTs approach has not been to create and split a
hotchpot. As a matter of practice and law, courts acknowledge and can consider the separate
identities of certain properties but are not required, as in other jurisdictions, to restore separate
property to the owner spouse. As seen later in this article, recent appellate cases allow parties
to totally exclude properties from the marital partnership and thus from division. See discussion
infra Part mI.D. However, even here, trial judges are able to look at the amount of the excluded
property to help them fashion a fair division of the divisible partnership estate. See id.
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we should neither presume its perfection nor allow it to bar consideration of
other models.
Before looking at the beyond, this article takes a long backward glance at
the development of the partnership model in Hawai'i. Decisions in the 1980's
and the 1990's, culminating in the Gussin - Tougas - Hussey trilogy, represent
an accelerated evolution that was preceded by a more gradual but necessary
sequence of decisions, events, and movements that began over a hundred years
ago. Pieces of the model began to assemble well before the cases of the past
thirteen years, and serve to lay the foundation for the model as we now under-
stand it. For one, the process required the labored changes in societal attitudes
regarding gender roles and positions, and the enactment of laws to reflect and
reinforce these changes.
The more recent flurry of judicial decisions effectively institutionalized
the partnership model. This article suggests, however, that the lofty
expectations of the model, as noble as they might be, may not comport with
the actual expectations of the parties and lead to perceptions that the court
"got it wrong." An increasingly stiff application of the partnership template
only aggravates this. A reminder is also left with the court to consider
whether the model actually achieves what it sets out to do and to "hold to the
light" other possibilities including compensatory spousal payments.
In culinary terms, what we have is something that was slow-cooked then,
in recent years, flashed-fried, like the meaty uhu26 or parrot fish, a local
favorite served at homes and restaurants. Extending the analogy, the
partnership model, as attractive as it is, cannot be devoured with abandon. In
the case of the uhu, sharp unbending bones await the unwary. Likewise, the
partnership model if applied without thought, can produce results that fall
short of our standards for fairness.
Part II provides a brief historical perspective of the partnership concept and
describes the convergence of the pieces needed for the emergence of the
partnership model in Hawai'i. Part mH chronicles the flurry of exchanges
between Hawai'i's two appellate courts, a process that forged and institution-
alized the model in this state. Part IV looks at how Hawai'i's incarnation of
the partnership model projects the court's heightened expectations of
marriages and family, as well as, the contributions and obligations that should
occur within them. The article concludes with the notion that our courts are
26 Uhu, or the parrot fish, is an island favorite that is prepared at some Chinese restaurants.
One method of preparation is to scald or "flash-fry' it with very hot oil after pouring shoyu and
placing chopped green onions, sliced ginger, and cilantro on the fish. However, because of the
size and meatiness of the uhu, it is generally insufficient to rely on flash-frying to ensure
thorough cooking. Thus, prior to pouring the oil, the fish should be steamed first, a slower
process that if done right will result in meat that is flaky and tender.
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moving in the correct direction, but must be careful about unduly skewing its
vision when applying the partnership model.
II. ASSEMBLING THE PIECES
A. Where Did the Partnership Model Come From?
At the time of Professor Kastely's article, the partnership model had already
vaulted into the national psyche. Her reference to marriage as a partnership,
which was later cited in Hawai'i appellate decisions, can be traced to a report
of the 1963 President's Commission on the Status of Women which stated in
pertinent part: "Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a
different but equally important contribution. This fact has become increas-
ingly recognized in the realities of American family living."2
In 1970, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA") which,
although never adopted in Hawai'i, placed an imprimatur on many of our
current notions regarding marriage and how decisions should be made when
a divorce occurs. Its prefatory note contained a brief but clear reference to the
partnership model as the framework for property division, stating "[t]he
distribution of property upon the termination of marriage should be treated,
as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution
of a partnership."2
The roots of this now often-cited analogy are actually centuries old, arising
not from our Anglo-American common law tradition,29 but from the Civil
27 COMMIrEE ON CIIL AND PoLrrIcAL RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE PREsIDENrr's COMMISSION
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, 18 (1963). Professor Kastely noted the committee's reference to
marriage as a partnership in her article. See Kastely, supra note 1, at 390 n.52.
28 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIvORCE Acr 9A U.L.A. 147, 149 (1973). Interestingly, the term
"partnership" was not used again in the text of the model act. However, as later discussed, part-
nership concepts undergirded the section on property division. See discussion infra Part II.E.
9 In the broad sense that partnerships represent the melding of disparate parts to form a
unit, with each part assuming a role in the function of the unit, our Anglo-American common
law tradition provides an odd but ultimately unsatisfying match. As noted by Justice Hugo
Black in United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), the common law determined that upon
marriage, husband and wife became one, with the "one" being the husband. See id. at 359.
In his commentaries, Blackstone described this merger of husband and wife into a single
legal identity:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law .... [Tihe very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection and cover she
performs everything; and is therefore called ... afemme-cover, and her condition during
her marriage is called her coverture.
I WIuMM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765), quoted in LENORE
WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 1 (1981).
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Code of Spain which came to North America by way of Spanish colonializa-
tion of Mexico and surrounding areas.3" The code espoused marriage as a
partnership which respected the individuality of each spouse.3' Unlike Anglo-
American common law, the Spanish Civil Code allowed both spouses to retain
their premarital legal identities, recognized and valued the individual
contributions of each spouse to the marital effort, and extended to each the
earned right to share in the assets of the marriage.32
Although the common law concept of a merged legal identity contained both the unit-forming
and contributory aspects of partnerships it failed to recognize the continuing vitality and
individuality of both spouses after the marriage, an element essential to our modem
understanding of marital partnerships. Homer Clark wrote:
Anglo-American law has for centuries prescribed rules for the proper behavior of
husbands and wives in marriage. These rules were often stated in the abstract.
Specifically, the courts have said that the husband has a duty to support his wife, that she
has a duty to render services in the home, and that these duties are reciprocal.
1 HOMER CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 423 (2d ed.
1987).
30 See Suzanne Reynolds, Increases in Separate Property and the Evolving Marital
Partnership, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 249 (1989). The Spanish Civil Code provided the
rule of law to Mexico and surrounding areas that were settled and colonized by Spain beginning
in the 1700's. After Mexico gained independence in 1821, it used the code as a foundation for
governance. Beginning in 1848, regions of Mexico that later formed many of the southwestern
and southern border states of the United States, came under the U.S. sovereignty. In these
regions, the influence of the Spanish Civil Code persisted in varying degrees thus blending
Spanish jurisprudence into the formation of American law. See W.S. MCCLANAHAN,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (1982).
31 See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 30, at 331.
32 See id. The Spanish Civil Code was subject to the scholarly review of "jurisconsults"
who published commentaries on the meaning of sections and phrases within the code. See id.
at 28. Since it was not uncommon for Spanish judges to rely on these commentaries when
deciding cases, the work of jurisconsults significantly influenced the formation of law within
the civil code system. See id.
Consistent with the code, jurisconsults discussed marriages as partnerships in surprisingly
modem terms. Although not in full accord on how partnerships dictated the division of property
among spouses, jurisconsults agreed that spouses were partners who worked to benefit the
marital community and shared in the fruits of marital labor.
For example, Juan de Matienzo, a preeminent sixteenth century jurisconsult, wrote: "With
regard to community of goods the law has regard to the industry and common labour of each
spouse and to the burdens of partnership and community." 2 WILLAM QuINBY DEFUNIAK,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 75-76 (1943). He added, "just as an express partnership
connotes a kind of contract of brotherhood, so too the partnership of husband and wife is called
a brotherhood" thereby justifying the "sharing of property acquired during marriage [which]
takes effect even though the husband comes to the marriage a rich and wealthy man while the
wife is poor and altogether without a dowry." L. at 76-77. He recognized that "[t]he wife can
work and take care of and preserve the family property" and that "the poorer spouse by work
and labour makes up the deficiency in his or her estate." Id. at 77.
Another noted jurisconsult, Joaquin Escriche y Martin (1784-1847), wrote "there is
established between the two consorts a partnership, though legal, different from others in that
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Its influence persisted when regions that had been under Spanish then
Mexican rule came under the sovereignty of the United States.33 These states
became known as "community property" jurisdictions and provided a counter-
point to the common law states.3' Although community property law never
became the majority position in this country,35 it provided a model for com-
mon law jurisdictions seeking to reformulate concepts of marriage, gender
status, and spousal property rights. As envisioned by the Spanish Civil Code
and the community property states, the concept of marriage as a partnership
of two spouses offered a ready alternative to the traditional "husband-centric"
model.
Finding a new way to think about property division was partly accelerated
by the national movement toward no-fault divorces which began in the 1960's
and was itself a result of changing perceptions about marriage, its functions,
and its principles.36 Under the fault system of divorce, punishment of spousal
misconduct, even when the conduct had no effect on marital wealth, was
considered an appropriate factor in deciding how to divide and distribute
the acquisitions are the property of each in equal proportions." RICHARD A. BAujNGER, A
TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, UNDER THE COMMUNITY OF GANACIAL
SYSTEM 43 (1895). Escriche y Martin pointed out that Spanish law construed all acquisitions
as equal in each spouse notwithstanding the fact that one spouse did not directly contribute skill,
labor or industry to the acquisition. See id.
" States that originally adopted the community property scheme as set forth by the Spanish
Civil Code included Arizona, California, Texas, New Mexico, Florida and Louisiana. Before
the end of the nineteenth century, its influences migrated north, affecting Washington and Idaho.
See BALLINGER, supra note 32, at 31-32. At present, only eight states retain the community
property system including Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas
and Washington. See Susan S. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share:
Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 569 n.10 (1995).
Wisconsin, by virtue of its adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act, is considered by some
to be a community property state. However, there is some disagreement on whether the
Uniform Marital Property Act is a community property law. See JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, THE
LAW OF EQUrrABLE DISTRIBUTION 1-8, 1-9 (1989).
34 See 2 HOMER CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 177
(2d ed. 1987).
31 See id. at 177 n.10.
36 In her article, Bea Ann Smith quoted Karl Llewellyn who wrote, "as we turn to review
the changes occurring in the ways by which single marriages serve their radiant functions, we
shall find also the social changes mirrored, distorted but unmistakable, in the rules and practice
on marriage dissolution." Smith also quoted Llewellyn as saying, "[c]hange the practices of
marriage, and divorce, after due lag, will be found readjusting to suit." Bea Ann Smith, The
Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689, 694-95
(1990) (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (pt.)), 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281,
1286 (1932)).
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property at divorce.3 7 When states began eliminating fault-based divorce, an
adjustment was also in order where property was concerned.38 One obvious
reason was that allowing parties to use spousal misconduct as leverage for
larger property awards worked against one of the driving forces for no-fault
divorces: reducing the acrimony that accompanied fault finding.39 But to the
extent that the move to no-fault divorces was an attempt to catch up with
evolving social perceptions and beliefs, so too was the change in property
division law a reflection of shifting norms and values.40
That the opportunity to rethink property division rules occurred at a time
when discussions on gender equality issues were well under way greatly
influenced the direction of reform.4 The notion that equal marital partners
were entitled to an equitable share of the marital estate upon divorce, based
on a concept of shared efforts and property, seemed to provide the correct fit.
Commercial partnership principles, as codified under the Uniform Partnership
Act,42 embodied some of the features of the Spanish Civil Code's marital
a1 See generally Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and
Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2311-12 (1994).
38 See JACOB, supra note 22, at 117.
'9 See id.
0 Lawrence Friedman in his insightful history of divorce law wrote that the fault-based
system of divorce became largely one of mutual consent and collusion, one of winks and
knowing nods, that persisted because of two irreconcilable social demands: the genuine demand
for divorce and the equally compelling demand for moral legitimacy in relationships of family
and sex. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 662-63, 666 (1984). And thus, no-fault divorce, which
allowed consensual (not to say that the consent was always mutual) dissolution minus the
collusion, represented a more honest albeit delayed ratification of what had long been desired
but became achievable only when an adequate quantum of moral opposition finally crumbled.
See id. at 664-66.
What social changes created the environment which allowed no-fault divorces to explode on
to the scene? Friedman strongly suggests the answer by listing the factors that ultimately
allowed no-fault divorce to thrive: the sexual revolution, the fading stigma of divorce, the new
role of women and marriage, and the emphasis of personal choice. See id. at 667.
Likewise, the change in property law also reflected social changes and could only occur
when social realities created the appropriate environment.
"' The push toward gender equality intersected with the movement away from fault-based
divorces. To the extent that women had looked to marriage as a significant if not sole source
of support and had therefore been protected by barriers to divorce, increasing access to divorce
by eliminating the showing of fault was an acknowledgment that women had the capacity to
fend for themselves, marriage notwithstanding. However, whether society actually provided real
opportunities for them was another matter. See generally WErrZMAN, supra note 4, at 357-99.
42 The Uniform Partnership Act, or UPA, was first adopted by the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws in 1914. See James W. Boyle, Preliminary Provisions and the Nature of a
Partnership Under the UPA, 9 HAW. B.J. 83, 84 (1973). In 1972, Hawai'i became the forty-
fourth jurisdiction to adopt the UPA. See id. at 84 n.6.
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partnership and thus provided an additional model for states to look to."3
B. Evolving Gender Positions and the Married Women Property Acts
Like other common law states, Hawai'i had to undergo an evolution in its
view of gender-based roles and positions within marriage before it could
accept the partnership model as a conceptual framework for the division and
distribution of property at divorce.44 It was a progression that took time to
develop.
Because of its unique history as an independent kingdom with a strong indi-
genous cultural heritage which remained largely unaffected by western influe-
nces until the nineteenth century, evolution of gender positions in Hawai'i did
not initially track the changes occurring in the United States. However, with
the arrival of Protestant missionaries in 1820 and the embracing of their mores
and values by significant leaders within the kingdom, 45 Hawai'i became
4' As seen later in this article, Hawai'i's courts did in fact rely directly on the UPA, codified
under Hawai'i Revised Statutes Chapter 425, to develop rules for property distribution upon
dissolution of a marital partnership. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
" Like many other evolutionary processes, defined stages represent no more than fluid
beliefs consisting of remnants from a passing stage, along with newly emerging perspectives
seeking articulation and understanding.
Even the often cited mergence of man and women into a single identity favoring the husband
may be at best an approximation. To wit, English law historians Pollock and Maitland wrote:
In particular we must be on our guard against the common belief that the ruling principle
is that which sees an 'unity of person' between husband and wife. This is a principle
which suggests itself from time to time; it has the warrant of holy writ; it will serve to
round a paragraph; and may now and again lead us out of or into a difficulty; but a
consistently operative principle it cannot be.
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 405-06 (2d ed.
1968).
4' Kamehameha the Great, the father of the Hawaiian kingdom, died less than a year before
the arrival of the missionaries. See SHELDON DMBLE, HISTORY OF THE SANDWICH ISLANDS, 124,
139 (1909). His son and heir Liholiho (Kamehameha II) was the sovereign when the
missionaries arrived. Although characterized by some as a weak ruler who had an appetite for
material goods and alcohol and who could not conform his conduct to the moral codes of the
missionaries, Liholiho was considered friendly and occasionally attended public worship. See
HAROLD WHITMAN BRADLEY, THE AMERICAN FROWIER IN HAWAII, THE PIONEERS, 1789-1843,
59, 142 (1968). Upon leaving Hawai'i for an ill-fated journey to England in November 1823,
Liholiho appointed Kaahumanu, the favorite wife of his father and Liholiho's kuhina nui [The
kuhina nui, although translatable into English as the premier or prime minister, actually held
power roughly equal to the king. See 1 RALPH S. KUYKENDAuL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM,
1778-1854: FOuNDATION AND TRANSFORMATION (1965)] regent or the defacto ruler in his
absence. See id. at 78, 117. Liholiho, who became ill, did not return until after his death. The
throne passed to the then eleven-year-old Kauikeaouli (Kamehameha III). See id.
During Kauikeaouli's minority, the regency continued. See id. Kaahumanu, who converted
to Christianity in 1825, led the kingdom's highest chiefs in lending the prestige and power of
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quickly immersed in Anglo-American thought and perceptions.46
their offices to the enforcement of a series of moral reforms. See BRADLEY, supra note 45, at
169. Despite admonitions against interfering with the political landscape, the missionaries took
advantage of the willingness of the kingdom's leaders to put forth a program of moral legislation
which "substituted the ideals of rural New England for the folkways of a Polynesian
archipelago." Id. at 168. Growing commercial interests and the presence of foreigners also
pushed the kingdom toward legislation that reflected western influences and values. See
KUYKENDAIL, supra note 45, at 120-26.
46 Prior to the arrival of Protestant missionaries from New England in 1820, the status of
women in Hawai'i developed against a frame of reference which differed in significant ways
from that experienced by married women on the North American continent. See Judith R.
Gething, Christianity and Coverture: Impact on the Legal Status of Women in Hawaii,
1820-1920, 11 HAWAI'IAN J. OF HIST. 193 (1977). Until 1819 when it was abolished by
Liholiho (Kamehameha II), Hawai'i had a kapu system which separated men from women in
certain aspects of daily life on the assumption that women had a polluting effect. While this
might suggest another system that institutionalized the diminution of women, the kapu system
did not tell the whole story. Women, in fact, could wield great power in pre-missionary
Hawai'i, and who was positioned to do so depended less on a binary system of male-female
categories, and more on a matrix consisting of male-female, chiefly-commoner groupings. See
JOCELYN LNNEKiN, SACRED QUEENS AND WOMEN OF CONSEQUENCE-RANK, GENDER, AND
COLONIAISM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 75 (1990).
The dissimilarity was amplified by the different system of land tenure which existed in pre-
missionary Hawai'i. Not a commodity to be bought, sold or owned, land in pre-contact Hawai'i
had a deep cultural and religious significance which made stewardship rather than ownership
the hallmark of land tenure in Hawai'i. Land was to be cherished and cared for rather than
merely used. See LI-KALA KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES 25-26, 51
(1992). Yet there was a hierarchical system for control of the land. What was present in
Hawai'i prior to the ascension of Kamehameha I was akin to a feudal system wherein land was
vested in the Mo'i (the King who was the paramount chief) of each island who in turn
apportioned control and possession to members of the class of high chiefs or Ali'i Nui. Upon
the arrival of a new Mo'i (either through succession or conquest), all control of land reverted
to him or her for reapportionment according to his or her dictates in consultation with a council
of Ali'i Nui. See id. at 51-52.
After Kamehameha united all major islands except for Kauai in 1795, he gave large tracts
of land in perpetuity to four Ali'i Nui who had contributed to the great Mo'i's rise to power.
These four were allowed to pass their interest to their descendants. See id. Thus began a system
of land inheritance and gifting which developed and expanded to bring land into the control of
female Ali'i Nui and lesser chiefs. See id at 133. In the case of inheritance, it was common for
female Ali'i to pass their interest to female descendants. See id.
The influence of the missionaries and their western view of gender positions within families
quickly took hold following their arrival in 1820 and was clearly reflected in laws promulgated
by the Hawaiian monarchy beginning in the 1840's. Within a short period of time, the
missionary influence, at least as reflected by early Hawaiian legal codes, managed to turn
traditional Hawai'i into a "remarkably close copy of mid-19th century New England." Gething,
supra note 46, at 195.
This stark and rapid shift in the status of women provoked suffragist Susan B. Anthony to
remark:
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It is therefore helpful to look at some of the developments in the law
regarding married women and property leading to the mid-1800's when
Hawai'i began its immersion into a more western, specifically Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
1. Early developments
Because divorces in most Anglo-American jurisdictions did not become
prevalent until the nineteenth century,47 early developments in spouse-related
I have been overflowing with wrath ever since the proposal was made to engraft our half-
barbaric form of government on Hawai'i and our other new possessions. I have been
studying how to save, not them, but ourselves, from disgrace. This is the first time the
United States has ever tried to foist upon a new people the exclusively masculine form of
government.
Id. at 213.
Two Political Science professors at the University of Hawai'i metaphorized the decision of
Protestant missionaries to protect, rescue and ultimately dominate Hawaiian society as a
peculiarly patriarchal imposition upon a Hawai'i that had been perceived as the "weak female
needing manly protection from a dangerous world." Kathy Ferguson & Phyllis Turnbull,
Masculine Order and Feminine Hawaii: From Missionaries to the Military, 38 SOCIAL
PROCESS 96 (1997). In their article, they discuss how the missionaries (and military systems)
in Hawai'i have contributed to and shaped the patriarchal concepts of our day to day society.
See id.
47 Professor Lawrence Friedman described this dearth:
England had been a "divorceless society," and remained that way until 1857. There
was no way to get a judicial divorce. The very wealthy might squeeze a rare private bill
of divorce out of Parliament. Between 1800 and 1836 there were, on the average, three
of these a year. For the rest, unhappy husbands and wives had to be satisfied with
annulment (no easy matter), or divorce from bed and board (a mensa et thoro), a form of
legal separation which did not entitle either spouse to marry again. The most common
"solutions," of course, when a marriage broke down, were adultery and desertion.
In the colonial period, the South was generally faithful to English tradition. Absolute
divorce was unknown, divorce from bed and board very rare. In New England, however,
courts and legislatures occasionally granted divorce. In Pennsylvania, Penn's laws of
1682 gave spouses the right to a "Bill of Divorcement" if their marriage partner was
convicted of adultery. Later, the governor or lieutenant governor was empowered to
dissolve marriages on grounds of incest, adultery, bigamy, or homosexuality. There is no
evidence that the governor ever used this power. Still later, the general assembly took
divorce into its own hands. The English privy council disapproved of this practice, and,
in the 1770's, disallowed legislative divorces in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New
Hampshire. The Revolution, of course, put an end to the privy council's power.
After Independence, the law and practice of divorce began to change; but regional
differences remained quite strong. In the South, divorce continued to be unusual. The
extreme case was South Carolina. Henry William Desaussure, writing in 1817, stated
flatly that South Carolina had never granted a single divorce. He was right. There was no
such thing as absolute divorce in South Carolina, throughout the 19th century. In other
Southern states, legislatures dissolved marriages by passing private divorce laws ....
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property law tended to forge around intact marriages.4" These developments
either dictated how property was held or controlled during marriage, or
defined how property was distributed. upon the death of a spouse.49 They
remain relevant, however, to the divorce context in the way they reflected and
North of the Mason-Dixon line, courtroom divorce became the normal mode, rather
than legislative divorce. Pennsylvania passed a general divorce law in 1785,
Massachusetts one year later. Every New England state had a divorce law before 1800,
along with New York, New Jersey, and Tennessee. Grounds for divorce varied somewhat
from state to state.
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204-05 (2d ed. 1985).
The story was scripted differently in Hawai'i at least during the pre-missionary period. Prior
to the arrival of Protestant missionaries from New England in 1820, marriage and divorce
customs were described as "quite informal" leading to a fluidity in the formulation and
dissolution of unions:
[E]xcept for the people of superior rank, there was very little in the way of ceremony
connected with marriage. Divorce consisted merely in quitting and either party was free
to terminate the arrangement at will, but there was some sentiment against changing wives
frequently .... A man might have two or more wives and, at the same time, each wife
might have two or more husbands.
Robert C. Schmitt & Rose C. Strombel, Marriage and Divorce in Hawai'i Before 1870 in
HAWAI'I HISTORICAL REVIEW, SELECrED READINGS 241 (Richard A. Greer ed., 1969).
Missionary influences quickly aligned Hawai'i's marriage and divorce customs with those
on the mainland United States, institutionalizing procedures for and restrictions on marriages
and divorces. The first Christian marriage among Hawaiians occurred on August 11, 1822. See
id In 1826, Hoapili, the governor of Maui who himself had entered into a Christian marriage
in 1823, outlawed at will unions and dissolutions on his island. See id. In the same year,
missionaries laid the foundation for a fault-based process for divorce, passing a resolution which
stated "an aggrieved party justly complaining of adultery, or willful desertion... may, by con-
sent of the proper authorities, be married to another... [and] . . . that the deserting party cannot
contract a new marriage... until the deserted is known to be fairly divorced." Id. at 243.
Under the guidance of Christian convert and kuhina-nui Kaahumanu, young Kauikeaouli
(Kamehameha III) on September 21, 1829 proclaimed in No Ka Moe Kolohe ("Law Against
Licentiousness") the following:
If a man sleeps with a woman and his wife be displeased and wish to be separated she
may apply to the Governor who shall grant a divorce and they shall be separated. If the
wife wish to leave him and marry again she may but the guilty husband shall not be at
liberty to marry again until the death of his first wife.
Id.
The king reworded this in 1835, proclaiming that:
[I]f the husband of the adulterous wife, or wife of the adulterous husband desires to be
separated for life on account of disgust arising from frequent adultery and bad conduct,
let a bill of divorcement be given and let them separate; but the adulterous persons shall
by no means marry again till the death of the party forsaken.
Id.
The years that followed saw a broadening in the grounds for divorce. In 1853, jurisdiction
over the granting of divorces moved from the governor to the courts. See id. at 244.
" See generally, CLARK supra note 34, at 498-524.
49 See id.
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institutionalized the incremental shifts in gender roles and positions, explained
the framework of property rights and obligations between spouses, and
provided a starting point for deciding how such rights and obligations might
shift when marriages dissolved. Thus, some of the developments described
below should be understood as doctrines, devices or practices that arose
outside the divorce context but later became useful in framing the discussion
of property division incident to divorce.
As stated earlier, one could generally characterize the early common law
framework as being based upon the "unity" of husband and wife with the
emergent unit being heavily, if not wholly dominated by the husband.50
'0 In Peters v. Peters, 63 Haw. 653, 634 P.2d 586 (1977), the Hawai'i Supreme Court
reviewed the history of gender positions within marriages enroute to deciding whether to uphold
the then-existing doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. The court quoted from William
Blackstone's Commentaries on English Law to describe the merging of the wife's identity into
her husband's:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law: (1) that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection,
and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme
covert, foemina viro cooperta; it is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and
influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is
called her coverture. Upon this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife,
depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by
the marriage.
Id. at 656, 64 P.2d at 588 n.2 (citing 1 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 442 (1765)).
Interestingly, the quote mixes two images. The first is the pure merging of legal identities
into a unit that is essentially the husband. Whether there was simply a death of the woman's
identity or a mere suspension during the marriage seems moot; the effect was the same at least
during the course of the marriage. The second image is that of the husband serving as a
guardian and protector, allowing the woman to maintain a separate albeit inferior identity
characterized by weakness, dependency and vulnerability. The latter has been argued by some
as a counter against the generally accepted notion of "unity" between husband and wife.
Pollock and Maitland, for example, viewed the "unity" concept as one which reduced women
to "a thing or somewhat that is neither thing nor person." In their view, what really existed was
an "exaggerated guardianship" which at least preserved a woman's personhood. See POLLOCK
& MArrLAND, supra note 44, at 405-06. Others have responded that requiring husbands to save
their wives from their assumed incompetence did not place women in a significantly better
position and dismiss it as "(un)convincing apologia." See WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK & MICHAEL
J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY LAW 4 n.14 (2d ed. 1971).
Regardless of which model we accept--the merged identity model, the guardianship model
or a hybrid--common law property doctrines had a decidedly protective or paternalistic attitude
toward women. For example, the concept of "dower", or the legal right or interest that a wife
acquired by marriage in the estate of her husband, was developed to protect a wife from
destitution in the event of widowhood. See Louis CANNELORA, SUMMARY OFTHE HAwAI'I LAW
OF DOWER AND CURTESY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 1 (1971). The dower, which under
common law became quantified as one-third of all lands owned by the husband during the
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Property rules relating to spouses reflected this, giving to the husband
dominion over the property brought into the marriage by the wife or acquired
by her during the marriage.5' In the rare instances where a marriage was
coverture or marriage, was protected to the extent that the husband could not alienate it by
selling lands during the marriage without first receiving the consent of the wife by way of
joining in the conveyance. As an alternative, the husband could will to his wife an equivalent
life estate in lands, thereby skirting the dower. See ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE
CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-1861, 10-11 (1987).
S" Pollock and Maitland roughly summarized the final shape that common law took. A few
sentences from that summary are as follows:
1. In the lands of which the wife is tenant in fee whether they belonged to her at the date
of the marriage or came to her during the marriage, the husband has an estate which will
endure during the marriage, and this he can alienate without her concurrence. If a child
is born of the marriage, thenceforth the husband as tenant of the curtesy has an estate
which will endure for the whole of his life, and this he can alienate without the wife's
concurrence. The husband by himself has no greater power of alienation than is here
stated; he can not confer an estate which will endure after the end of the marriage or (as
the case may be) after his own death. The wife has during the marriage no power to
alienate her land without her husband's concurrence.
2. Our law institutes no community even of movables between husband and wife.
Whatever movables the wife has at the date of the marriage, becomes the husband's, and
the husband is entitled to take possession of and thereby to make his own whatever
movables she becomes entitled to during the marriage, and without her concurrence he
can sue for all debts that are due to her.
3. Our common law-but we have seen that this rule is not very old-assured no share
of the husband's personality to the widow. He can, even by his will, give all of it away
from her except her necessary clothes, and with that exception his creditors can take all
of it. A further exception, of which there is not much to be read, is made of jewels,
trinkets and ornaments of the person, under the name of paraphernalia. The husband
may sell or give these away in his lifetime, and even after his death they may be taken for
his debts; but he cannot give them away by will.
4. During the marriage the husband is in effect liable to the whole extent of his property
for debts incurred or wrongs committed by his wife before the marriage, also for wrongs
committed during the marriage. The action is against him and her as co-defendants.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 44, at 403-05.
As described in the Peters decision, Hawai'i codified this "ancient but unvenerated concept
of the female marriage partner's legal subjugation" in 1846 as part of Act 2, 1 Statute Laws of
His Majesty Kamehameha III. In relevant part, the statute read:
The wife, whether married in pursuance of this article or heretofore, or whether validly
married in this kingdom or in some other country, and residing in this, shall be deemed
for all civil purposes, to be merged in her husband, and civilly dead. She shall not, with-
out his consent, unless otherwise stipulated by anterior contract, have legal power to make
contracts, or to alienate and dispose of property-she shall not be civilly responsible in
any court of justice, without joining her husband in the suit, and she shall in no case be
liable to imprisonment in a civil action. The husband shall be personally responsible in
damages, for all the tortuous [sic] acts of his wife; for assaults, for slanders, for libels and
for consequential injuries done by her to any person or persons in this kingdom.
Peters, 63 Haw. at 657, 634 P.2d at 589 n.3 (citing Act 2, 1 Statute Laws of His Majesty
Kamehameha III).
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dissolved, property division generally depended on who held title to the
property or contributed the funds to acquire it. It was essentially an owner-
driven distribution.52 While this appeared to offer relief to the wife by letting
her recoup her separate property, it actually favored husbands, in light of the
general incapacity of married women at the time to hold or acquire property.53
Many wives simply had little to recoup.
2. Getting around legal disabilities of the common law
In the seventeenth century, England's courts of chancery or equity' began
to uphold devices created to reverse or circumvent the legal disabilities
suffered by married women.55 For example, wealthy fathers seeking to
preserve the right of property management and use for their daughters resorted
to trusts as a way of bypassing their sons-in-law.56 This gave the daughter a
52 See JACOB, supra note 22, at 113; BRETr R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
PROPERTY 4 (2d ed. 1994); see also RICHARD H. CHUSED, PRIVATE ACTS IN PUBLIC PLACES, A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 64 (1994).
53 See JACOB, supra note 22, at 113. This, in large part, caused alimony to become the
primary form of post-divorce support. Support of the ex-wife was considered, at least until the
eighteenth century, to be an extension of the husband's duty to support during marriage. The
heritage for this view of alimony came from England where absolute divorces were prohibited
until the mid-1800's. English courts, however, were authorized to grant divorce a mensa et
thoro, which amounted to separations short of legal dissolution. The support which the husband
was ordered to pay his estranged wife was considered to be no more than what he was expected
to do since the marriage was still technically intact. See CLARK, supra note 34, at 220-21.
5" England's equity courts were a response to the strictures of the common law. Individuals
who were unable to gain justice through the formal application of common law could
theoretically approach the king, who was considered the "fountainhead" of justice, for an
alternative decision based on considerations of fairness. The original arbiters of equity were the
king's secretary known as the chancellor.. Early chancellors were clergymen who were more
familiar with church or canonical teachings than the common law. Their rulings and grants of
relief were therefore based on moral or ethical grounds. As the demand for such rulings
increased, a separate court system, consisting of courts of chancery or equity, was devised to
consider and grant equitable relief. See GEORGE L. CLARK, EQUITY-AN ANALYSIS AND
DISCUSSION OF MODERN EQUITY PROBLEMS 3-4 (1919).
5' See CLARK, supra note 34, at 501. It should be pointed out that under English common
law, unmarried women enjoyed legal property rights far in excess to that of married women.
For example, they could contract, hold title, and bring litigation. However, even these rights
paled against those held by the men of the times. See id. at 498.
56 If the father had fully gifted the property to the daughter, the son-in-law would have
assumed control over it. While the property was not his in title, the husband exercised control
by virtue of being the "guardian" of the marital estate, a part of which was the property brought
into the marriage by the wife or acquired by her by gift or inheritance during the marriage. The
control would continue through the marriage, and through the life of the husband if a child was
born of the marriage.
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modicum of control and use of property, often in the form of land, without
making an outright gift to her.57 By separating use and control from title,
these trusts effectively side-stepped the common law rule which enabled a
husband to control property held in his wife's name.5" Challenges to such
trusts were rejected by the equity courts,59 on the grounds that the donor of the
property (the father in the above example) had as an incident of ownership, the
absolute right to dispose of it upon conditions and limitations of his
choosing.' The endorsement of these trusts by the chancery courts created
separate estates of equity for married women, estates within which women
were able to exercise legal rights of control and use that the common law took
from them.
6'
American courts were either slow or inconsistent62 in following the lead of
England's chancery courts, thereby leaving it to state legislatures to develop
statutory reforms.63 And they acted.64 Struck by a wave of public feminist
A thorough treatment of how separate estates for women evolved in England using devices
such as trusts is found in MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY
AMERICA 84-87 (1986).
57 See id. at 85-86.
58 See JACOB, supra note 22, at 107.
'9 Such trusts were not recognized by common law courts; only courts of equity provided
a supportive forum. See WARBASSE, supra note 50, at 30.
60 See 2 JAIRUS WARE PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OFTRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 1111(7th
ed., revised and enlarged by Raymond C. Baldes, 1929).
61 See CLARK, supra note 34, at 502.
62 Marylynn Salmon recounted several reasons why these doctrines and practices emanating
from England's chancery courts failed to catch on rapidly in America. See SALMON, supra note
56. First, several colonies simply chose not to duplicate England's chancery court system and
such colonies often failed to adopt equitable rules on women's separate estates. While some
common law courts tried to handle questions of equity, they were hampered by a lack of tradi-
tion in equity law. See id. at 82. Second, the English model was itself still undergoing transi-
tion and refinement. Transferring those developments across the Atlantic was understandably
slow given the primitive communication and transportation modes of the time. See id. at 88.
Third, the movement in England arose from the country's moneyed classes, those who had ade-
quate property for the creation of separate estates to be a concern. Given the far less endowed
populations in America, the ground for the movement to develop was less fertile. See id.
Finally she suggested that the difficulties of transplanting feudal English practices into an
increasingly commercial America may have accounted for the hesitation. For example, tying
large parcels of land into a trust made them either unavailable to be mortgaged against, or
inaccessible to creditors of the husband, the marriage partner who was far more likely to be
invested in commercial pursuits. See id. at 93.
63 See CLARK, supra note 34, at 502.
Elizabeth Warbasse described how in the 1820's a movement within state legislatures
toward statutory codification became a prelude to the grand reforms reflected in the Married
Women's Property Acts. See WARBASSE, supra note 50, at 57. The codification movement,
as described by Lawrence Friedman, grew out the of the notion that the common law was no
longer an adequate system and that the European practice of codification offered a better model:
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sentiment in the nineteenth century, states began to enact such remedies which
collectively came to be known as the Married Women's Property Acts.65
Although these laws were not intended to and did not by themselves bring
women fully to the table with men, they at least helped to institutionalize the
notion that married women could legally own and control property.
Popular acceptance of this notion was a building block in bringing common
law states closer to the partnership model already embraced by the community
property system. Although these laws took on different incarnations
depending on the enacting state, one unifying theme was that certain types of
property were to be deemed the wife's separate property, subject at least
theoretically to her control. More specifically, these laws reserved for married
women increased dominion over property they brought into the marriage, as
well as, property they acquired during marriage as gifts and inheritances, or
in some cases, through earnings.
3. Hawai'i's adoption of the common law and the enactment of the
Married Women's Property Act
Even before the statutory adoption of English common law in 1892,66
The smell of feudalism still oozed from the pores of the common law. To men like
Jeremy Bentham and his followers in England, and David Dudley Field, Edward
Livingston, and others in America, the common law was totally unsuited for an Age of
Reason. It was huge and shapeless. Common-law principles had to be painfully extracted
from a jungle of words. "The law" was an amorphous entity, a ghost, scattered in little
bits and pieces among hundreds of case-reports, in hundreds of different books. Nobody
knew what was and was not law. Why not gather together the real principles of law, put
them together, and build a simple, complete and sensible code? The French had shown
the way with the Code Napoleon. Louisiana was at least something of an American
demonstration.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 403.
Warbasse opined that the move to codify the common law necessitated a critical attitude
toward the common law thereby creating an environment for creative thought and reform. See
WARBASSE, supra note 50, at 57. And although the codification movement did not ultimately
supplant the common law, it did result in the reduction of many legal principles to writing. This
process created opportunities to rethink these principles and to make changes as the laws were
being written. See id. at 63-72.
65 See CLARK, supra note 34, at 502-04.
This enactment is presently codified under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1-1. It reads:
The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is
declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise
expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the
State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage;
provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by
the written laws of the United States or of the State.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-1 (MICHIE 1995).
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Hawai'i's developing case law reflected a clear patriarchal bent. For example,
in Hookii v. Nicholson,67 the Supreme Court of the Hawaiian Kingdom found
that "[t]here [could] be no question as to the general principle of law, that the
husband [was] exclusively entitled to the society and service of the wife, and
that no contract made with the wife in contravention of, or affecting the rights
of the husband [was] valid without his consent. '61 In Maa v. Administratrix
of the Estate of Kalua,69 the supreme court looked to common law authorities
to support its holding that if a husband reduced his wife's choses in action (the
right to pursue repayment of a personal loan, in this case) to possession, said
choses became his entitlement and not his wife's.70  Likewise, in
Riemenschneider v. Kalaehao,7" the court found that a carriage and three
horses purchased by a married woman out of the proceeds of the sale of land
belonging to her, were nonetheless the property of her husband by virtue of
The Anglo-American common law actually came to Hawai'i well before the statutory
adoption of common law principles in 1892. In 1844, John Ricord was appointed attorney
general by Kauikeaouli (Kamehameha III). See KUYKENDAU, supra note 45, at 236. Under
Ricord's leadership, an expanded formal judiciary developed as a response to a growing number
of cases that, in other countries, would have been disposed of by courts of equity, probate or
admiralty. See id. at 242. Under Ricord's advice and with his help, Kekuanaoa, then governor
and judge of Oahu, assumed jurisdiction of such cases and began deciding them on principles
of American and English jurisprudence. See id. As the only trained lawyer in the kingdom,
Ricord was called upon to guide Kekuanaoa's decisions which he did by way of written
opinions that drew heavily on Anglo-American common and civil laws. See id.
67 1 Haw. 467 (1856). This case was included in the initial compilation of reported
decisions issued between 1847-1857 and originally published in 1857.
6' Id. at 468. The case was based on a challenge by working women, most of whom were
married, against the unfair treatment of their employer, merchant tailor C.H. Nicholson. See id.
at 467-68. The decision reflected the fact that women were already working outside the home
and were daring enough to challenge perceived mistreatment by their male employer. The
plaintiffs' complaint was largely motivated by decreased wages brought on by Nicholson's
introduction of a sewing machine which curtailed the need for hand sewing. See id. at 469-70.
The women sought a nullification of their employment contract with Nicholson, arguing that
their husbands had not specifically consented to their employment contract. See id at 468. The
court rejected the argument by inferring consent. See id. at 469.
' 4 Haw. 201 (1879).
70 See id. at 203-05. The wife, Maa, was married to Kekai at the time that she made a $75
loan to Kalua in 1858. See id. at 202. Maa argued that the money was her property and in her
possession when she made the loan, and that she was therefore individually entitled to recover
the debt. See id In her lawsuit, she sought to avoid the argument that the right to sue belonged
to Kekai who died subsequent to the making of the loan. See id. The court apparently found
that Kekai had in fact reduced all of Maa's money "to his possession" (even though the money
was in her hands) by virtue of the marriage and that any loan she made was therefore as her
husband's agent and not in her own right. See id. at 204. He (or his estate) was thus entitled
to repayment and not Maa. See id. at 204-05.
7' 5 Haw. 550 (1886).
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the marriage.' In Mutch v. Holau73 the high court even found the husband's
control to extend premaritally and voided an engaged woman's premarital (but
post-betrothal) transfer of real property to a brother, calling the conveyance
a "surreptitious" circumvention of the prospective husband's equitable
rights.74
Conversely, the court upheld a husband's duty to support his wife as an
incident of the marriage even beyond a decision to separate. For example, in
Luka v. Poohina"5 and Kekoa v. Borden" the court stated the general rule
regarding a married woman's right to necessaries from her husband, and that
a wife could contract for necessaries as an agent of her husband. Alimony
was considered an extension of the husband's duty to support during marriage,
"a consequence of the merger of the legal existence of the wife, in that of the
husband."'
' See id. at 551-53. Interestingly, this was a case between the estate of the wife's first
husband (William Harbottle) and the wife's second husband (William Kalaehao). See id at 550.
Kalaehao was charged by the deceased's estate for the wrongful conversion of the subject
carriage and horses. See id. Although the opinion is not clear on this point, the facts suggest
that Kalaehao, as the second husband, insisted on the control of the subject horses and carriage
in direct challenge to the estate of Harbottle. See id. The conflict would not seem unusual
given the norms of the time. The issue was reduced to which husband had control, the
resolution of which depended on whether the property was the wife's beyond the death of her
first husband thereby making it available for control by the second husband. The court found
that the property belonged to the wife and was therefore subject to the control of her current
husband. See id at 552.
7' 5 Haw. 316 (1885).
74 See id. at 317. It is not clear from the opinion if the betrothed couple ever married.
However, there is allusion to the birth of a child. See id.
15 5 Haw. 695 (1876). In this case, the wife separated from her husband on account of his
adultery. See id Subsequently, she allegedly engaged in adultery and the question was whether
her misconduct barred her from further support from her husband. See id at 695-96. The court
determined that the "notoriety" of her adultery had to be so severe that it withdrew her from the
protection of the coverture. See id. at 697. Otherwise, husband was not entitled to an
instruction that his wife's adultery served as a defense to his duty to provide necessaries. See
id.
76 5 Haw. 23 (1883). This case posed the interesting situation of a wife's attorney seeking
payment of fees from a husband on the theory that the wife's attorney fees were "necessaries".
See id. at 23. The attorney had defended the wife in a criminal action based on her desertion
of her husband. See id. at 24.
The court ruled that had there been misconduct by the husband which justified either the
wife's separation or divorce from him, she could have brought the appropriate action and re-
quested an award of alimony or post-separation support. See id. at 24. However, the case at bar
failed to present such facts thus resulting in a denial of the attorney's petition. See id. at 24-25.
77 Kaelemakule v. Kaelemakule, 33 Haw. 268, 270 (1934). This was part of a larger quote
which read in pertinent part:
The common law imposes upon the husband the duty to support his wife so long as she
is free from conjugal fault and our statute recognizes such duty. Speaking of this
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The first attempts to codify rules relating to marriage and property adopted
and further institutionalized this patriarchal bent. The Civil Code of the
Hawaiian Islands was passed in 1859 and included a section which read "[t]he
wife, whether married in pursuance of this article or heretofore, or whether
validly married in this kingdom or in some other country, and residing in this,
shall be deemed for all civil purposes, to be merged in her husband, and civilly
dead.""8 As a result, she could not, as a general principle, enter into contracts
or dispose of property without her husband's consent.79 At the same time, he
was personally responsible for damages resulting from tortious acts by the
wife.80 Upon marriage, the law made the husband the "virtual owner" of all
movable property belonging to the wife before the marriage as well as
movable property acquired during the marriage."s Further, he could control
and enjoy the profits of the wife's fixed or immovable property which she
either owned prior to the marriage or acquired during the marriage. 2 His duty
to support his wife was also affirmed in the Hawaiian Civil Code.
8 3
By 1888, however, the move to reverse the legal disabilities of married
women came to the Hawaiian Kingdom through the adoption of Hawai'i's
incarnation of the Married Women's Property Act. 4 These laws were
described as "destroy[ing] the common law fiction of the unity of husband and
common-law duty it was said by Chief Justice Brickell in Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 89,
96: "The common law compelled him" (the husband) "to maintain his wife-to supply
her with necessaries suitable for her situation, and corresponding with his social position,
and the degree of his fortune. If the husband neglects this duty the wife may on his credit,
against his will, obtain necessaries, and he will be liable for them. In such case she is
presumed to have authority to bind him, but the presumption is made only to enforce a
performance of duty. Schouler's Dom. Rel., 85; 2 Kent. 128; Tyler ofi Inf. and Cov., 340.
This duty of the husband did not arise from, nor was it solely dependent on, the
common-law principle, that marriage was a gift of the husband of the wife's estate-that
he thereby became vested with an ownership qualified or absolute, of her property, and
rights of property. The duty was as obligatory on the husband, to whom the wife brought
no portion, as on him who had received the largest fortune. It was a consequence of the
merger of the legal existence of the wife, in that of the husband."
Id.
78 The Civil Code of the Hawaiian Islands, § 1287 (1859).
79 See id.
go See id.
" See id. § 1286.
82 See id.
83 See id.
8 These laws were codified as Chapter 175, §§ 2993 - 3013 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii,
1925.
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wife."85 Under these laws, married women in Hawai'i retained their separate
real and personal property throughout the marriage, free from the control of
their husbands.8 6 Among other things, they could enter into contracts,8 7 be
appointed "executrix, administratrix, guardian or trustee", 88 sue and be sued
individually, 9 work or transact business on an account separate from their
husbands,' and have their separate property protected from attack by their
85 First Nat'l Bank v. Gaines, 16 Haw. 731, 733 (1905).
Prior to 1888, HawaiTs statutes supported the common law tradition of giving to the
husband dominion of all property, as well as, the concomitant obligation to support. Section
1286 of the Compiled Laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom (1884) delineated this control and
obligation:
§ 1286. The husband, whether married in pursuance of this article, or heretofore, or
whether validly married in this Kingdom or in some other country, and residing in this,
shall be accountable in his own property, for all the debts contracted by his wife anterior
to, and during marriage; to any of which debts, he may set up the same defense she could
have interposed had she remained sole. The husband shall be bound in law to maintain,
provide for, and support his wife during marriage, in the same style and manner in which
he supports and maintains himself. The husband shall, in virtue of his marriage, and in
consideration of the responsibilities imposed on him by law, be the virtual owner, except
otherwise stipulated by express marriage contract, of all movable property belonging to
his wife anterior to marriage, and of all movable property accruing to her after marriage;
over all of which movable property he shall, unless otherwise stipulated by contract, have
absolute control for the purposes of sale or otherwise, and the same shall be equally liable
with his own for his private debts. The husband shall in virtue of his marriage, unless
otherwise stipulated by express contract, have the custody, use and usufruct, rents, issues
and profits of all property of a fixed and immovable nature, belonging to his wife before
marriage, or accruing to her after marriage; and he may, with her written consent, rent or
otherwise dispose of the same for any term not exceeding the term of his natural life:
provided, that in case his wife shall first die, the husband legally married as aforesaid,
shall cease to have control over the immovable and fixed property of his wife, and the
same shall immediately descend to her heirs as if she had died sole, unless there happens
to be legitimate issue of the marriage within the age of legal majority; in which case the
husband shall continue to enjoy a curtesy in said immovable or fixed property, until such
issue shall attain majority, when the same shall descend to the heir or heirs of the body
of the wife. The immovable and fixed property of the wife shall not be liable to be sold
for the payment of the husband's debts, whether contracted in his own behalf solely, or
in support of or for the use of his wife after marriage. But such immovable and fixed
property may be legally sold on execution to satisfy the debts contracted by the wife
before marriage, if no property of the husband be found to satisfy the same.
Compiled Laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, § 1286 (1884).
6 See Revised Laws of Hawai'i § 2993 (1925) (current version at HAw. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 572-25 (Michie 1997)).
8 See id. § 2994 (current version at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-22 (Michie 1997)).
88 Id. § 2996 (current version at HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-26 (Michie 1997)).
9 See id. § 2998 (current version at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-28 (Michie 1997)).
9 See id. §§ 2995 and 3003, 1925 Revised Laws of Hawai'i 1071, 1072.
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husbands' creditors. 91
Even under these laws, however, a wife's dominion was not unfettered. For
example, a significant limitation on a married woman's ability to control her
property was that she could not validly sell or mortgage her real estate without
the written consent of her husband.' Likewise, she could not make contracts
for personal service without her husband's written consent.93 With time, some
of these limitations disappeared. 94
C. Embracing the Partnership Mode: Hawai'i as a Community Property
State-A Four Year Fling
With the evolution of gender roles well underway, Hawai'i in the 1940's
was positioned to consider adopting a community property scheme that, by its
general reliance upon a model of equal partnership between spouses, would
further acknowledge and institutionalize women's increasingly independent
and powerful place in society and the family. Hawai'i took that step in 1945
when it enacted legislation to become a community property state. In the
Community Property Act of Hawai'i of 1945, Hawai'i's territorial legislature
recognized "the partnership interests of the husband and the wife in accumula-
tions subsequent to marriage."95 In passing the bill out of committee, the
territorial house judiciary committee wrote:
In theory the marital relationship in respect of property acquired during its
existence is a community of which each spouse is a member, equally contribut-
ing by his or her industry to its prosperity. The avowed object and purpose of
the community system is to place husband and wife on an equal footing as to
their property rights. The community estate is created by law as an incident of
marriage. The property owned by each spouse before marriage remains his or
her separate estate, while all that is acquired during coverture otherwise than by
gift, descent, or devise becomes community property.'
In reviewing the community property law, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
affirmed the notion that "the wife's labors in the home are substantially
commensurate with the efforts of the husband in marital economic gain."97 It
9' See id. § 2999 (current version at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-23 (Michie 1997)).
9 See id. § 2993 (this prohibition was repealed in 1925).
9 See id. § 2994 (this prohibition was repealed in 1945).
14 See, e.g., supra notes 92-93 and parenthetical explanations. However, the "revolution"
was far from over. In the decades that followed, progress was slow, hard fought and
incremental. See infra notes 107, 118, 122, 123 and accompanying text. The struggle continues
today.
" Bulgo v. Bulgo, 41 Haw. 578, 586 (1957).
96 Id.
9' Id. This review of the community law system actually occurred seven years after the
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traced the Spanish origins of the community property system noting that "[tihe
basic idea of the Spanish law was that upon marriage the husband and wife
became partners as to subsequent 'gains and acquests' with the profits of the
partnership to be divided equally upon its dissolution.'"" The court observed
that while each spouse retained ownership of his or her separate property,
"each [spouse] unselfishly and unhesitantly had at heart the success and well-
being of the marital union and that, accordingly, the fruits and income of all
property of each naturally were to be devoted to the benefit of the marital
union."99
Even while accepting the precepts of equal partnership, however, Hawai'i's
incarnation of community property tended to favor the husband, at least in its
paternalistic view of him as the "guardian of the coverture." For example, the
husband controlled the management of all community property that did not
stand in the wife's name."° He also maintained the obligation to support his
wife and children.' Interestingly, the legislature also retained its laws on
dower and curtesy, thereby keeping in place the concept that a husband's
earnings could be deemed to belong to him rather than to the marriage except
for his general obligation to support his family. Reconciling this with the
community property notion that the labors and fruits of the marriage belonged
to the partnership and not to the individual spouses posed a difficult tension.
The new scheme and the paradigm shift it presented was nonetheless
important enough to move the territorial bar to educate itself and the public on
what it all meant. At the suggestion of the territorial attorney general, the bar
president commissioned a panel of attorneys to review and analyze its
provisions. °' From the ensuing report came a series of seven articles that ran
system had already been repealed. The court's review was necessitated by the facts of the case
which concerned holdings and liabilities subject to the territorial community property laws in
effect between 1945-1949. In this case, the appellant argued that the community property law
resulted in an unconstitutional taking of his property to the extent that it mandated an equal split
of income arising from property that appellant owned solely and separately before the April 12,
1945 effective date of the law. See id at 580. The court rejected appellant's argument, noting
that husbands, even under the community property scheme, maintained control over the
community's income during the marriage. See id. at 587.
98 Id. at 581.
99 Id. at 581-82.
"0 1945 Haw. Sess. Laws 311, 314-15 (repealed 1949).
101 Id. § 12391.13(h) (repealed 1949).
" C. Nils Tavares, then Attorney General for the Territory of Hawai'i, asked the Bar
Association of Hawai'i to provide a summary and analysis of the community property law.
Heaton Wrenn, who was president of the bar, appointed Livingston Jenks, Eugene H. Beebe and
Eugene K. Kai to perform the study with the additional charge that it be written in a form that
could be easily understandable by the public. The report, entitled "Hawai'i's Community
Property Law, An Analysis by a Special Committee of the Bar Association of Hawai'i," was
completed on June 13, 1945 and included a section of anticipated questions and answers.
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in the Star Bulletin in June 1945.'03 In addition, at the prompting of concerned
Honolulu attorneys, the University of Hawai'i Board of Regents voted to
recommend action to seek a property law expert from the mainland to give a
series of lectures on community property. 4
Only four years after passage, however, the community property law
scheme was repealed. During the 1949 legislative session, the primary
motivation for adopting the community property scheme became clear. Far
from seeking some modicum of equality, it was evident that the Community
Property Act had been adopted primarily to take advantage of federal tax
provisions which permitted husbands and wives to split incomes in community
property jurisdictions; when the Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1948
to permit spouses to split income even in non-community property states,
Hawai'i's "need" to enact a community property law evaporated.1
0 5
03 These articles, entitled "Facts on Community Property Law - Analyzed for Information
of the Public", ran in the Honolulu Star Bulletin on June 11, 1945 through June 14, 1945 and
June 18 through June 20, 1945. These articles summarized the key provisions of the community
property scheme and, using a question and answer format, explained the practical effects of the
new law.
i"4 See Regents Recommend Lecture Series on New Property Law, HONOLULU STAR
BULLETIN, June 12, 1945, at 3.
105 See JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, TWENTY-FIFTH LEGISLATURE OF THE TERRITORY OF
HAwAI'I, 1579 (1949).
Legislative committee reports prior to the passage of the community property laws were
much more subtle in suggesting tax advantages as the prime if not sole reason for adopting a
community property system in the territory. A casual reading of these reports suggests that
while tax considerations were on the minds of the drafters, they did not constitute the sole or
even the most important reason. Take, for example, this paragraph from the territorial senate
judiciary committee's report:
The changes in property rights would be brought about by the bill are recommended
because they recognize the partnership interests of the husband and wife in accumulations
subsequent to marriage. Eight states have community property laws. In community
property jurisdictions married couples are able to divide their incomes for income tax
purposes, with resulting savings.
AN ACT RELATING TO TAXATION, AND AMENDING §§ 5151 AND 5252 OF THE REVISED LAWS OF
HAwAI'I 1945, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, TWENTY-THIRD LEGISLATURE OF THE TERRITORY OF
HAWAI'I, 931 (1945).
It should be noted that the decision to adopt the community property scheme in order to
benefit from then existing federal tax provisions was not unique to Hawai'i. Nebraska,
Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon and Pennsylvania were likewise motivated. See WILLIAM Q.
DEFUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 89 (1971). In
addition, community property bills were introduced but failed to pass in Alabama, Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Wisconsin. See Note, Epilogue to the Community
Property Scramble: Problems of Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332 n.4 (1950).
The specific tax advantage arose from provisions allowing each spouse in a community
property state to file a separate tax return declaring as income one-half of the marital
community's total income even if the income was earned by only one spouse (usually the
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Perhaps more telling was a Senate Judiciary Committee comment which
described a clash between what the law seemingly achieved and what the
community wanted or was ready for: 'The institution of community property
is foreign to the history and mores of Hawai'i. If community property were
to continue, it would be necessary to revise the present provisions of Chapter
301A extensively and perhaps to re-examine the laws relating to dower and
curtesy, joint tenancy, and other laws."'' 06 Thus, while the language and the
concepts of the modem partnership model were being used, Hawai'i history
ultimately records a lukewarm regard for them. 7
Interestingly, Hawai'i law still contains a section on community property
which was enacted to guide the disposition of property that remained
"community" after the 1949 repeal."' This vestige of the community property
law, which was passed concomitantly with the 1949 repeal, has offered a
prototype for the partnership model for almost fifty years. However,
restrictions on its application and its obscurity since the repeal of the
community property scheme severely limited its influence on more recent
developments of property division. Nonetheless, the four year experiment
may well have had some impact on local sensibilities in the years that
immediately followed.
One feature of the community property system in Hawai'i foreshadowed
property division incident to divorce as it exists today. Unlike some
husband). By halving the community income, each spouse was able to get into a lower tax
bracket. While this did not yield much benefit to a lower or moderate income couple, its
advantages were considerable for those with high incomes. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra
this note, at 89.
Changes in the Internal Revenue Code in 1948 ended the movement of states to the
community property system, a migration that began in 1939 when Oklahoma experimented with
an elective system which allowed married couples to decide whether to subject themselves to
community property principles. See id. at 90-91.
106 DEFUNiAK & VAUGHN, supra note 105, at 90-91.
" Community property and its underlying partnership principles served as a counter against
patriarchal order. By asserting that community property was "foreign to the history and mores
of Hawai'i," the legislature rejected this counter, expressing instead its preference for patriarchal
values.
08 This vestige of the community property scheme is found in Hawai'i Revised Statutes,
Chapter 510. Seeking to avoid confusion over how to treat property that had been subject to
community property principles during the years of 1945-1949, the territorial legislature
determined that such property would continue to be treated as community property unless
subsequently converted to separate property. Statutory provisions reflecting community
property principles were thus retained to govern the disposition of such property, and remain
viable law to this day. See also An Act to Repeal and Amend Laws Relating to Community
Property, Ch. 301 A, 1949 Haw. Sess. Laws 629 et seq. (Act 242, as set forth in the 1949
Session Laws, both repealed the community property scheme and put into place what is now
known as Hawai'i Revised Statutes Chapter 510. Sections 1 and 2 described the purpose for
retaining a vestige of the community property scheme).
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community law jurisdictions that equally divided community property as a
starting point, Hawai'i mandated that community property be divided "in such
proportions as such court, from the facts of the case, shall deem just and
equitable."'" No guidance was given on what an "equitable" division was and
it was assumed that a court could select from a wide range of possible choices,
limited only by whether its choice was fair in light of relevant circum-
stances." 0
This was a significant historical development in that it represented the first
clear grant of plenary judicial power to divide property incident to divorce."'
Although this grant disappeared with the repeal of the community property
"o9 Revised Laws of Hawai'i § 12391.14 (1945) (repealed 1949).
Ito "Fair" is a relative term. In describing early property division statutes, Brett Turner
pointed out the difficulties arising from giving judges too much discretion in deciding what was
fair. The norms and social forces at the time tended to turn the meaning of "fair" into something
that meant "pro-husband." See BRETr TURNER, EQurrABLE DISTRIBUrION OF PROPERTY 7-8 (2d
ed. 1994). As an example, Turner recounted how a "surprising number of decisions" considered
it "liberal" to award a wife a third of the marital estate at divorce, and that an equal division was
reserved for only the most unusual cases. See id. at 8.
.. Previously, Hawai'i, like other common law jurisdictions, empowered judges to compel
the husband to provide such suitable allowance for the wife, for her support, as the judge
deemed just and equitable. See Revised Laws of Hawai'i § 12226 (1945) (current version at
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47 (Michie 1997)). This was generally construed as giving courts
the power to order alimony as a post-divorce extension of the husband's duty to support his
wife. See CLARK, supra note 34, at 220-21.
As stated earlier, common law property division at divorce was essentially owner-driven.
Cf. Revised Laws of Hawai'i § 12233 (1945) (This provision entitled the wife to property in her
name at divorce. However, as written, the provision appeared to reserve this entitlement for the
wife only if the husband's adultery or "other offense amounting thereto" caused the divorce.
This was ultimately amended in 1955 with the adoption of Hawai'i's "equitable distribution"
statute. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text). But the court which had jurisdiction
of the divorce was not empowered to divide property within the divorce action. See H. R.
STAND. COMM. REP. No. 356, 28th Terr. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1955), reprinted in HAw. H. R.
JOURNAL 697 (1955)). In fact, courts settled property matters by way of extra-divorce
proceedings that were generally available for matters of property disposition. See id. For
example, if real property had to be divided, the parties would file a separate action to partition
the parcel. See id. Likewise, an action would need to be initiated to divide personal property.
The legislature was clearly concerned about this grossly inefficient process and sought to
streamline it by empowering domestic relations judges to adjudicate property division as part
of the divorce action. See id.
It should also be noted that although the domestic relations courts were not specifically
empowered to divide property until the mid-1900's, they were empowered to make lump sum
alimony awards, or "alimony in gross" that partially had the effect of property distributions.
Thus, if a wife was found to have contributed to the acquisition of the husband's property and
was therefore entitled to compensation for her efforts, she could be entitled to a lump sum
distribution which, while couched in alimony terms, amounted to a share of her husband's
property. See Nobrega v. Nobrega, 13 Haw. 654, 658-60 (1901) and Nobrega v. Nobrega 14
Haw. 152, 155-58 (1902).
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law in 1949, it resurfaced six years later in a more expansive form. This
reemergence is described in the next section.
D. Adopting an Equitable Distribution Scheme and Allowing Family Court
to Divide Property
With the demise of the short-lived community property system in 1949,
Hawai'i restored its common law system of property ownership which, in the
context of property distribution, favored the spouse who was better-positioned
to own and acquire property in his or her name. However, in 1955, Hawai'i
reopened the door to change by enacting an amendment which reinstated the
court's power to make an equitable distribution of property. Specifically, the
territorial legislature authorized the court:
[T]o finally divide and distribute the estate, real, personal or mixed, whether
community, joint, or separate, in such proportion as shall appear just and
equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, to the ability of
the husband, to the condition in which they will be left by such divorce, to the
burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of the children of such marriage, and all
circumstances of the case.' 
2
With this amendment, Hawai'i joined the swelling ranks of "equitable
distribution" jurisdictions which gave judges broad discretion to assign to
either spouse property acquired during marriage, irrespective of title, taking
into account the circumstances of the particular case and recognizing the value
of both the financial and non-financial spousal contributions." 3 The modem
view of equitable distribution systems recognizes that "marriage is essentially
a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a partnership to which
both spouses contribute-directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinan-
cially-the fruits of which are distributable at divorce."" 4
,,2 1955 Haw. Sess. Laws 60 (current version at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47 (Michie
1997)).
113 See JOHN DEWITr GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUrrABLE DISTRIBUTION 1-6 (1989).
Herbert Jacob noted that the development of equitable distribution statutes began in Kansas
and Oklahoma in the late 1800's. Kansas in 1889 passed legislation that read as follows:
[With regard to] such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired by
the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either or both of
said parties, the court shall make such division between the parties respectively as may
appear just and reasonable, by a division of property in kind, or by setting the same apart
to one of the parties, and requiring the other thereof to pay such a sum as may be just and
proper to effect a fair and just division thereof.
JACOB, supra note 22, at 114.
114 GREGORY, supra note 113, at 1-6.
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That Hawai'i was ready to give a domestic relations judge the discretion to
fashion an equitable division after considering all relevant factors seemed
clear. Whether the legislature or Hawai'i's judges had actually recognized
and accepted the modem view of marriages as partnerships was less clear.
Thus, this zone of discretion was, perhaps initially, only a theoretical
opportunity to apply partnership principles to the division of property at
divorce. It should be remembered that divorce was still fault-based at this
time and thus courts could consider, among other things, the misconduct of a
spouse regardless of whether it impacted on the finances of the marriage.'
5
Nonetheless, by adopting this amendment, the legislature in 1955 signaled
an emerging awareness of an evolving social order. For example, in its
committee report, the House Judiciary Committee recognized the entitlement
of a wife to a just share of a family business which she helped establish and
contributed to, and sought to give her access to the value due to her by way of
a property settlement.' 6 In the same breath, it recognized that husbands, as
well as wives, were entitled to a fair property settlement based on an array of
factors." 7 This was a departure from the traditional notion that along with
their control over property, husbands had a duty to support, a duty that
extended beyond marriage."' However subtly, equality was displacing
hierarchy. 9 as the guiding principle in property division. It suggested at least
a quiet erosion of traditional gender-based boundaries, creating an opportunity
to think about spousal roles and responsibilities in more dimensions than were
previously possible.
Moreover, the new legislation, on its face, allowed judges to consider and
divide all property regardless of its form, or the technical or legal manner in
which it was held. ° Community property, as well as separate and jointly held
"5 This is to say that judges and litigants could consider factors that had little to do with
partnership principles. Lenore Weitzman described how under the fault-based divorce laws, a
litigant was encouraged to detail or even exaggerate the grievous behavior of her spouse as a
means to punish him by way of a larger property award. See WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 28.
No-fault reformers argued that justice was better served if the judicial system considered the
economic situation of the spouses rather than culpability for bad behavior. See id. at 29.
116 See S. STAND. CoMM. REP. No. 595, 28th Terr. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1955), reprinted in
HAW. S. JOURNAL 1955, Spec. Sess. (1956) 632 (1955).
117 See id.
118 However, it should be noted that among the factors that courts had to consider was the
"ability of the husband" with no corresponding reference to a wife's ability. Further, the
support and maintenance provisions continued to refer only to a husband's obligation to support
both wife and children. See Revised Laws of Hawai'i § 324-37 (1955). While forward steps
were being made, the transformation was far from complete.
119 See JACOB, supra note 22, at 5.
'2o In passing House Bill No. 499 (the bill which ultimately became Hawai'i's equitable
distribution statute), the Senate Judiciary Committee wrote: "The purpose of this bill is to
confer upon the Judge... the power to make property settlements between the parties of all
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property, became subject to distribution. In doing so, Hawai'i became an "all-
property" jurisdiction as contrasted to "dual-property" systems which identifi-
ed certain categories of property to be exempt from division. In one fell
swoop, this took from the dominant spouse the use of title and control of pro-
perty as an easy shield against post-divorce property division. Nothing was
exempt. In maximizing the pool of property from which an equitable division
could occur, the legislature enlarged the font from which courts could draw
to duly address the needs of each divorcing spouse. By so doing, it moved to-
ward the concept of marriage as a partnership with an emphasis on its sharing
aspects. For in considering all property for division, the legislature affirmed
the notion that spouses should demonstrate their commitment to the marital
partnership by dedicating resources to it, including property that might be con-
sidered separate. Therefore, it was conceptually appropriate to make some
assumptions that those resources belonged to the unit rather than to its in-
dividual parts, and that with the dissolving of the unit came the need to divide
these collectively shared resources, with little regard to how title was held.
Whether the legislature or the courts actually looked at both spouses as
equal partners in 1955 was questionable." After all, Hawai'i's equitable
property, real, personal, or mixe4 whether held as community, joint or separate property." S.
STAND. COMM. REP. NO. 595, 28th Terr. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1955), reprinted in HAW. S.
JOURNAL 1955, Spec. Sess. (1956) 632 (1955)(emphasis added).
121 See GREGORY, supra note 113, at 2-4, 2-22.
122 The Hawai'i Supreme Court, in its Bulgo decision, reviewed the community property
scheme which existed in Hawai'i ten years before. See Bulgo v. Bulgo, 41 Haw. 578 (1957).
After extolling the virtues of that system, the court took a puzzling turn in its opinion, which
suggested a misunderstanding of how the system should have worked and may have revealed
a perspective that reinforced the paramount position of the husband in a marriage.
In responding to the husband's argument that the community property scheme was
unconstitutional to the extent that it took from him half of the income generated from his pre-
marriage separate property, the court replied almost apologetically:
No property is taken from the husband and it will be noted he has the administration and
control of the community-property income, whether it be income from his own property
• .. or income from the wife's separate property or... income from the efforts of the labor
of the community. As a rule it becomes of importance only when the community is termi-
nated. As has been aptly said, a community is a partnership which begins only at its end.
Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
To support its statement, the court drew from a 1907 United States Supreme Court decision,
Garrozi v. Dastas, 204 U.S. 64, 79, in which the justices reviewed a case from Puerto Rico, a
community property jurisdiction.
The rights of the wife are dormant during the marriage, because the husband is charged
to watch over and conduct the affairs of the conjugal society. But this right, which is
inert, as long as the husband is at the head of the affairs of the community, becomes active
when the marital authority ceases to exist. The wife is like a silent partner, whose rights
arise and reveal themselves when the partnership ceases.
Id. at 79.
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distribution statute was enacted a few years prior to the national struggle
toward gender and race equality which began to foment in the 1960's."3 Yet,
the doors were beginning to open. Thus, the 1955 legislation was significant
not only in how it enabled courts to adjudicate an equitable and just property
division, but in how it reflected a change in attitude and perception, a start
down the road that took us to where we are.
Finally, in a way that could not have been anticipated at the time of its
passage, the equitable distribution statute was vital to the ultimate adoption of
the partnership model by becoming the center of a storm between the state's
two appellate courts beginning in the 1980's. It was through this long,
sometimes frustrating, struggle that the partnership model was finally
crystallized. This exchange will be described in Section III.
Thus in the court's eyes, the system adopted by the territorial legislature between 1945 and
1949, reserved the fruits of partnership for the dissolution of the marriage. How the court
reached its conclusion remains an enigma in light of the language of the community property
statute which clearly distributed power to both spouses to be exercised throughout the marriage.
12 An account of U.S. Congresswoman Patsy Mink's struggle to take the bar examination
and find employment after graduating from the University of Chicago School of Law in the
1950's sheds light on the difficulties experienced by even highly trained professional women
during this period:
John [Congresswoman Mink's husband] found a position with the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters Association, while Patsy first had to prove that she was eligible to take the
Hawai'i bar examination. Under a domicile law that required a woman to take the
residency status of her husband, Patsy was now considered a resident of Pennsylvania and
would have to reestablish her Hawai'i residency. Irate, Patsy challenged the sexist statute.
The attorney general then reversed his earlier denial and ruled that since she had not ever
physically resided in Pennsylvania, she had not assumed her husband's domicile.
Even with her admission to the bar in June 1953 Patsy failed to obtain work as an
attorney in the private or public sector. Prospective employers believed that attorneys
were expected to work long hours and that women "should not be out late at night."
When interviewers learned that she had a child, they rejected her without further
consideration, even if she explained that she had adequate care for [her daughter] Wendy.
They were concerned that she might have "another child." With help from her father,
Patsy turned to solo practice. She opened her law office, furnished with borrowed pieces,
in downtown Honolulu. Despite news stories announcing that she was the first Japanese
female admitted to practice law in the Territory of Hawaii, few clients materialized. To
augment her income and to fill time, she took court-appointed cases and lectured in
business courses at the University of Hawaii. Her early cases were those that established
law firms traditionally avoided: criminal, divorce, and adoption cases.
Esther K. Arinaga & Rene E. Ojiri, Patsy Takemoto Mink, in CALLED FROM WITHIN, EARLY
WOMEN LAWYERS OF HAwAi'I 261 (Mari J. Matsuda ed., 1992).
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E. Passing Through the Tumultuous Sixties -The Divorce Revolution and
the UMDA
The turmoil of the sixties created a fertile environment for social change
which in turn compelled a retooling of the law. A major push for female
representation and power in the workplace merged with changing attitudes
toward the longevity of marriages during this tumultuous decade."n Together
they forced a serious examination of the nature of property within marriage
and how that property should be distributed when a marriage dissolved. As
women's earning power increased, their economic contributions could not be
denied and needed somehow to be acknowledged. At the same time,
assumptions regarding a wife's dependence on her husband were being
replaced by the belief that women as well as men were capable of financial
self-sufficiency, thereby raising challenges to the way we thought of alimony
and our objectives for awarding it.125 Any move to reform divorce law
therefore needed to include the reevaluation of the place of alimony while
defining a cogent theory of property division that reflected emerging cultural
realities.
In the mid-sixties, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") began to generate a code of uniform laws
regarding marriage and divorce, which became known as the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA")." 6 This assembling of experts was an
attempt to organize ideas and capture the energy emanating from the push
toward divorce reform which bubbled in the 1960's. One of the areas
requiring work was property division which was characterized as "in even
worse condition" than the then-extant confusion over divorce in general." 7
Professor Robert J. Levy of the University of Minnesota Law School was
selected to provide a preliminary analysis with recommendations to help direct
the work of the NCCUSL's Special Committee on Divorce. Levy quoted the
following from a 1963 report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights
of the President's Commission on the Status of Women: "Marriage is a
24 See TURNER, supra note 110, at 9-10.
', In the late 1960's, Samuel P. King, who later became senior judge of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai'i, was the state circuit court judge assigned to handle
all domestic relations cases in Honolulu. In an article that called him "Hawaii's foremost
authority on divorce," Judge King said "[a]limony should be used for rehabilitation purposes,
not as a lifetime annuity for a wife." He added, "in 1969, it should be viewed as a short-term
stop-gap measure. It certainly shouldn't provide a woman with a lifetime insurance policy
unless she is in ill health." Drew McKillups, Judge Calls Hawaii Alimony Law Unfair,
HONOUILu ADVERTISER, May 13, 1969, at C-2.
126 See Prefatory Note to UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 9A U.L.A. 147 (1968).
127 ROBERT J. LEVY, UNIIV RM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS 135 (1969).
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partnership to which each spouse makes a different but equally important
contribution. This fact has become increasingly recognized in the realities of
American family living. While the laws of other countries have reflected this
trend, family laws in the United States have lagged behind.. ...,,2' Noting
both the burgeoning drive to erase fault as a basis for divorce and the dramatic
rise of women in the work force after the second World War, Levy concluded
that basing property division on fault or title ignored the realities of American
family life.129 He found it odd that states restricted the use of fault in the
divorce itself in order to reduce acrimony but allowed the parties to allege
fault in the same proceedings to justify a higher property award. 3 His
objections to title-based property division drew from its tendency to mask the
contributions, increasingly economic, that wives made to the acquisition of
property nominally owned by husbands.'
The diminution of alimony as the primary source of post-divorce support
corresponded with the emerging importance of property division incident to
divorce. With the growing acceptance of marriage as a partnership and its
expansive view of spousal partnership contributions, greater attention had to
be given to effectuating a fair return on those contributions by way of
appropriate property awards, and the UMDA sought to reflect this.'
Observing that many jurisdictions of the era, including Hawai'i, already had
statutes giving courts the discretion to effectuate a "fair" distribution of
property, Levy suggested that an appropriate next step was to guide judges
toward relevant factors. He included the duration of the marriage, each
spouse's contributions, both economic and non-economic, each spouse's
"mode" of life (i.e., their individual circumstances), and the extent of each
spouse's separate holdings.' Such an approach would help curb any problem
121 Id. at 164 (quoting THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 18 (1963)).
129 See id. at 165.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See Prefatory Note to UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 9A U.L.A. 149 (1968).
133 The UMDA's Prefatory Note reads in relevant part:
The Act's elimination of fault notions extends to its treatment of maintenance and
property division. The distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage should
be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution
of a partnership. The Act authorizes the division, upon dissolution, of property acquired
by either spouse during the marriage (except for gifts and inheritances) as the primary
means of providing for the future financial needs of the spouses. Where the marital
property is insufficient for this purpose, the Act provides that an award of maintenance
can be made to either spouse under appropriate circumstances to supplement the available
property.
Id. (emphasis added).
131 See LEVY, supra note 127, at 169.
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with "judicial discretion turned loose cannon," and focus judges on appropri-
ate specific factors.'35
Beyond trying to identify relevant considerations, the NCCUSL drafted a
section on property division that supported a vision of marital partnership akin
to that already held by community property states. In its initial draft of
Section 307 which dealt with the disposition of property, the NCCUSL
distinguished marital property (all property acquired by either spouse during
the marriage except, primarily, for gifts and inheritance) from separate
property, recommending a return of the latter to the owner spouse and an
equitable division of "community" or marital property. 136 Consistent with its
vision of the marital partnership, the NCCUSL topped its list of relevant
considerations with the "contribution of each spouse to [the] acquisition of the
marital property, including contribution of a spouse as a homemaker."'37
This draft provision, issued in 1970, provided one of several focal points for
strong dissension from the Family Law Section ("FLS") of the American Bar
Association. 3 s The refusal of the FLS to support the UMDA in general and
135 See Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and
Future, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 807, 826 (1990).
136 See id. at 827. The relevant portions of the NCCUSL's comment to the original section
307 of the UMDA reads:
(T)he court is directed first to set apart to each spouse all of his or her property that is not
defined as marital property by subsection (b), and secondly to divide the marital property
between the parties in accord with the standards established by this section. The court
may divide the marital property equally or unequally between the parties, having regard
for the contributions of each spouse in the acquisition thereof, the length of the marriage,
the value of each spouse's non-marital property, and the relative economic position of
each spouse following the division. The court is directed not to consider marital
misconduct, such as adultery or other non-financial misdeeds, committed during the
marriage, in making its division
Subsection (c) creates a presumption that all property acquired after marriage and prior
to a decree of legal separation is marital property. In the absence of contrary evidence this
presumption will be controlling, regardless of the manner in which title is held by the
spouse. A spouse seeking to overcome the presumption has the burden of proof on the
issue of identification. The presumption is overcome by a showing that the property (1)
was acquired prior to the marriage, was the increase in value of such property, or was
acquired after the marriage in exchange for such property; (2) was acquired after the
marriage by gift, bequest, devise or descent or in exchange for property so acquired; (3)
was acquired after the entry of a decree of legal separation; or (4) was designated as non-
marital property by a valid agreement of the spouses, all as provided in sub-section (b).
The phrase "increase in value" used in subsection (b) (5) is not intended to cover the
income from property acquired prior to the marriage. Such income is marital property.
Id at 827 n.99.
' UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307(1), 9A U.L.A. 239 (1968).
138 A number of reasons have been mentioned to explain the sometimes heated disagreement
between the NCCUSL and the FLS. Some have attributed it to personalities and egos between
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the proposed property division provision in particular, moved the NCCUSL
to develop an alternative version of section 307, now known as Alternative
A. 139 This alternative, which allowed judges to equitably divide all property
and not just marital property, sufficiently placated the FLS and helped bring
the UMDA to a narrow endorsement by the ABA in 1974."4
How the UMDA brought Hawai'i closer to its embrace of the partnership
model is open to conjecture. The fact that it elevated to a national debate a
uniform code section on property division modeled in part on community
property principles must have had some impact in molding local thought and
discussion. 41 In fact, a year after the American Bar Association endorsed the
UMDA, the Honolulu Advertiser ran a series of articles on divorce in
Hawai'i.42 The series drew largely from a melange of interviews with judges,
attorneys, and parties of divorce. Among those quoted was Thomas Rice, then
the leadership of two powerful institutions. See Harvey L. Zuckman, The ABA Family Law
Section v. The NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation, and Forced Reconciliation over the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 CAm. U. L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1974). Others have pointed to the
differences in world views, with the NCCUSL, consisting primarily of academics, and the FLS,
representing frontline family law practitioners, unable to bridge the distance. See Peter
Severeid, Increase in Value of Separate Property in Pennsylvania: A Change in What Women
Want?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 557, 578 (1995). Still others describe the FLS's fear of shifting
paradigms, moving away from the growing status quo of equitable distribution of all property
and toward an adoption of a system that was closer to that adopted by the small minority of
community property states. See id.
139 See Sevareid, supra note 138, at 579. Alternative B of section 307, which was closer to
the original draft, was adopted to meet the needs of community property states which preferred
its system to the "hotchpot of assets" contemplated in Alternative A. See UNEF. MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 307(2) cmt., 9A U.L.A. 239 (1968).
" See Sevareid, supra note 138, at 579.
141 Herbert Jacob wrote:
Almost no state fully adopted the property provisions of the NCCUSL's Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act. Some provisions won wider acceptance than others; some
spawned different responses to the same problems. However, the adoption of the marital
property concept clearly gathered momentum after the NCCUSL first suggested it in 1970
... [w]hile we have no direct documentary evidence of a link between the NCCUSL's
actions and state adoption of these provisions, it is reasonable to conclude that the model
provided by the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act played a role in the diffusion of these
provisions.
JACOB, supra note 22, at 121.
142 Honolulu Advertiser reporter Pat Hunter wrote a four-part series on various aspects of
divorce. The series ran in the Advertiser from April 7, 1975, through April 10, 1975. See Pat
Hunter, No-Fault Divorce - It Still Isn't Easy, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Apr. 7, 1975, at B 1; Pat
Hunter, Financial Results in Divorce Can Be a Disaster, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Apr. 8, 1975,
at B 1; Pat Hunter, What Happens When Custody is an Issue, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Apr. 9,
1975, at El; Pat Hunter, The Poor Who Can't Afford Divorce Costs, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
Apr. 10, 1975, at B1.
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one of the state's most notable family law attorneys. 43 In discussing the
economic consequences of divorces, Rice said:
Although there's no statute at the present time that says you have to treat divorce
the same way you would the dissolution of a partnership, the trend is to consider
the marital partnership equal and try to divide the assets equally ... [e]ach
[spouse] has contributed to the accumulation and preservation of those
assets .... 144
At the time of Rice's statement, the UMDA was already available for
consideration and adoption by all states. His statement that Hawai'i had not
yet statutorily adopted the partnership model could be construed to reflect an
awareness of the UMDA's presence in the wings. Not only did Hawai'i's
statutes say nothing about marital partnerships, but its appellate courts would
say nothing about such partnerships for at least another decade. 45 Thus,
Rice's reference to a "trend" must have sprung not from local sources but
from an awareness of broader conversations such as those that occurred during
the heated UMDA debates.
46
The UMDA acted as a prism, first capturing the social and economic shifts
within individual relationships and the larger society, then translating those
changes into proposed legal reform. It was reflective and responsive, seeking
to conform the law to current realities rather than to blaze new trails. It gave
a formal place and process for reform, and by its national character and repute,
institutionalized the debates and the vocabulary on the changing face of
divorce and its incidents. It gave a message on where things could or should
be, and left it to the states to decide whether or when to climb on.
143 On September 13, 1996, Thomas Rice died at the age of seventy-six. In a one-page
bulletin sent to section members in September 1996, Hawai'i State Bar Family Law Section
Chair Geoffrey Hamilton noted that Rice had been regarded by many as the "father" of modem
Hawai'i divorce practice. Hamilton also reminded members that Rice had been the section's
first chairperson.
'44 Pat Hunter, Financial Results in Divorce Can be a Disaster, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN,
Apr. 8, 1975, atB1.
145 See infra notes 264-79 and accompanying text.
'" Rice also alluded to the importance of non-economic contributions spouses made to
partnerships that entitled them to share in the profits of the partnership. See Hunter, supra note
144, at B1. While acknowledging that the evaluation of those contributions was not easy, it was
clear that he thought it appropriate to consider them. In a statement that mixed enlightenment
with the continued realities of gender positions in the sixties, he said the following: "Men
generally fail to realize they didn't get where they are today all by themselves. There's no way
to measure how much of a man's success is due to his wife's satisfaction in him and his
subsequent feeling of confidence." Id.
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F. Statutory Changes in 1978
The momentum of divorce reform reflected in, and perhaps, generated by
the UMDA, and the passage of the state's no-fault divorce law in 1972,'1
7
represented clear changes in the way we were willing to look at gender and
marriage. In 1978, these changes were further embodied in legislative
amendments that remain largely intact to this day. These amendments, which
were introduced in House Bill 2095-78, sought to "amend the law relative to
the duty of parties to marriage to support themselves, each other and their
family."'48 The amendments clustered around two distinct periods: one
cluster targeted Hawai'i Revised Statutes sections 573-6 and 573-7 (now
renumerated as Hawai'i Revised Statutes sections 572-23 and 572-24,
respectively) which dealt with the support obligations of spouses during
marriage; the remaining cluster was directed to Hawai'i Revised Statutes
section 580-47 which dealt with property division and spouse support at the
termination of a marriage.
1. The "mutualization" of intra-marital support
The amendments dealing with support within an ongoing marriage
consisted mainly of changing gender adjectives so that what had been a
statutory duty for the husband to support his wife was transformed into a duty
by both spouses to support each other and their family. This was significant
in that it eliminated, by statutory fiat, the traditional notion of husband as the
breadwinner and wife as the homemaker, replacing it by the more egalitarian
idea of mutual support.'49 The amended statutes were in accord with the
147 Passed in 1972 by the sixth state legislature, Act 11 amended portions of Hawai'i Revised
Statutes Chapter 580 to eliminate fault as grounds for divorce. 1972 Haw. Sess. Laws 165-67.
48 S. STAND. COMM. REP. No. 720-78, 9th State Legis., Reg. Sess. (1978), reprinted in
HAW. S. JOURNAL 1978, Reg. Sess. 1088 (1978).
149 The "bilateralization" of support obligations within marriage met with some resistance
particularly from women who considered themselves homemakers and were concerned that this
mutual support statute would allow wayward husbands to duck their obligations with impunity.
A sample of the forceful and passionate testimony submitted against the bill is as follows:
As the mother of seven children I have been very conscious of a movement to downgrade
mothering and the family. I am deeply concerned with the impact of this on future
generations. I see HB #2095 dealing with spousal liabilities as one step in that
degradation process.
I am not concerned for its impact on me for I have a responsible husband, but not
everyone does, and for those who don't, their only recourse is the law. If they are not
protected under the law we have failed them.
With both parties of a marriage equally liable for the necessities to maintain that
marriage, what is to protect the full-time homemaker from a husband who goes out and
runs up bills he cannot pay? Is the wife then required to:
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 20:1
concept of a marital partnership to the extent that they set forth both an ideal
and an expectation that spouses would take care of each other, and that each
brought into the marriage a modicum of resources, financial and non-financial,
to be used for the security and advancement of the marital unit.)" If there was
dependency, it was assumed that each partner relied on the other, although
perhaps in different ways, and that the fact of dependency did not per se sug-
gest inferiority. The law let the spouses decide for themselves the nature and
extent of each person's labors and contributions, but assumed that these deci-
sions would ultimately be driven by the best interests of the family. Where
the process of intrafamilial decision-making failed to work, and the court was
relied upon to intervene, specific factors were set forth to guide the court."'
2. Support obligations after the breakup
The other cluster of amendments proposed in House Bill 2095 dealt with
support obligations in separation and divorce.' These amendments modified
1) leave her children with a sitter and go out and earn money to pay off those debts or, 2)
sell other goods she may have to pay off the debts or, 3) serve beside her husband in a
prison term incurred through non-payment?
I would say House Bill #2095 does not meet the needs of the full-time homemaker and
has the potential to do her great harm. I believe it requires greater study to find a law that
will satisfy all parties equally... for I believe being treated the same is not necessarily
just in all cases.
Marilyn White, Testimony against House Bill No. 2095-78 heard by the House Judiciary
Committee (Feb. 8, 1978).
The amendments were driven in part by Hawai'i's ratification of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment in 1972 which is now found under Article One, section 3 of the Hawai'i State
Constitution. See Sherry Broder & Beverly Wee, Hawaii's Equal Rights Amendment: Its
Impact on Athletic Opportunities and Competition for Women, 2 U. HAW. L. REv. 97, 100-01
(1979). Stating simply that the "[equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the State on account of sex[,]" the statutory amendments under House Bill No.
2095-78 were cited by the House Judiciary Committee as necessary for avoiding the
constitutional deficiency of imposing support obligations on the male spouse only. See H. R.
STAND. COMM. REP. No. 309-78, 9th State Legis., Reg. Sess. (1978), reprinted in HAW. H. R.
JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. 1526-27 (1978).
s0 The original draft of House Bill No. 2095-78 set forth factors to be considered when
determining support obligations during separation and divorce, but did not extend the factors
to the determination of obligations in an ongoing marriage. And thus the bill was amended to
resolve this concern. See H. R. STAND. COMM. REP. No. 309-78, 9th State Legis., Reg. Sess.
(1978) reprinted in HAw. H. R. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. 1526-27 (1978).
'51 See infra note 154 and accompanying text. These factors are now found in Hawai'i
Revised Statutes section 580-47(a), the section that deals with the division of property and
alimony incident to a divorce. The House Judiciary Committee amended the bill to apply this
list to ongoing marriages. See H. R. STAND. COMM. REPORT No. 309-78, 9th State Legis., Reg.
Sess. (1978), reprinted in HAW. H. R. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. 1527 (1978).
152 The "mutualization" of post-separation or divorce support obligations was already
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Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47 to include a non-exhaustive list of
specific factors for the family court to consider when deciding support
obligations. 153 Among these factors were the financial resources of the
parties, each party's ability to independently meet his or her needs, the
duration of marriage, the standard of living during the marriage, the age of the
parties, the physical and emotional conditions of the parties, each party's
needs, and the probable duration of the need of the party seeking support.'
54
Although this set of amendments focused on support and maintenance
provisions of divorce and not ostensibly upon property division, legislative
committee reports indicate that legislators fully intended to apply these factors
to property division as well. For example, the House Judiciary Committee
wrote, "[tihe bill also amends laws relating to divorce and separation by
listing factors which are to be considered by the court in determining the
disposition of property and support and maintenance obligations.' 55
Likewise, the Senate Judiciary Committee which developed the draft that
ultimately became the current law wrote:
Your Committee notes that when the Legislature adopted no-fault divorce in
Hawai'i, one of the primary purposes was to avoid unnecessary disputes between
the parties. However, because of the vagueness of the present law, many divor-
ces continue to be marred by disputes over division of marital assets and support
and maintenance obligations. Your Committee therefore amended the bill by
listing factors which clearly define the rights and obligations of the parties in
regard to division of marital assets and maintenance obligation. These factors
add certainty to the law and minimize avoidable disputes between the parties.'
56
legislatively enacted in 1967 under Act 76, eleven years before support obligations in ongoing
marriages turned gender neutral. See 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 76-77. This act amended Revised
Laws of Hawai'i section 324-37 (now Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47) to read in
relevant part:
Upon granting a divorce, the court may make such further orders as shall appear just and
equitable... compelling either party to provide for the support and maintenance of the
other party and finally dividing and distributing the estate of the parties, real, personal,
or mixed, whether community, joint, or separate. In making such further orders, the court
shall take into consideration the respective merits of the parties, the relative abilities of
the parties [as opposed to just the husband's], the condition in which each party will be
left by the divorce, the burdens imposed upon either party for the benefit of the children
of the marriage, and all circumstances of the case ....
1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 76.
' These factors were enacted in 1978 under Act 77. See 1978 Haw. Sess. Laws 100-02.
'54 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47(a) (Michie 1997). See infra note 156, for the
complete listing.
' H. R. STAND. CoMM. REP. No. 309-78, 9th State Legis., Reg. Sess. (1978), reprinted in
HAW. H. R. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. 1526-27 (1978)(emphasis added).
156 S. STAND. CoMM. REP. No. 720-78, 9th State Legis., Reg. Sess. (1978), reprinted in
HAW. S. JoURNAL, Reg. Sess. 1088 (1978)(emphasis added).
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 20:1
The list of thirteen factors assembled by the Senate Judiciary Committee
clearly bore the influence of the UMDA, matching almost item by item, the
list appearing in the UMDA's section 308.157 Although the legislative history
evinced a consistent and firm intent to apply these factors to property division
as well as to alimony, the statutory language inexplicably failed to reflect this.
157 UMDA section 308 reads in relevant part:
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time the court deems
just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors
including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
martial property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs
independently, and the extent to which a provision for support of a child
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987).
In comparison, House Bill No. 2095-78, H.D.1, S.D.I, which is now codified as Hawai'i
Revised Statutes section 580-47, reads in relevant part:
In addition to any other relevant factors considered, the court, in ordering spousal support
and maintenance, shall consider the following factors:
(1) Financial resources of the parties;
(2) Ability of the party seeking support and maintenance to meet his and
her needs independently;
(3) Duration of the marriage;
(4) Standard of living established during the marriage;
(5) Age of the parties;
(6) Physical and emotional condition of the parties;
(7) Usual occupation of the parties during the marriage;
(8) Vocational skills and employability of the party seeking support and
maintenance;
(9) Needs of the parties;
(10) Custodial and child support responsibilities;
(11) Ability of the party from whom support is sought and maintenance to
meet his or her own needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking
support and maintenance;
(12) Other factors which measure the financial condition in which the parties
will be left as the result of the action under which the determination of
maintenance is made; and
(13) Probable duration of the need of the party seeking support and
maintenance.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47(a) (Michie 1997).
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As adopted, the plain language of the changes to Hawai'i Revised Statutes
section 580-47 instructed the family court to consider these factors in ordering
support and maintenance only, leaving property division to the flexible but
vague "equitable distribution" standard.15
Nonetheless the factors for support and maintenance reflected the changing
attitudes toward alimony, and correspondingly, property division. They were
gender neutral, thereby reinforcing the fact that the need for, as well as the
ability to provide support could run both ways. They affirmed that alimony
would in most cases be temporary rather than the lifetime post-divorce annuity
it had once been.'59 They provided bench marks for determining the need for
support, weighing heavily the potential, ability and opportunities for an
individual to obtain income independent of the former spouse. The conspicu-
ous absence of fault or marital misconduct from the list followed the
elimination of fault-based divorces six years earlier 6°
'5 Because of the flexibility of the "equitable distribution" standard, courts could
conceivably use the listed factors in disposing of the property distribution scheme. As seen
later, however, the case law which developed through the 1980's to the present, created a
framework which its critics argued diverted analysis to the particulars of the framework and
away from a fuller'possible range of relevant factors. See, e.g., infra notes 264-79 and
accompanying text.
' The UMDA's alimony provision, section 308, set forth a two-tiered process for
determining support.
The first tier was to be used to see if support was even appropriate. Specifically, this first
step stated that a court could only grant support if the petitioning spouse "(1) lacks sufficient
property to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make
it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home." UNIF.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987).
The second tier, consisting of many of the factors adopted in House Bill No. 2095-78, was
to be used to determine the amount and periods of time of an award only if the spouse seeking
support satisfied the first level of inquiry.
While Hawai'i did not adopt the two-tiered system, it was clear that the days of requiring a
husband to provide long-term support was over. The multifactorial analysis that was adopted
provided a screen against both the frequency and longevity of awards.
In fact, by the time the 1978 amendments were adopted, the number of alimony awards
granted in Hawai'i were already on the wane. Eight years before, the Honolulu Star Bulletin
reported that "(v)ery few women receive alimony nowadays according to officials of Hawaii's
Family Court. The trend in the past ten or fifteen years, not only in Hawai'i but in most other
states as well, has been to award child support only." Few Divorcees Get Alimony, HONOLULU
STAR BUEIN, July 30, 1970, at D-3.
"0 Actually, Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47 contained no expressed prohibition
against the use of fault as a factor. However, the effect of this omission was later clarified when
the Hawai'i Supreme Court declared that fault would be a non-factor in both alimony and
property division. See, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 44 Haw. 491, 355 P.2d 188 (1960);
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 7 Haw. App. 11, 740 P.2d 36 (1987).
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 20:1
Even without explicitly attributing this list of factors to property division,
the statute already contained language which gave some direction to courts.
Such considerations as "the respective merits of the parties, the relative
abilities of the parties, the condition in which each party will be left by the
divorce, [and] the burdens imposed upon each party for the benefit of the
children of the parties" remained available to the court.' 6 ' Although vague-
ness made their application somewhat difficult,'62 these considerations
reflected the same attention to gender-neutral needs, abilities and circum-
stances that was emerging across the country. The ideals of egalitarianism
and sharing (not only of property but also of the disruption caused by divorce)
were evident in these factors and helped to lay the foundation for acceptance
of the marital partnership model.
As indicated above, Hawai'i apparently drew from the UMDA in amending
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47. Like the UMDA, the amendments,
to a large extent, did no more than reduce a twirl of existing realities into a
code of legal rules. It would be the last significant amendment to Hawai'i
Revised Statutes section 580-47 related to property division and alimony.
From there, the courts took over.
G. The Court Acts
Some look to the 1986 Hawai'i Supreme Court decision in Cassiday v.
Cassiday63 as the first enunciated step toward the eventual adoption of the
partnership model in Hawai'i. While Cassiday marked a clear turning point,
it was preceded by a string of Intermediate Court of Appeals decisions
authored by Chief Judge James Bums in the 1980's which outlined the model
and began casting it as the norm."6 Although none of these ICA decisions
used the term "partnership," their concepts unmistakably bore its markings.
To a degree, the ICA decisions, with their thoughtful detail, were logical
extensions of previous appellate decisions. It is therefore helpful to look a
few years back to when divorce reform began to hit the nation, to get an idea
of where Hawai'i appellate decisions were moving and the foundation they
laid for later decisions.
6 1978 Haw. Sess. Laws 101; see also supra note 116.
162 As seen later in this article, the reported difficulties in applying and measuring such
vague and generalized factors led to the development of a framework which was intended to
lend certainty and predictability to property division decisions.
163 68 Haw. 383,716 P.2d 1133 (1986).
' See discussion infra Part ll.G.2.
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1. The pre-Burns period: Richards, Carson and Au-Hoy
As mentioned above and in the next section, development of the partnership
model of property division began to accelerate after Chief Judge Bums joined
the ICA and almost single-handedly created much of the body of modem
appellate decisions dealing with family law in Hawai'i. Before the creation
of the ICA, however, the Hawai'i Supreme Court issued several opinions that
laid stepping stones on the path leading to the ultimate development and
adoption of the partnership model. In this section, we will look at three cases,
Richards v. Richards,65 Carson v. Carson," and Au-Hoy v. Au-Hoy 
67
a. Richards v. Richards
In 1960, the Hawai'i Supreme Court, then the only appellate court in the
state, 16' decided Richards v. Richards.'69 The Richards opinion was the
supreme court's first significant attempt to construe the "equitable distribu-
tion" statute enacted in 1955, which apart from the short-lived community
property statute, finally authorized courts to divide and distribute property.
The tone of the opinion was decidedly modem when stood against the Bulgo
v. Bulgo170 decision three years before.
The case had begun in 1955, when Helen Richards filed a divorce complaint
alleging grievous mental suffering as the grounds for the divorce. 71 Having
reserved the issues of alimony and property division for later consideration,
the trial court granted the divorce.' 72 Over a course of seven months, the trial
court took evidence and heard arguments on alimony and property division.
73
161 44 Haw. 491, 355 P. 2d 188 (1960).
'66 50 Haw. 182, 436 P.2d 7 (1967).
167 60 Haw. 354, 590 P.2d 80 (1979).
'6 The Hawai'i Intermediate Court of Appeals, which has become the primary source of
family law appellate opinions, was created only after the 1978 Constitutional Convention which
adopted the needed constitutional provision for an intermediate appeals court. For an
interesting account of its creation and role, see Jon C. Yoshimura, Administering Justice or Just
Administration: The Hawai'i Supreme Court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals, 14 U.
HAW. L. REV. 271 (1992).
169 44 Haw. 491, 355 P. 2d 188.
170 41 Haw. 578 (1956); see also supra note 122.
171 See Richards, 44 Haw. at 492, 355 P.2d at 190.
172 See id. at 493, 355 P.2d at 191.
173 See id. At the time of the trial, the statute dealing with support payments and property
division read, in relevant part, as follows:
Upon granting a divorce the judge may make such further decree or order against the
defendant, compelling him to provide for the maintenance of the children of the marriage,
to provide such suitable allowance for the wife, for her support, and to finally divide and
distribute the estate, real, personal or mixed, whether community, joint, or separate, in
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While granting a permanent alimony award of $600 per month to Mrs.
Richards, the court denied her request for property beyond household
furniture, silver, art work and other items considered under the rubric of
"household paraphernalia."'74 Mrs. Richards challenged the adequacy of the
permanent alimony award as well as the property division.
175
The significant item of property at issue was Mr. Richards' shares of stock
in Kahua Ranch, Limited. 76 He acquired about 3/4 of his shares prior to
marriage and purchased the final 1/4 during the marriage. 177 Estimates of the
total value ranged from $160,500 to $573,000, the former being the husband's
estimate, the latter being the wife' S.17' The trial court awarded all shares to
the husband.
179
Mrs. Richards argued that she was entitled to a portion of the stock because
she contributed to its acquisition and maintenance "to the extent that she used
her [own] funds to pay the living expenses which libelee [Mr. Richards] was
such proportion as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits
of the parties, to the ability of the husband, to the condition in which they will be left by
such divorce, to the burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of the children of such
marriage, and all other circumstances of the case.
Id. at 501, 355 P.2d at 195 (emphasis added).
Note again that the obligation of support at the time fell on the defendant, which by the plain
language of the statute, was assumed to be the husband.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 494, P.2d at 191. Interestingly, Mrs. Richards also argued that the divorce
should not have been granted prior to the adjudication of support and property issues. See id.
Her argument suggested a continued reliance on the male spouse, not surprising given the norms
of the time (pre-1960). Her concern was understandable: had Mr. Richards died after the
divorce but before an award of property and support could be made, Mrs. Richards would have
been without the financial resources available through a dower incident to the marriage, or
through a property award incident to the divorce.
The parties had been married for seventeen years when the divorce was filed in 1955. See
id. at 516, 355 P.2d at 202. This was apparently not the first marriage for either spouse. See
id. at 513, 515, 355 P.2d at 200-01. At the time of the marriage, Mr. Richards was president
of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd., earning an annual income of $125,000 and owning
assets with a net worth of $941,000. See id. at 516, 355 P.2d at 202. During the marriage,
however, he lost his position, experienced a significant drop in income, and incurred business
debts of over $640,000. See id. Nonetheless, the parties continued to maintain an expensive
lifestyle to the time of the divorce, with expenses exceeding income. See id.
176 See id. at 511, 355 P.2d at 199.
'77 See id. at 512, 355 P.2d at 200.
178 See id.
179 Mr. Richards was also allowed to keep his residence worth $43,500 (there was no net
worth at the time of the divorce due to encumbrances equal to the property's value), other
corporate stock worth $99,423 and was awarded $15,000 worth of household paraphernalia.
See id. at 493, 510-11, 355 P.2d at 191, 199-200.
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bound to provide."' 0 The court was unpersuaded, finding that the husband
was not solely responsible for paying living expenses incurred during the
marriage.18' Further, the court determined that Mr. Richard's net worth had
been significantly eroded by the lavish lifestyle enjoyed by the parties despite
Mr. Richard's declining income." 2 Thus, far from helping to preserve her
husband's estate, she helped to consume it. 8 3 The court also took note of
Mrs. Richards' own property and its considerable "during marriage" apprecia-
tion. ' 4
In considering the permanent alimony issue and whether the $600 per
month award was adequate, 5 the court looked primarily at each spouse's
individual income and necessary expenses, and concluded that the award,
while "on the low side," was insufficient to evince judicial abuse of discretion
(the appropriate standard of review). 6 The court sought a "realistic appraisal
of the situation of the parties at the time of the divorce" which included "a
consideration of the respective resources and revenues of the parties, their
accustomed manner of living, and the manner of living which is appropriate
on the basis of such resources and revenues," with the primary consideration
generally being the respective income of the parties.8 7 The court was willing
to give less weight to actual income as a measure of need when the income
was being depressed because of malingering or that assets were being kept in
80 See id. at 513, 355 P.2d at 200. In addition, Mrs. Richards argued that Mr. Richard's
misconduct, which led to the divorce, entitled her to an amount of property equal to the dower
she would have received had the marriage remained intact. See id. at 502, 355 P.2d at 195.
This argument was rejected because the court determined that personal misconduct was not an
appropriate factor in the division of property. See id. at 509, 355 P.2d at 198. Thus, the
elimination of fault as a basis for property division disappeared before the elimination of fault-
based divorce in 1972.
282 See id. at 513-14, 355 P.2d at 200-01.
282 See id. at 514, 355 P.2d at 201.
283 See id.
284 At the time of marriage, Mrs. Richards' property consisted of $25,205 in bank deposits,
a claim of $12,436 against a former husband's insurance adjustments, household paraphernalia
valued at $25,587 and jewelry of an unspecified value. See id. at 513, 355 P.2d at 200. At
divorce, she had bank deposits, traveler's checks, U.S. treasury bonds and current credits
amounting of $42,045. See id. In addition, she held securities valued at $4,827 and jewelry
worth $52,925. See id. The household paraphernalia awarded to her by the trial court totaled
$35,000 in value. See id. The at-marriage total was thus at least $63,000; the at-divorce total
was approximately $135,000. See id.
1" Mrs. Richards was seeking an award of $1,813 to supplement her own income of
$2,400/month. See id at 502, 355 P.2d at 195. She argued that a total monthly income of over
$4,000 was needed to maintain the lifestyle to which she had become accustomed. See id. at
502, 514, 355 P.2d at 195, 201.
286 See id. at 515-16, 355 P.2d at 201-02.
281 See id. at 516, 355 P.2d at 202.
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a non-productive form.'"8 The court was also willing to factor in such
circumstances as the ill-health of a party ostensibly as a measure of need or
inability to earn income."8 9
The court rebuffed as overly broad the general proposition that a wife, who
was divorced because of her husband's misconduct, was entitled to live in the
same manner to which she was accustomed during the marriage and that the
husband was obligated to fund that lifestyle by way of an alimony award."9
While the court appeared to think that the proposition could be true in some
instances, it was clearly departing from a punitive fault-based formula well
over a decade before no-fault divorces became a statutory reality.
The Richards opinion showed that its authors were ready and able to use at
least some of the pieces of the partnership model. Certainly, the court was
willing to ignore statutory language that still emphasized a husband's ability
and responsibility to amass resources and provide support. 19' It assumed the
possibility that both spouses could earn and obtain wealth, provide support,
and experience need. This was essential to the understanding of an equal
partnership.
Further, the court was willing to look at spousal contributions, and the
compensation thereof, as a basis for property division and distribution."9 But
while the concept of contributions would have a place in the marital
partnership model, it would often require neither an appraisal of each
contribution nor a dollar-for-dollar repayment. Instead it would exist as an
assumption, or perhaps, an expectation. That partners expended energy and
other resources in myriad and sometimes mundane ways, in the interest of
advancing the partnership, would generally be deemed sufficient to justify a
fair, if not equal, sharing of partnership property when that partnership
dissolved. In Richards, the court only considered financial contributions that
were more easily measurable. It would take several more years and another
case before the value of non-financial contributions would be recognized. 93
188 See id. at 516-17, 355 P.2d at 202.
189 See id.
'90 See id. at 516, 355 P.2d at 202.
191 See id at 513-14, 355 P.2d at 200-01 (rejecting Mrs. Richards' assumption that husbands
were obligated to fund all of the family's living expenses).
192 See id. at 512-13, 355 P.2d at 200 (reviewing the trial record to identify contributions by
the wife to the "building up" of the husband's estate, and finding none to justify a sharing of the
husband's estate). Interestingly, the court also noted how, in an earlier decision, it had recog-
nized the contributions of the wife to the growth of the marital estate and how it had found
alimony in gross awards to be a way to compensate her during the period when domestic rela-
tion courts lacked jurisdiction to divide property incident to divorce. See id. at 505, 355 P.2d
at 196-97.
1' A more modem conceptualization of contributions can be found in Epp v. Epp, 80
Hawai'i 79, 92-93, 905 P.2d 54, 67-68 (1996) and Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai'i 319, 933
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b. Carson v. Carson
In 1967, seven years after Richards, the supreme court issued its decision
in Carson v. Carson.94 Once again, the supreme court faced the question of
whether the trial court had correctly declined the wife's request for an award
of her husband's separate property, which consisted largely of real property
and securities acquired prior to marriage with a worth of $250,000 at the time
of divorce.'95 The trial court refused providing no explanation other than to
note that the husband's property was obtained before the marriage and that the
marriage was "fairly short" (eight years).' However, the court granted Mrs.
Carson a monthly award of $400 over a period of three years "to get her
adjusted," noting that it had already "strain[ed] the evidence in order to grant
her an absolute divorce."'
197
P.2d 1353, 1367 (1997).
In more recent developments of property distribution law as described later in this article,
the courts began to generally categorize property as marital versus non-marital property, finding
the distinction helpful in thinking about how property should be divided. See infra Part In.
In Richards, the court either broadly defined "non-marital" property or simply adhered to a
form of title-based distribution. Allowing the husband to retain the entire value of his Kahua
Ranch stock, a full one-fourth of which was acquired during the marriage, suggests this. See
Richards, 44 Haw. at 511-12, 355 P.2d at 200. As valued by the husband, the stock was worth
$160,000 (wife argued that the value was closer to $600,000). This alone exceeded wife's total
award of about $135,000, much of which represented a return of the property she apparently
owned premaritally or acquired during the marriage. See id. at 512-13, 355 P.2d at 200.
Although the statute subjected all types of property to division and distribution regardless of
whether they were community, joint or separate, the Richards opinion suggested both an
inclination to return property. to the spouse who brought it into the marriage, and an
understanding that such a return would be fair. The supreme court's tone changed seven years
later when it decided Carson v. Carson. See infra notes 194 and 199 and accompanying text.
Richards also provided an early look at how the court thought about distributing the "during
marriage" appreciation of property acquired premaritally. In the case of the Kahua Ranch stock,
the court appeared predisposed to let such growth in value remain with the owner spouse unless
the other spouse could sufficiently justify a claim to it. See id. at 511-13, 355 P.2d at 199-200.
In later years, as the partnership model began to emerge, appellate decisions tended to favor
awarding a part of the during-marriage appreciation to the non-owner spouse. See, e.g., infra
note 257 and accompanying text (the ICA first states a "general rule" guiding trial judges toward
the sharing of during marriage appreciation of separate properties).
9"4 50 Haw. 182, 436 P.2d 7 (1967).
'95 See id. at 183-86, 436 P.2d at 9-10. The husband-respondent in this case was Robert
Carson who was chief administrative assistant to then-United States Senator Hiram Fong. The
job paid Carson $20,000 per year which, when added to income from other sources, gave
Carson a per annum income of $30,000. See High Court Reverses Divorce Case Ruling,
HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN, Dec. 13, 1967, at A-9.
196 See Carson, 50 Haw. at 187, 436 P.2d at 9, 11.
197 See id. at 183, 436 P.2d at 9. The court also remarked that it "certainly [had] not fe[lt]
sorry for Mrs. Carson" but expressedly denied that this impacted its decision to withhold
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The supreme court found the trial judge's reasoning to be an abuse of
discretion. 9 ' Concluding that the trial judge had placed undue weight on the
"separateness" of the husband's property, the court reversed the decision and
instructed the trial judge on remand to consider other factors listed in Revised
Laws of Hawai'i section 324-37, including the "respective merits of the
parties," the "ability of the husband," "the condition in which parties would
be left by the divorce," and "all other circumstances of the case."'
'
The supreme court took the opportunity to run down the statutory list of
factors. The court began with the "respective merits of the parties" which it
interpreted to include "the consideration of a spouse's contribution to, or
assistance in the accumulation or preservation of, the separate property of the
other. ' 2"" As it did in Richards, the court looked for evidence that Mrs.
Carson had somehow contributed. Unlike Richards, however, it found it in
the form of such activities as the sewing of her own dresses, the purchasing
and refinishing of second hand furniture, and fulfilling the social role of
aiding her husband in his employment.2"' The court also noted that she
worked without compensation at a "family business" distributing cosmetics,
drugs and jewelry.2' It concluded that by helping to maintain the level of
marital property, the wife facilitated the preservation of the husband's
separate property which would otherwise have been used to pay for marital
property from her. Id.
198 See id at 187, 436 P.2d at 11.
'9 See id. at 184, 436 P.2d at 9. Whether the trial judge had actually failed to consider
factors other than the premarital acquisition of property or had considered them but simply
failed to say so is open to conjecture. According to the trial judge, the fact that the acquisition
occurred prior to marriage was not by itself dispositive. See id. However, the judge failed to
elaborate other than to say that the facts of the case did not justify an award to the wife. See id.
Neglecting to say what those "facts" were or how they were weighed could well have been the
extent of the court's culpability.
The trial judge, Allen Hawkins, did consider the length of the marriage. See id. at 187, 436
P.2d at 11. The parties were married for approximately eight years. See id. Judge Hawkins
considered the marriage to be a "fairly short" one and used this finding to support his decision
to withhold the husband's separate property from the wife at the time of divorce. See id. at 183,
436 P.2d at 9. In reviewing this portion of the decision, the supreme court measured the length
of the marriage in terms of how many years were "happy" ones. See id. at 187, 436 P.2d at 11.
Finding that the marriage had been relatively good for 6 1/2 years, the court determined the
period to be long enough to entitle wife to some share of the husband's separate property. See
id. The idea of looking at the "good" years of the marriage was an early incarnation of a
concept labeled "DOFSICOD" (date of final separation in contemplation of divorce), developed
later by the state's appellate court. It looked at when the marriage was, in fact, a marital unit
in which spouses were assumed to share both resources and burdens. See Woodworth v.
Woodworth, 7 Haw. App. 11, 15, 740 P.2d 36, 39-40 (1987).
200 See Carson, 50 Haw. at 185,436 P.2d at 10.
20 See id.
= See id.
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expenses.203 The court did not require Mrs. Carson to show that she brought
property or money to the marriage as a precondition for sharing in her
husband's separate property. 204 However, had she dissipated her husband's
assets, the court would have considered it a relevant factor.
205
While still bent toward economic contribution and dissipation, the Carson
analysis considered acts that, at best, may have had minimal impact on the
accrual or maintenance of economic benefits, and whose intended purpose
was not necessarily financial enhancement. For example, sewing or
refinishing furniture could well have been personal hobbies that had an
incidental financial benefit, while attending Washington, D.C. soirees were
more likely to be social obligations or opportunities that had little if any
financial implications. Although still couched in more tangible economic
terms, the Carson analysis was actually moving toward an understanding of
contributions that were in fact non-financial, but in congregate, served an
essential function in the development and support of the marital unit. That
Mrs. Carson's contributory acts may have in fact had little measurable
financial effect, but remained noteworthy, suggested a shift away from an
emphasis on what financial resources one brought to or acquired for the
marriage. It was an understanding that was to become essential to the
acceptance of the partnership model.
The remainder of the Carson analysis was largely aimed at measuring Mrs.
Carson's post-divorce needs. Guided by the language of the statute, the court
applied factors to its property division analysis that had traditionally appeared
in discussions relating to alimony. Looking at such factors as Mrs. Carson's
age, limited employment opportunities, minimal separate property, and
various medical problems, the court evidenced its belief that property division
was not a mere unscrambling and distribution of property that necessarily
dictated a return of property to the owner spouse.2°
The supreme court was clear that property division would be used as a
source for meeting the demonstrated needs of a spouse, needs that, especially
in longer unions, sprung from the circumstances of the marriage.2 7 This
would justify reaching not only more deeply into the marital property but also
into the less needy spouse's separate property.28 This does not necessarily
square with a strict vision of partnership, or at least not a commercial one. To
the extent that partnerships seek a return of the original investment value to
each partner and an equal division of the partnership property, there is little
203 See id.
204 See id. at 185-86, 436 P.2d at 10.
205 See id. at 186, 436 P.2d at 10.
206 See id. at 186-87, 436 P.2d at 10-11.
207 See id.
208 Seeid. at 184, 186, 436 P.2d at 9-10.
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room for consideration of need.209 Traditional partnership analysis tends to
seek historical landmarks within the marriage, thereby explaining its
preference for identifying past contributions over future needs.21 Nonethe-
less, the then-controlling statute, Revised Laws of Hawai'i section 324-37,
directed courts to inject need into their formulation, and thus the Carson
court's attention to need-based factors was not surprising.2 1'
The Richards and Carson decisions set the landscape upon which a slew of
property-related cases, beginning in 1980 and generated by the then-newly
created Intermediate Court of Appeals, were built. On the eve of the ICA
explosion, however, came one more Hawai'i Supreme Court decision, Au-Hoy
v. Au-Hoy.
212
c. Au-Hoy v. Au-Hoy
The Au-Hoys were married for thirty years and had no children from the
marriage. 21' This was the second marriage for at least Mrs. Au-Hoy, whose
separate property at the time of divorce consisted of an inherited interest in
real property "of substantial value" on the island of Hawai'i. 214 Mr. Au-Hoy's
"separate ' 215 property included two lots in Pupukea, Oahu.216 The Au-Hoys
20 See infra note 258 (Hawai'i's commercial partnership law states that upon dissolution,
partners should recover the amount of their initial investment and equally divide the profits and
losses generated by the partnership; post-partnership need is nowhere to be found in the Hawai'i
commercial partnership law); see also Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division
and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 896-97
(1988).
210 See Reynolds, supra note 209, at 896-97.
211 The court's focus on need came under its discussion of the condition of the parties after
the divorce, one of the factors listed specifically in Revised Laws of Hawai'i section 324-37.
See Carson, 50 Haw. at 186,436 P.2d at 10-11. It found that "[allthough there are no children
of the marriage, the condition in which the parties will be left is to be considered, the needs of
the wife being of the most importance." Id. at 186,436 P.2d at 10 (quoting Van Klefans v. Van
Klefans, 274 P.2d 708 (Wash. 1929)).
212 60 Haw. 354, 590 P.2d 80 (1979).
213 See id. at 355, 590 P.2d at 81.
214 See id.
213 It is unclear whether the term "separate" as used in this case carried the same meaning
generally used today. While Mrs. Au-Hoy's inherited real property might fall within the current
definition of "separate" property, which includes premarital property brought into the marriage,
as well as gifts or inherited property acquired during the marriage, the other "separate"
properties in the case may have been labeled as such by virtue of whose name was on title. In
the course of a thirty year marriage, even if the spouses maintained somewhat separate lives, it
wc ld be difficult to imagine that the separate properties in this case consisted solely of
premarital properties or gifts or inheritances acquired during the marriage.
In fact, the opinion stated that with the possible exception of Mrs. Au-Hoy's inherited real
property interest in Kona, the parties owned little if any significant property at the time of the
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owned a third Pupukea lot as tenants by the entirety.217 Each spouse worked,
maintained separate bank accounts upon which they drew to meet their
separate needs; however, the husband covered food and utility expenses
incurred after the couple moved into their Pupukea home in 1964.2" One joint
account existed but it was funded solely by the husband and never used by the
wife.
2 19
The trial court awarded the two "separately" owned Pupukea lots and a one-
half interest220 in the family home to Mr. Au-Hoy. Mrs. Au-Hoy kept her
Kona property and the other one-half interest in the family home.22" ' She was
also granted the right to occupy the family home but was to assume the
mortgage payments, property taxes, and charges and improvement costs.222
The decision did not describe division of anything other than the real property.
The husband filed the appeal, claiming inter alia that the trial judge erred in
awarding the wife one-half of the lot on which the family home was built.223
The supreme court affirmed the decision below with little explanation
beyond its finding that the family court had not abused its discretion.224
marriage. See id. at 355, 590 P.2d at 81. From this, one could reasonably infer that other than
Mrs. Au-Hoy's real property interest, all of the significant properties described in the opinion
were acquired during the marriage. Thus, the term "separate" property as used here was
intended to allude more to the fact that one spouse held title or acquired it during marriage for
one's own use and control rather than to strictly describe property that has traditionally been
deemed "non-marital"; i.e., premarital property or property acquired by gift or inheritance
during the marriage.
One could argue that the Au-Hoys' clear, consistent and long-standing pattern of separating
assets and leading separate lives signaled that this was not a typical partnership and that
ordinary understandings of separate and marital property did not necessarily apply. "Separate"
in this case could simply have affirmed the parties' agreement that property obtained or accrued
during the marriage would be deemed as not belonging to the marital unit. In this sense, there
is some kinship to the most recent incarnation of what is "non-marital" property as defined in
case law. As seen later in this article, Hussey v. Hussey, 77 Hawai'i 202, 881 P.2d 1270 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1994), sets forth a category of "marital separate property" which consists of property
acquired during the marriage via gift or inheritance that the acquiring spouse clearly designates
as belonging outside the marital partnership. See id. at 207, 881 P.2d at 1275-76.
216 See Au-Hoy, 60 Haw. at 355, 590 P.2d. at 81.
217 See id. at 356, 590 P.2d at 81.
218 See id. at 355, 590 P.2d at 81.
219 See id.
220 This was awarded in the form of a tenancy-in-common. See id. at 357, 590 P.2d at 82.
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See id. The trial court also made decisions regarding other properties including two lots
in Wahiawa, Oahu which bore the name of Mrs. Au-Hoy's son and daughter-in-law as tenants
by the entirety. Mr. Au-Hoy apparently argued that it was he and Mrs. Au-Hoy who actually
paid for at least one of the lots which thus entitled him to some return of value. See id. at 356,
590 P.2d at 82 n.1.
224 See id. at 358-59, 590 P.2d at 83.
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Because the parties had maintained separate bank accounts and largely
covered their own expenses during their thirty year marriage, the court
appeared swayed that the parties had, by agreement, pursued separate lives,
and therefore, were entitled to the properties each accumulated during the
marriage for his or her own use, even if the properties were purchased with
during-marriage earnings.225 The court appeared to reach this conclusion
despite the fact that: 1) the parties cohabited in a jointly owned home for at
least the final decade of the marriage; 2) husband paid for food and utilities
during this period; and 3) husband established a joint bank account which wife
could access.226
Like the Richards case, all "during-marriage" appreciation was apparently
awarded to the title holder of the principal property.227 This demonstrated at
least some adherence to a title-based model of distribution. It is unclear if the
supreme court, like it did in Carson, gave attention to need-related factors.
The majority was willing to accept the trial court's statement that it had
reviewed all relevant factors as required in Carson enroute to arriving at a
"fair and equitable" distribution. 28 Given the fact that wife had maintained
her own employment,229 covered many of her own expenses during the
marriage, 230 and owned a valuable interest in real property in Kona, the trial
court apparently considered her needs to be adequately met. That the trial
judge required her to assume the mortgage payments and the other ordinary
' Seeid.
226 See id. at 355-56, 590 P.2d at 81.
22 The trial court awarded to husband the two lots in Pupukea which were held in his name
and one-half of the family home in Pupukea. See id. at 356-57, 590 P.2d at 82. The wife
received the other one-half of the family home, as well as her Kona property, which she
acquired premaritally. See id. at 355-57, 590 P.2d at 81-82. In its decision, the trial court
alluded to specific parcels of property and not to their values. Thus, it could be assumed that
the value of a given parcel, including any during-marriage appreciation, was awarded to the
spouse who received that parcel.
22 This rather cursory review drew a dissent from Justice Baird Kidwell who argued that the
majority had accepted too easily the trial judge's blanket assurances that he had considered all
relevant factors and was aware of the Carson decision in developing what he considered a fair
and equitable distribution. See id. at 359, 590 P.2d at 83 (Kidwell, J., dissenting). Kidwell
complained that the trial judge failed to provide a description of what factors were weighed, and
therefore thought it impossible to decide if the court below considered the statutory criteria for
property division. While acknowledging that trial judges would occasionally stumble upon facts
that defied the statutorily required analysis, Kidwell insisted that trial courts had to do more than
simply state its awareness of the Carson opinion, and must instead, give due consideration to
statutory factors. See id. at 360-61, 590 P.2d at 84 (Kidwell, J., dissenting).
229 See id. at 355, 590 P.2d at 81.
0 See id.
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costs of owning real property 3' was a further acknowledgment of her financial
ability.
One might say that the Au-Hoy decision accords with the partnership model,
although the partnership in this case departed from the norm. The supreme
court recognized that this particular partnership developed upon the premise
that each partner would carve out his or her own sphere of financial acquisi-
tions and liabilities, essentially excluding these from the community pot and
thus, the default principles of partnership distribution. This particular
partnership, unlike the ideal marital partnership which emphasizes sharing,
was one that allowed each spouse to act autonomously even to the extent of
excluding during-marriage acquisitions from the marital estate. The court
recognized the parties' expectations of separateness and upheld a distribution
that affirmed those expectations.
d. Summarizing the "pre-ICA explosion" period
In summary, on the eve of the "ICA explosion" which ultimately led to the
present norm of using partnership to guide property division, Hawai'i's
supreme court had already assembled several pieces of the partnership model.
The court recognized that each spouse had the potential to become self-
supporting through the acquisition of property and income, and could expect
equal treatment. Neither spouse was presumed subordinate to or dependent
upon the other, although the court, as it had in Carson, recognized that one
spouse's post-divorce needs could have developed from the marriage itself and
therefore be met through a shifting of property from the less needy spouse.
Spousal contributions, although primarily financial at this point, arose as a
major but not dispositive justification for distributing property. The notion of
contribution would lend itself particularly well to the partnership model
because it characterized what was expected of spouses and neatly explained
why each spouse might be entitled to an equal slice of the marital estate.
Absent evidence of contribution, the court was hesitant to award property
that was separately owned by one spouse to the other. This included not only
the principal property but any increase in value that accrued during the
marriage. If a contribution were made, the court was inclined to consider only
those that directly resulted in an acquisition or an increase of value. This
meant that tangible, more measurable financial contributions, might result in
an award of separate property appreciation whereas household contributions
might not unless a nexus to the appreciation could be drawn (as the Carson
court tenuously tried to do).
231 See id. at 357, 590 P.2d at 82.
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The cases indicated that "separateness" had a broader meaning than that
currently used. Its definition seemed drawn in part from the model of title-
based property distribution. The court thought it fair to return to the spouse
what apparently "belonged" to him, whether it was acquired before or during
the marriage. As the Au-Hoy decision illustrated, even earnings acquired
during a long marriage and the substantial properties purchased with those
earnings were not necessarily "marital." As noted above, the opinions
reflected little inclination toward assigning during-marriage appreciation of
separate property to the marital estate unless a spouse could demonstrate an
entitlement through contribution.232
While fault-based factors were at least nominally eliminated from
consideration, a variety of factors based on title, need and contribution, gave
courts much to consider in fashioning an equitable award. Pieces of the
partnership model were present, but were mixed with other considerations.
As implied in the Au-Hoy dissent,233 identifying and juxtaposing a myriad of
relevant factors would be in many cases a difficult task, and in some, almost
impossible. Perhaps in recognition of this practical reality, the supreme court
in Au-Hoy appeared somewhat satisfied with less than the comprehensive and
specific multifactorial analysis called for in its Carson decision. 4
232 One commentator reviewed how community property states treated during-marriage
increases in separate property. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 239. She noted that even
community property states initially departed from their Spanish civil law roots in developing
policies that favored preserving separate property for the owner spouse. See id at 259-60. This
was so even when marital assets were used to increase the value of separate property. See id.
She explained that this originated from the paternalistic notion that a wife's separate estate had
to be protected and that any increases in its value could not be taken from her lest it threaten the
wholeness of her separate estate and thus her ability to retain it in its entirety. See id. at 260..
In addition, because community property states followed the common law practice of letting
the husband manage the family's finances, including the wife's estate, courts concluded that if
a husband used marital property and labor to increase the value of the wife's separate property,
such use was a gift to the wife and thus she was solely entitled to the increase. See id. There
was no need to compensate the community or to otherwise give an entitlement to the
partnership. See id.
Later, when trial judges had to decide whether to divide during-marriage increases in the
husband's separate property, they merely adopted the "no-division" stance of the earlier "wives"
cases even though the underlying policies of the "wives" cases did not apply. See id.
When courts in these states began to shift direction and allow the community to partake in
increases in a wife's separate property, the rationale centered on the sometimes unjustified
assumption that the husband applied all partnership resources to the betterment of the
community. It therefore followed that the community developed some entitlement to the
increase. See id. at 261.
23 See Au-Hoy, 50 Haw. at 359, 590 P.2d at 83 (Kidwell, J., dissenting).
I Because the standard of review in these cases is "abuse of discretion", an appellate court
has the leeway of upholding a lower court's decision absent abuse. See id. at 358, 590 P.2d at
83. The court in Au-Hoy was willing to infer that the family court had met its obligation
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The cases that followed grappled with this tension between a desire for
specificity and comprehensiveness on the one hand, and judicial efficiency on
the other. The former tended to stretch the inquiry while the latter tended to
structure if not restrict it. This struggle would soon expand to consider the
need of practitioners for enough structure and certainty to assess the facts
before them, reasonably predict outcomes, and develop negotiating
positions.235 As called for by Justice Kidwell in the Au-Hoy dissent, requiring
detailed findings from the trial judge that were sufficient to facilitate appellate
review would continue to surface as a concern.236 With Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 580-47 as the base, these all became part of the primal soup
from which the partnership model finally emerged.
2. Judge Burns arrives
Pursuant to a 1978 amendment to the Hawai'i State Constitution and the
statutory provisions enacted to implement the amendment, the Intermediate
Court of Appeals was formed.2 3' The first three-member panel was sworn in
on April 18, 1980 and convened its first session ten days later.238 One of the
original appointees to the ICA was James Burns who had previously served
in the state circuit court. During his three years on the circuit court bench,
Judge Burns ("Bums") was assigned to the family court.239
pursuant to Carson by virtue of the court's summary representation that it was aware of the
Carson mandate and had performed the required analysis enroute to fashioning its decision. See
id. That the lower court had not described with much specificity what it actually considered
apparently did not faze the reviewing judges. See id.
235 At this writing, the American Law Institute is developing drafts of Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations. In the preface of its first draft, Pro-
fessor Marygold Melli of the University of Wisconsin wrote: "When divorce is understood as
a process of party negotiation with the possibility of judicial review, one can see that substantive
rules are not helpful when cast in terms of judicial discretion exercised... 'to achieve an equit-
able division' or after considering a list of multiple factors. More effective to channel negotia-
tion by parties and their lawyers are rules that use appropriate presumptions and formulas."
Preface to the Tentative First Draft of A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIs AND RECOMMENDATIONS at xviii (Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar. 15, 1995).
236 Facilitating appellate review through clear and sufficiently detailed trial court findings
was certainly a concern of ICA Chief Judge James Bums who wrote most of the post Au-Hoy
family law decisions. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
237 See Yoshimura, supra note 168, at 276-78.
23 See 1979-1980 ST. OF HAW. JUDICIARY ANN. REP. 14.
239 Judge Bums ("Bums") was appointed to the state circuit court in May 1977. See id. All
of the Judiciary's annual reports from FY 1976-1977 through 1978-1979 showed Bums to be
one of two circuit court judges assigned to the family court. The other was Judge Betty
Vitousek, who was the family court's senior judge during this period. See 1976-1977 ST. OF
HAW. JUDICIARY ANN. REP. 32, 1977-1978 ST. OFHAW. JUDICIARY ANN. REP. 32, 1978-1979
ST. OF HAW. JUDICIARY ANN. REP. 40.
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Frank Padgett, another of the original ICA appointees2' who later became
an associate justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court, knew of Bums' expertise
and interest in family law, and during his long tenure as the supreme court's
assignment judge, funneled family law cases to the ICA for Bums' review.24
This no doubt contributed to the stream of family law decisions authored by
Bums during the 1980's to the present. The impact of these decisions on the
current state of family law, particularly in property division and distribution,
earned Bums such honorifics as "father of modem Hawai'i appellate family
law.
,,242
a. Promulgating general rules and etching the outlines for the partner-
ship model
Bums started early and fast. His initial decisions demonstrated an
awareness that partnership principles might provide a framework for arriving
at equitable property distributions. For example, in Linson v. Linson,243 the
ICA held that non-vested retirement benefits were subject to division in
divorce proceedings.2' The court recognized that such benefits were more
potential than real. However, keeping them out of the equation meant that if
they were to vest and mature, the non-employee spouse could not access them
even though she had expended "effort" during the marriage to help acquire
them." Taking its lead from three community property states that considered
non-vested retirement benefits as part of the marital partnership and therefore
240 Yoshimi Hayashi was the third appointee. See 1979-1980 ST. OF HAW. JUDICIARY ANN.
REP. 14. Hayashi was the ICA's original chief judge. See id. Like Justice Padgett, he was
subsequently appointed to the state's supreme court. See 1981-1982 ST. OF HAw. JUDICIARY
ANN. REP. 16-17. Bums succeeded him as the ICA's chief judge after his departure in 1982.
See id. at 18.
24 Justice Padgett was quoted as follows:
Judge Bums had been in the family court as a trial court judge and built up a good deal
of familiarity with the procedures and had a lot to do with trying to get that court back on
track. And I felt that we, again, ought to take advantage of his expertise on the first run
through.
See Yoshimura, supra note 168, at 294.
242 William Darrah, Introductory Remarks at the 1995 Family Law Section/Hawaii Institute
of Continuing Legal Education Annual Divorce Law Update (Dec. 7, 1995). Darrah, a
prominent family law practitioner and leader in state bar activities relating to family law, has
chronicled and analyzed many of the Bums-authored decisions in the Journal of Hawai'i
Family Law, a publication of the Family Law Section for which Darrah has been the editor since
its inception in January 1990.
243 1 Haw. App. 272, 618 P.2d 748 (1980).
244 See id. at 277, 618 P.2d at 751.
245 See id. at 275, 277-78, 618 P.2d at 750-5 1.
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community property,m6 the ICA found that whether or not non-vested benefits
constituted "property," it simply was inequitable to ignore the fact that "18 of
the 20 years necessary to qualify for it were years in which the Linsons were
partners in marriage."247 Therefore, the court included it in the divisible
marital estate 48 and affirmed the family court's award of 50 percent of Mr.
Linson's retirement benefits multiplied by a factor of 18/20.249
What Mrs. Linson's contributions were are not at all clear from the opinion.
No reference was made to her having worked or owning property of
significant worth. There was no mention of children or of any significant
homemaker efforts. On the surface, her 50 percent award was solely based on
her status as an equal partner in the marriage.
In subsequent decisions, Bums began constructing a framework of what he
termed "general rules" that formally etched the outlines for the partnership
model. He intended these rules to guide property divisions and to give trial
judges and practitioners a sense of uniformity, certainty and predictability.250
246 See id. at 275-76, 618 P.2d 750 (citing LeClert v. LeClert, 453 P.2d 755 (N.M. 1969);
DeRevere v. DeRevere, 491 P.2d 249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); and In re Marriage of Brown, 544
P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976)).
247 Id. at 277, 618 P.2d at 751 (emphasis added).
248 See id. at 278, 618 P.2d at 751.
249 See ida t 273, 618 P.2d at 749. The factor of 18/20 consisted of the number of years that
Sgt. Linson was in the military while married but prior to separation (eighteen years) divided
by the number of years that Linson needed to serve in order for his retirement to vest (twenty
years). See id.
250 See Hashimoto v. Hashimoto, 6 Haw. App. 424, 725 P.2d 520 (1986). In Hashimoto,
Bums explained his insistence on setting standards. Although not intended to be "fixed rules"
for determining the amount of property to be awarded to each spouse at divorce, these standards
provided a starting point from which to perform the equitable distribution analysis required by
statute. See id. at 426, 725 P.2d at 522. Burns was clearly bothered by the notion that without
any guidelines, two cases presenting identical facts could yield widely disparate results
depending on who the judge was. See id at 426-27, 725 P.2d at 522-23. Not only did this raise
serious questions about the consistency of court decisions but also made it more difficult for
attorneys to make reasonable predictions about outcomes, advise clients and propose negotiating
positions. See infra note 283.
At a state family law conference, Bums made the following remarks:
Many of you know by now that I am a big fan of standardized rules and procedures,
uniform principles and manuals. Prior to the 1980's, family court lawyers enjoyed
standardized rules and procedures and uniform principles in divorce cases. But that was
because one judge in each circuit decided all the cases. And for those of you who are old
enough to remember, the line of succession went from Judge Corbett to Judge King to
Judge Lum to Judge Vitousek.
Chief Judge James Burns, Introductory Remarks at the 1995 Family Law/Hawai'i Continuing
Legal Education Institute (Dec. 7, 1995).
Bums' point was that by knowing the one presiding judge and his or her style, preferences
and tendencies, one could reasonably project a range of possible outcomes and plan accordingly.
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He stated his first general rule in the 1983 decision of Raupp v. Raupp.25'
Writing for the court, Bums determined that it was generally equitable to
award each divorcing party the date of marriage net value of his or her
premarital property.252 In addition, the court held that it was generally
equitable to award to each party the date of acquisition net value of gifts and
inheritances which he or she received during the marriage.253
Two months after Raupp, in another decision by Burns in Takara v.
Takara,2M the ICA declared another general rule: that it was generally
equitable to award each divorcing party one-half of the net value of jointly
held property.255 A final general rule came in Cassiday v. Cassiday56 in
As explained in Hashimoto, Bums was also concerned about facilitating appellate review
under the abuse of discretion standard. See Hashimoto, 6 Haw. App. at 427, 725 P.2d at 523.
3 Haw. App. 602, 658 P.2d 329 (1983). The Raupps were already in their forties at the
time of their marriage in 1970. See id. at 603, 658 P.2d at 331. Both owned property
premaritally, with Mrs. Raupp owning substantially more, including several parcels of real
property. See id. at 603-05, 658 P.2d at 331-33. Unlike the marriage in Au-Hoy, the union here
saw significant mixing of premarital property with marital property (or the transformation of
premarital into ostensibly marital property) over the ten-year marriage. See id. at 608, 658 P.2d
at 334. For example, the parties worked together to form a mobile food concession called "The
Chew Chew Caboose" which consisted of a trailer attached to a pick-up truck. See id. at 606,
608, 658 P.2d at 333-34. During the marriage, the parties liquidated premarital property to
acquire other properties, some of which was used to finance the start-up and maintenance of the
"Caboose" and to cover day-to-day living expenses. See id. at 608, 658 P.2d at 334.
The ICA also used the opinion to set forth "nuts and bolts" directives on how parties were
to identify and organize specific values and items of property to help a trial court sift through
the information enroute to fashioning a property award. See id. at 609, 658 P.2d at 335.
252 See id. at 610, 658 P.2d at 335.
25 See id. at 611, 658 P.2d at 336.
' 4 Haw. App. 68, 660 P.2d 529 (1983). This case involved a two-and-a-half year
marriage. The husband in this case inherited three parcels of real property before the marriage.
See id. During the marriage, husband converted two of these parcels into tenancies by the
entirety and the parties purchased a third parcel together. See id.
The trial court awarded all parcels to the husband except for a one-half interest in one of the
parcels that husband had turned into a tenancy by the entirety. This one-half interest was
awarded to the wife. See id at 70, 660 P.2d at 531. The ICA affirmed the lower court decision
finding that the relatively short marriage justified deviation from the rule that jointly held
properties should, as a general proposition, be divided equally. See id. at 71, 660 P.2d. at 532.
25 See id. It is interesting that in Takara, pieces of jointly owned property were not in fact
equally divided, general rule notwithstanding. There were three jointly-held properties, two of
which became joint after husband conveyed them to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entirety. See id at 68, 660 P.2d at 530. The third was purchased together. Of these three, the
court only divided one equally. See id. Various circumstances, including the fact of the gifts
from the husband and the relatively short marriage (less than three years), explained the trial
judge's decision. The ICA also upheld the trial court's award to husband of a fourth
parcel-the marital home acquired during marriage under a tenancy by the entirety. See id. at
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which Burns wrote the following:
As a general rule, it is equitable to award each divorcing party one-half of the
after acquisition but during marriage real increase in the net value of property
separately owned at the TOM [time of marriage] or acquired during the marriage
by gift or inheritance and still separately owned at the TOD [time of divorce]. 7
68, 70, 660 P.2d at 530-31. The opinion was oddly silent on why the wife received nothing.
This case illustrated Bums' belief that general rules were not in fact fixed and that deviation was
expected if circumstances so justified.
256 6 Haw. App. 207,716 P.2d 1145 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 68 Haw. 383, 716
P.2d 1133 (1986).
... See id. at 213, 716 P.2d at 1149-50. The court had an earlier opportunity to consider
"during marriage" appreciation of premarital separate property in Takara but declined to
generate a rule. See Takara, 4 Haw. App. at 71, 660 P.2d at 532. It also had a chance to look
at the issue in Raupp but did not do so because appellant/husband had failed to claim any
entitlement to such appreciation during the trial. See Raupp, 3 Haw. App. at 610, 658 P.2d at
335.
The husband in Cassiday was a West Point graduate and retired U.S. Air Force brigadier
general. See Cassiday, 6 Haw. App. at 208, 716 P.2d at 1147. The wife maintained the home
during the thirty-plus years of marriage. See id. at 215, 716 P.2d at 1150. Husband acquired
several pieces of valuable real property through gifts and inheritance during the marriage. He
also owned valuable parcels of land prior to the marriage. See id. at 209-11, 716 P.2d at 1147-
48. In addition, husband made several during-marriage purchases of real estate, placing some
in his name and others in both his and his wife's names. See id. For many of his separate
properties, husband used "nonnarital" funds to purchase or maintain them. To be "nonmarital",
the funds could not have come from income earned during the marriage. See id. at 209, 716
P.2d at 1147 n.3.
The trial court essentially awarded all of the separate property to husband and split the jointly
held properties equally. See id at 209-11, 716 P.2d at 1147-49. Wife was awarded none of the
during-marriage appreciation of husband's separate real property. See id. at 212, 716 P.2d at
1149. In addition, wife was awarded $1,150/month in alimony along with $1,150/month from
husband's military retirement. See id. at 215, 716 P.2d at 1150.
Wife appealed to the ICA arguing primarily that she should have received 50% of the
increased value of husband's separate real property to the extent those increases occurred during
the marriage. See id. at 212,716 P.2d at 1149. These increases were apparently sizable and an
award of 50% would have been substantial. The ICA reversed the property division and
remanded the case to the trial court. See id. at 216, 716 P.2d at 1151.
Wife also argued that her spousal support award was far less than the $5,000/month
allowance she needed to maintain the standard of living to which she had become accustomed
during the marriage. See id at 215, 716 P.2d at 1151. Agreeing with the wife, the ICA reversed
the spousal support order and set forth a sequence of relevant factors for the trial court to
consider. While the factors were enumerated under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47(a),
the ICA used the occasion to list and order what it generally considered most relevant. It
directed trial courts to ask themselves the following:
(1) After taking into account the property awarded in the divorce case, what amount
does the spouse seeking support need to maintain the standard of living established in the
marriage? If no need can be demonstrated, no support should be ordered.
(2) Considering the income of the party seeking support, or what it should be, and the
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 20:1
This last rule announced in Cassiday completed an analytical framework
that tracked the principles of commercial partnership law, which provided a
template for dividing property based on the partnership model of marriage.
In this model, the divorcing partners could generally expect to receive an
equal portion of the partnership's profits (i.e., the net value of the marital
estate), as well as a return of their respective contributions to the partnership
property (i.e., property owned premaritally and brought into the marriage, or
property acquired during marriage by one spouse in the form of gifts or
inheritances).25
During this period, Bums never said that partnership principles were the
basis for his general rules. It is clear, however, that he embraced them. In
Linson, Bums noted that Mrs. Linson had been a "partner[] in marriage" and
could thus share equally in her husband's military retirement. 59 Then later,
in Raupp, Bums sought the point when it became fair to begin deeming the
acquisitions of the parties as property of the union.260 Bums was essentially
income producing capability of the property awarded to him or her in the divorce action,
what is his or her ability to meet needs independently? If the spouse can meet needs
independently, no support should be ordered.
(3) Considering the income of the party from whom support is sought, or what it should
be, and the income producing capability of the property awarded to him or her, what is
his or her ability to meet his or her own needs while meeting the need for spousal support
ofthe other party? See id. at 215-16, 716 P.2d at 1151.
Finding that the trial judge in this case had not answered these questions, the ICA remanded the
case. See id. at 216, 716 P.2d at 1151.
" Hawai'i commercial partnership law provides in relevant part as follows:
Rules determining rights and duties of partners
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined,
subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(a) Each partner shall be repaid the partner's contributions, whether by way of capital
or advances to the partnership property and share equally in the profits and surplus
remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and must
contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the
partnership according to the partner's share in the profits.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425-118(a) (Michie 1993). This section was quoted later by the
Hawai'i Supreme Court as it moved toward a formal acceptance of the partnership model. See
infra note 327.
2 Linson v. Linson, 1 Haw. App. 272, 277, 618 P.2d 748, 751 (1980).
260 In Raupp v. Raupp, 3 Haw. App. 602, 658 P.2d 329 (1983), Bums instructed
practitioners to introduce relevant evidence establishing an itemized description and value as
of the date of marriage of all property owned by the party at the date of marriage. See id at 609,
658 P.2d at 335. This would assist the court in determining the net value of premarital property
as of the date of marriage. Burns recognized that the partnership did not necessarily have to
begin with the formal marriage and considered the possibility that an "economic partnership"
could have existed prior to marriage. See id at 609, 658 P.2d at 335 nn. 7-8. To the extent that
it did exist, Bums thought it might be appropriate to obtain values not at the date of marriage
but when the defacto premarital partnership began. See id This has more recently been labeled
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looking for the birth of a partnership.
He began to more explicitly allude to the partnership model after Professor
Kastely's 1984 article in which she endorsed the model and recommended
how it should apply when dealing with the during-marriage appreciation of
property acquired premaritally and of gifts and inheritances received during
the marriage.26 ' Burns adopted Kastely's position that appreciation of such
separate property should be treated as marital property and divided accord-
ingly. He also agreed with her assessment that failing to do so would suggest
that marriage was "only a partial commitment" and would not encourage
sharing within marriage.262 Accordingly, in Cassiday, Bums instructed the
trial court to reconsider its refusal to grant to the homemaker wife 50 percent
of the ostensibly substantial "during marriage" appreciation of the husband's
separate real property holdings.26 a
However, it was not until the Hawai'i Supreme Court reversed several of
Bums' decisions and caused him to reformulate his analysis in subsequent
decisions, that the partnership model shot through the surface to become the
guiding principle for the division of property. Amid the sometime-heated
exchanges between the two appellate courts, the partnership model remained
a point of agreement and therefore served as the starting point for each new
reformulation. The next section describes this period of conflict, growth and
definition.
Ill. FORGED UNDER FIRE: THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL EMERGES
A. Developing Uniform Starting Points
It was Bums' Cassiday decision that suffered the first reversal by the
Hawai'i Supreme Court.2" The reversal came within twelve months of the
"DOLT' or the "date of living together." Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai'i 319, 324, 933 P.2d
1353, 1358 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).
Burns later came up with the term "DOFSICOD" or "date of final separation in
contemplation of divorce" to signal the de facto end of the marriage and therefore the
partnership. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 7 Haw. App. 11, 11,740 P.2d 36, 37 (1987).
261 See Kastely, supra note 1, at 391.
262 Cassiday v. Cassiday, 6 Haw. App. 207, 213,716 P.2d 1145, 1149-50 n.7 (1985). Bums
referred the reader to Kastely's article for the rationale of this new general rule, and thus by
reference, could be said to have adopted her concerns for sharing and equalization of ownership.
263 See Cassiday, 6 Haw. App. at 213,716 P.2d at 1149-50.
264 Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383,716 P.2d 1133 (1986).
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ICA decision.265 In a decision by Chief Justice Herman Lum,2  the supreme
court determiined that the ICA's general rule which equally split the during
marriage appreciation of separate property, "creat[ed] a rebuttable presump-
tion that separate property should be evenly divided" thereby restricting the
statutory grant of discretion to family court judges.267 The court considered
it a "fixed rule" that was not authorized by Hawai'i Revised Statutes section
580-47268 and directed the trial judge to do the multi-factorial analysis required
by statute and affirmed in the Carson decision.269
Although the partnership model was clearly reflected in Bums' general
rules, it was in Chief Justice Lum's reversal that marriage was first-clearly
described as a partnership.270 Perhaps doing no more than articulating what
practitioners and judges were already thinking, the supreme court noted that
"marriage [wa]s a partnership to which both partners [brought] their financial
resources as well as their individual energies and efforts" and the fact that one
partner brought substantially greater assets to the marriage did not make it any
less of one.27' The court then ran through a number of factors. However, this
time, the court focused on those that highlighted the contributions of the
272homemaker spouse.
265 The ICA decision was dated May 24, 1985. The reversal from the supreme court came
on March 18, 1986, about ten months later.
266 The opinion was authored by Chief Justice Herman Lur who, like Bums, had been
assigned to the family court while sitting on the circuit court bench. Lum served as the family
court's senior judge for approximately five years, succeeding Judge Samuel P. King who
resigned from the bench to accept an appointment as a federal court judge. See 1979-1980 ST.
OF HAW. ANN. REP. JUDIcIARY 15.
267 Cassiday, 68 Haw. at 388, 716 P.2d at 1137.
268 In pertinent part, Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47 reads as follows:
(a) Upon granting a divorce, or thereafter if, in addition to the powers granted in
subsections (c) and (d), jurisdiction of those matters is reserved under the decree by
agreement of both parties or by order of court after finding that good cause exists, the
court may make any further orders as shall appear just and equitable .... (2) compelling
either party to provide support and maintenance of the other party; (3) finally dividing and
distributing the estate of the parties, real, personal, or mixed, whether community, joint
or separate .... In making these further orders, the court shall take into consideration:
the respective merits of the parties, the relative abilities of the parties, the condition in
which each party will be left by the divorce, the burdens imposed upon either party for
the benefit of the children of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-47(a) (Michie 1997)(emphasis added).
269 See Cassiday, 68 Haw. at 388, 716 P.2d at 1137.
270 See id. at 387, 716 P.2d at 1136.
271 See id. This description of marriage as a partnership was written in the context of
describing a common theme among appellate decisions, most of which were authored by Bums.
The description itself drew from Professor Kastely's article. See id.
272 See id. at 387-88, 716 P.2d at 1137.
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The court remanded the case, directing the trial judge to seriously consider
how "the marriage in and of itself affected the accumulation or preservation
of Husband's separate properties. '  In essence, the court was asking: How
much better did Ben Cassiday do because he married Barbara Cassiday? It
noted that during the course of a long marriage, Cassiday rose from major to
brigadier general, benefitted from his wife's efforts at establishing and
maintaining the home, raising the children, and fulfilling the social obligations
expected of a high-ranking officer's wife.274 It further noted that his wife's
efforts had some part in ensuring his success in the military, so much so that
he never had to liquidate or otherwise use any of his separate property to pay
for the needs of the marital unit.275 Thus, the court instructed the trial court
to credit the wife for her contribution to the marriage itself and to factor this
credit into deciding how much of the "during marriage" appreciation to award
her.276 However, it refused to uphold the ICA's rebuttable presumption even
though it was premised on a notion of partnership that emphasized equality
and sharing.2 77 While endorsing the partnership model as a "time-honored
proposition,"278 the court seemed willing to consider that marriages were not
always equal partnerships, that the contributions of one spouse, while
significant, might not warrant an equal division of even marital property.
2 79
Cassiday provoked a quick response from the ICA. Six months after
Cassiday, the ICA issued its decision in Hashimoto v. Hashimoto."' Bums
explained that far from being fixed, his "general rules" were intended to be no
more than "uniform starting points" from which to begin the equitable
273 See id. (emphasis added).
274 See id.
275 See id. at 388, 716 P.2d at 1137.
276 See id. at 388-89, 716 P.2d at 1137-38.
277 See id. at 388, 716 P.2d at 1137.
271 Id. at 387, 716 P.2d at 1136.
279 See id. at 388, 716 P.2d at 1137. The court wrote: "An equal division of the marital
estate may be wholly equitable in one circumstance and grossly unfair in another." See id.
Alternatively, the court was willing to divide property unequally even if the partnership were
equal, as long as other factors justified such a division, for example, if one partner squandered
assets. See id.
Ironically, while the court struck down the "general rule" that "during marriage" appreciation
of separate property should be equally divided, it characterized as "generally accepted" another
general rule: that each divorcing party was entitled to the date of marriage net value of his or
her premarital property and date of acquisition net value of gifts and inheritances which he or
she received during the marriage. See id. at 390, 716 P.2d at 1138. In addition, it generated
what seemed to be a rule of its own: that a trial court could award up to one-half of during-
marriage appreciation to the non-owner spouse depending on the circumstances of the case. See
id. at 389, 716 P.2d at 1138.
280 6 Haw. App. 424, 725 P.2d 520 (1986).
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distribution analysis required by statute."' He urged that in order to promote
"uniformity, stability, clarity or predictability" in judicial decisions, trial
judges should begin their analysis from a series of "uniform starting points.'2 s2
He added that if a departure from these starting points were ordered, trial
judges had to describe with adequate specificity the reasons for the
departure.8 3 To implement this, he assembled a framework.
To begin, Bums created five categories of net market values ("NMVs").
Category 1 consisted of the total NMV of premarital property on the date of
the marriage.24  The during marriage appreciation of such property was
labeled Category 2.285 Category 3 consisted of the NMV of all gifts and
inheritances acquired during the marriage while the NMV of the during marri-
age appreciation thereof was Category 4.286 Category 5 was the total NMV at
the date of divorce minus the NMVs from the other four categories.287 This
final category was an approximation of what would generally be considered
the "marital" estate which, all things being equal, would be divided equally.
Having established these categories, Bums proceeded to set forth the
following uniform starting points for dividing NMVs in each category:
(1) Category 1 (premarital property): 100% to the owner spouse;
288
(2) Category 2 (appreciation of Category 1): 75% to the owner spouse, 25% to
the non-owner spouse;
2s9
281 See id. at 426, 725 P.2d at 522.
282 See id. at 426-27, 725 P.2d at 522-23.
283 See id. at 427, 725 P.2d at 523. Specificity would, in Bums' view, greatly facilitate
appellate review by giving reviewing courts the benefit of knowing how the trial court reached
its decision and whether the decision breached the abuse of discretion standard of review. See
id.
2" See id. at 425-26, 725 P.2d at 522. Category 1 was actually defined as "[t]he date-of-
marriage net market value of all property separately owned at the date of marriage but excluding
the value attributable to property that is subsequently legally gifted by the owner to the other
party, to both parties, or to a third party." Id.
n5 See id. at 426, 725 P.2d at 522. Category 2 was defined as "[t]he during-the-marriage
increase in the net market value of category 1 property that the owner separately owns at the
time of the divorce." Id.
286 See id Category 3 was defined as "[lthe date-of-acquisition net market value of property
separately acquired by gift or inheritance during the marriage but excluding value attributable
to property that is subsequently legally gifted by the owner to the other party, to both parties,
or to a third party." Il Category 4 was defined as the "during-the-marriage increase in the net
market value of category 3 property that the owner separately owns at the time of the divorce."
Id.
2"' Id. Category 5 was actually defined as "[t]he time-of-divorce net market value of all
property owned by one or both of the parties at the time of the divorce minus the net market
values included in categories 1, 2, 3 and 4." Id.
2'8 See id. at 425-28, 725 P.2d at 522-524.
289 See id. This apportionment arose from Bums' observation that the Hawai'i Supreme
Court had allowed the non-owner spouse to have 0% to 50% of the appreciated value of
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(3) Category 3 (gifts and inheritances during marriage): 100% to the owner
spouse;
29%
(4) Category 4 (appreciation of Category 3): 75% to the owner spouse, 25% to
the non-owner spouse; 29' and
(5) Category 5 ("marital" properties): 50% to each spouse.292
The framework reached full-bloom in Woodworth v. Woodworth293 in which
Burns developed the idea that some marriages, and therefore some marital
partnerships, arrived at a de facto end prior to its legal dissolution .2 9  He
called this "the date of final separation in contemplation of divorce," or
"DOFSICOD, 2 95 and developed a Category 6 which consisted of NMVs
specific to this period.296 He determined that if DOFSICOD occurred before
Category I and 3 NMVs. See id. at 428, 725 P.2d at 523. For his uniform starting point, Bums
decided to pick the midpoint of this range or 25%. Correspondingly, the owner spouse's share




293 7 Haw. App. 11, 740 P.2d 36 (1987), overruled in part by Myers v. Myers, 70 Haw.
1434, 764 P.2d 1237 (1988).
29" See id. Prior to the Woodworth decision, Bums fine-tuned the framework of uniform
starting points in Reese v. Reese, 7 Haw. App. 163, 747 P.2d 203 (1987), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 69 Haw. 497, 748 P.2d 1362 (1988). The portions of the Reese decision that were later
vacated did not affect the concept of uniform starting points.
Woodworth dealt primarily with land which the parties purchased as tenants in the entirety.
See Woodworth, 7 Haw. App. at 14, 18-19, 740 P.2d at 39,41. After the purchase, the parties
grew increasingly estranged both emotionally and physically. See id. at 14, 740 P.2d at 39. In
August 1982, husband discussed divorce with the wife and no attempt at reconciliation occurred
thereafter. See id. A few months later, husband built a house on the property, spending about
$39,000. See id. During the divorce proceedings, the trial court awarded half of the aggregate
value of the house and lot to the wife. See id. at 15, 740 P.2d at 39. Husband then appealed,
arguing that the wife deserved none of the value derived from the construction of the house
since the house was built well after the date of final separation. See id.
295 See id. at 15, 740 P.2d at 39-40. DOFSICOD was defined as the earlier of (1) the date
of the completion of the trial or (2) the date when one spouse clearly and unconditionally
communicated to the other by word and/or deed that the marriage in fact ended and that a
divorce was being sought, and thereafter did nothing to communicate anything to the contrary.
See id. at 15-16, 740 P.2d at 39-40.
Bums first described this idea of DOFSICOD in a footnote in Cassiday v. Cassiday, 6 Haw.
App. 207, 209,716 P.2d 1145, 1147 n.2 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 68 Haw. 383, 716
P.2d 1133 (1986).
296 See id at 16, 740 P.2d at 40. An easy way to think of the Category 6 NMV is to consider
it to be the difference between all the NMVs as of the end of trial minus the total NMVs as of
the date of final separation. Technically, the ICA defined the Category 6 NMV as "[t]he
difference between the NMVs, plus or minus, of all property owned by one or both spouses at
the conclusion of the evidentiary part of the trial and the total of the NMVs, plus or minus,
includable in categories 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5." Id.
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the conclusion of the evidentiary part of the trial, and the net market values of
the properties owned by the spouses at the conclusion of trial changed since
DOFSICOD, the difference, plus or minus, should be awarded, as a starting
point, to the legal owner spouse in proportion to his or her legal ownership.297
Essentially, Burns was looking at property as it was acquired or accrued
between the final separation of the parties and their divorce, and recognized
that although the shell of legal status remained, the innards of the marriage
disappeared at DOFSICOD, thereby warranting a departure from the
assumptions made of intact marital partnerships.29
297 See id. at 17, 740 P.2d at 41.
298 See id. In an attempt to approximate the defacto endpoint of the marital partnership to
which the uniform starting points applied, the ICA developed DOFSICOD. The ICA, beginning
in Raupp v. Raupp, 3 Haw. App 602, 658 P.2d 329 (1983), also considered the point at which
the partnership started. See id.
In 1989, in Malek v. Malek, 7 Haw. App. 377, 768 P.2d 243 (1989), the ICA found that
partnerships could begin before the onset of the legal marital relationship, as long as they
developed into marriages. See id. at 379, 768 P.2d at 246.
In Malek, the parties began cohabiting regularly in December 1982 and married in April
1984. See id. at 378, 768 P.2d at 245-46. During the period of cohabitation, husband provided
all the financial support while wife assisted him in his self-employment. See id. at 379, 768
P.2d at 246. In 1986, the parties separated in contemplation of divorce with the proceedings
starting a year later. See id. at 378, 768 P.2d at 245.
At the time of the divorce, the only property of significance was husband's lease of a two-
acre parcel in Maui on which a house was built. See id. On the date of the marriage, the net
market value of the parcel was $113,000. See id. During the two-year marriage, the value
increased by $2,000. See id. The family court judge awarded 50% of the appreciation and 5%
of the date of marriage net market value to wife, totaling $6,150. See id. Both awards deviated
from the applicable uniform starting points but the ICA found no abuse of discretion in the
deviations and affirmed the decision. See id. at 382, 768 P.2d at 248.
There is a brief reference to the wife's contribution to the date of marriage net value of the
property (i.e., the wife "assisted" husband in his work and in the upgrading of the house). This
suggested that the family court judge gave value to the wife's premarital efforts on behalf of the
partnership. See id. at 378-79, 768 P.2d at 245-46.
The ICA distinguished this case from a typical palimony case by stating that this premarital
relation "matured" into a marriage which ultimately ended in divorce. See id. at 379,768 P.2d
at 246. Therefore, the Maui leasehold, although acquired premaritally, was considered part of
the marriage and subject to the uniform starting point analysis then in existence.
Had the parties not married, the result would likely have been different. Appellate courts in
Hawai'i have been slow in recognizing domestic or economic partnerships formed by cohabiting
individuals. The Hawai'i Supreme Court has said that: "[M]arriage holds positive and negative
legal consequences for each party. A person who is not legally married does not qualify for the
positive legal consequences of marriage." Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 275, 832 P.2d 259, 264
(1c92)(internal quotations omitted).
Recent legislative enactments that created domestic partnerships entitling unmarried
domestic partners to many of the economic benefits previously granted to married persons will
necessarily alter this principle. 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 1211-45.
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In Woodworth, Bums also proposed that courts should presume that
property arose from marital efforts and therefore belonged to the marriage,
unless a party could show otherwise.299 As such, the ICA clearly favored the
expectation that marital partners equally share burdens and resources and
should likewise share the marital estate upon dissolving their partnership. It
challenged the spouse seeking to deviate from this expectation to affirmatively
state and prove his case.3 °°
For several years following Woodworth, the ICA continued to issue
decisions that used this partnership-based system of uniform starting points.
With the exception of the Hawai'i Supreme Court decision in Myers v.
Myers,3°' which invalidated the uniform starting point for dividing values
accrued or acquired during the period beginning at DOFSICOD and ending at
divorce (i.e., Category 6), this system remained largely unscathed for
299 See Woodworth, 7 Haw. App. at 17, 740 P.2d at 41. For example, Bums wrote:
The spouse who asserts that a NMV [net market value] is not a category 5 NMV [i.e., the
prototypic marital category] has the burden of proving that assertion. In the absence of
sufficient proof that a NMV is other than a category 5 NMV, then that NMV is a category
5 NMV and the USP [uniform starting point] for dividing it is 50 percent to the husband
and 50 percent to the wife.
Id.
'oo See id.
301 70 Haw. 143, 764 P.2d 1237 (1988).
302 See id. at 150, 764 P.2d at 1242. At issue were two items of property that appreciated
greatly during the two to three year period between DOFSICOD and the divorce. The first was
an option agreement (referred to in the opinion as the "Kaiser Option") to purchase real property
which had been the site of Kaiser Hospital and on which the Hawai'i Prince Hotel now sits. See
id. at 146, 764 P.2d at 1240. The second was an interest in a limited partnership holding Revere
Copper stock (referred to in the opinion as the "Revere Copper investment"). Both had been
purchased by Mr. Myers prior to DOFSICOD as identified by the family court. See id. at 146-
47, 764 P.2d at 1240.
The trial judge equally divided the value accrued up to DOFSICOD then, pursuant to
Woodworth, awarded all of the post-DOFSICOD appreciation to Mr. Myers who was the sole
title-holder. See id. at 147, 764 P.2d at 1240. After the ICA upheld this portion of the decree
as consistent with Woodworth, Mrs. Myers appealed to the Hawai'i Supreme Court. See id.
While keeping intact the remainder of USP framework, the high court struck down the
uniform starting point-i.e., "in proportion to legal ownership"-for property acquired or
accrued during the period between DOFSICOD and the divorce (i.e., Category 6). See id. at
153-54, 764 P.2d at 1243-44. The court found that this starting point amounted to a
presumption that impermissibly stifled the discretion given to the family court by statute. See
id. It found that the ICA's use of titular ownership as a starting point violated Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 580-47's mandate to look beyond mere title in dividing property. See id. at 153,
764 P.2d at 1243.
Given that the USP for the DOFSICOD-to-divorce period was devised to acknowledge the
defacto end of the partnership, it was ironic that the high court alluded to the same partnership
model in nullifying this particular USP. Stating that a final division of marital property "[could]
be decreed only when the partnership is dissolved" the supreme court ostensibly rejected the
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several years and set the standards on which family law practitioners and the
family court came to rely.a'3
B. Gussin v. Gussin: Uniform Starting Points Crumble But Partnership's
in the Crumbs
In 1992, however, the Hawai'i Supreme Court proceeded to finish what it
had started in Myers and nullified the entire system of uniform starting points,
striking out against what it deemed to be hard and fixed rules that unduly
restricted the discretion of the family court as mandated by Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 580-47. Heralded as the "most significant Hawai'i divorce
case decided by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in thirty-two years,"'  the
ICA's notion that a de facto end could precede the de jure dissolution of a marital partnership.
See id. at 154, 764 P.2d at 1244.
To make the point, the high court noted that while some of the post separation growth was
a result of Mr. Myer's efforts and skill, at least some of it arose from external forces such as
rapid changes in the yen-dollar exchange rate which contributed to the increased marketability
and value of the option. See id at 153-54,764 P.2d at 1244. The court considered this "passive
appreciation" to be a significant factor that both the trial court and ICA ignored. See id. The
court suggested that because it had nothing to do with affirmative acts by Mr. Myers, this kind
of appreciation should be attributed to the continuing partnership and divided accordingly. See
id at 154, 764 P.2d at 1244. Had the court accepted Burns' notion that the partnership in fact
devolved into something less, if not disappeared altogether at DOFSICOD, it might not have
stressed this distinction since the appreciation, whether passively or actively obtained, would
have been deemed outside the partnership.
303 Pursuant to Muraoka v. Muraoka, 7 Haw. App. 432, 776 P.2d 418 (1989), standardized
balance sheets or charts (called "Muraoka Charts") used for detailing family assets and liabilities
were regularly prepared and submitted to the family court for review. Not only did these sheets
include a reporting of the applicable assets and liabilities, they also incorporated the categories
of net market values along with the concomitant uniform starting points developed by the ICA.
See Memo of Senior Family Court Judge Daniel G. Heely to All Family Court Judges, Staff and
Attorneys Regarding Muraoka Charts dated June 14, 1991.
While the genesis of this system of uniform starting points and net market values officially
occurred in 1986, its basic structure was not much of a departure from the ICA's earlier system
of general rules. If anything, a labeling change occurred rather than any grand internal
overhauling. Thus, by the time the supreme court nullified uniform starting points in 1992, the
system had been in place for almost a decade.
Amid concerns that the supreme court would ultimately go beyond its Myers decision and
reverse the entire system of uniform starting points, House Bill No. 2470 was introduced to
expressedly authorize courts to utilize a uniform decisional process akin to the kind devised by
the ICA. H.R. 2470, 16th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1992). The intent of the proposed legislation was
to prevent a return to the pre-USP era. Testifying in support of the bill were leaders of the bar's
family law section and the family court. See Yamauchi, supra note 16 at 438-41. Despite the
favorable support, the bill failed to pass. HAW. S. JOURNAL 1992, Reg. Sess. 1517 (1992)(while
the bill cleared the State House, it failed to pass out of the State Senate).
3o4 Yamauchi, supra note 16, at 423 (quoting Special Edition, H.S.B.A. FAM. L. SEC. J.
HAw. FAM. L. No. 7, Sept. 2, 1992, at 1).
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supreme court's decision in Gussin v. Gussin,a°5 left little of the Bums-built
uniform decisional process.3t 6
305 9 Haw. App. 279, 836 P.2d 498 (1991), cert. granted, 72 Haw. 618, 838 P.2d 860
(1991), vacated, 73 Haw. 470, 836 P.2d 484 (1992). Lori Yamauchi's article provided an
interesting description of the cases and events leading to Gussin, and recorded the concern of
practitioners and judges following Gussin. See Yamauchi, supra note 16, at 438-43.
" A year before the Gussin decision, Bums already appeared to sense that his uniform
decisional process faced substantial opposition and imminent reversal from the supreme court.
Perhaps goaded by a dissenting voice within his own court (starting with Bennett v. Bennett, 8
Haw. App. 415, 807 P.2d 597 (1991), Associate ICA Judge Walter Heen authored three
concurring opinions expressing opposition to the system of uniform starting points), Burns
elaborated on his reasons for insisting on a uniform decisional framework.
In writing for the majority in Bennett, Burns reiterated that his framework was
.. . designed to standardize and facilitate the factual analysis, facilitate settlements,
identify the reasons for a particular decision, facilitate appellate review, facilitate the
continued case-by-case development of express and uniform ranges of choice applicable
statewide to similar fact situations, and [brought] as much statewide consistency,
uniformity, and predictability as is possible to family court decisions dividing and
distributing property in divorce cases.
Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 421, 807 P.2d 597, 601 (1991).
He then expanded on how uniform starting points made appellate review more meaningful
in view of the "abuse of discretion" standard of review used in property division cases. See id.
at 422-23, 807 P.2d at 602. Asserting that a trial judge's acceptable range of choices was of
judicial and not legislative origin, Burns opined that absent any guidance in the form of uniform
categories, starting points and range of choices, appellate courts had little choice but to either
defer to the trial court's decision or impose a less deferential standard of review. See id. By
having some guidelines on what choices were within the permissible range, appellate courts
could better gauge if a trial court exceeded its discretion.
In Bennett, Burns also argued that prior supreme court decisions actually supported rather
than proscribed his partnership-based framework. He wrote:
The Hawaii Supreme Court has not disapproved of these developments. Moreover, the
Hawaii Supreme Court has also imposed uniform limits on the family court's range of
choice. For example, in Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 716 P.2d 1133 (1986), the
Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that "[iut is generally accepted that each divorcing party
is entitled to the date of marriage net value of his or her premarital property and the date
of acquisition net value of gifts and inheritances which he or she received during the
marriage" and that the "trial court may award up to half of [the during-marriage]
appreciation [of separate property] to the non-owning spouse[.]" 68 Haw. at 389-90, 716
P.2d at 1138. Subsequently in Myers, it defined "marriage" as a "partnership," thereby
deciding that partnership principles guide and limit the range of the family court's
choices.
Bennett, 8 Haw. App. at 423, 807 P.2d at 602.
Then in Gardner v. Gardner, 8 Haw. App. 461, 810 P.2d 239 (1991), Bums affirmed that
partnership principles guided property division in this state and that his system of uniform
starting points was a working incarnation of those principles. After reviewing the progression
of decisions from his court, he concluded:
In our view, the uniform process we have developed is much better than the prior ad hoc
process and is accomplishing its purposes outlined above. If there is a problem with the
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In Gussin, the parties were married for eight years.' Entering the marriage,
husband owned $42,982 in cash and an apartment worth $33,000.308 During
the marriage, husband sold the apartment and deposited the proceeds as well
as the premarital funds into joint accounts.3 "9 From these joint accounts, the
parties withdrew funds to purchase the jointly-held marital residence.310 The
purchase price was $300,000; the equity grew to $583,000 at the time of
divorce.31'
At the time of divorce, the estate of the parties was estimated at $820,000,
the marital residence being the largest asset.31 Of the $583,000 attributed to
the marital residence, the family court first awarded $101,026 to husband,
which represented a return of the date of marriage value of his cash and
apartment with an adjustment for inflation. 313 'The remaining value of
$481,974 was divided evenly. 314 The wife filed an appeal arguing that the trial
court erred in returning the date-of-marriage value of husband's premarital
property.31 5 She reasoned that husband's premarital property had "trans-
muted" into marital property or, in the alternative, had been gifted to her.31 6
uniform process, it is with its implementation, not with the process itself. The appropriate
solution to an implementation problem is to require proper implementation, not to
discontinue the process.
Therefore, we reemphasize that the uniform process is only a process. USPs are only
starting points. There are currently only a few limits on the family court's range of
choice. Subject to these few limits, the family court currently has, and must
knowledgeably exercise, a wide range of choice and equitable discretion when deciding
how to divide and distribute property in divorce cases.
Id. at 469-70, 810 P.2d at 244.
Responding to Associate Judge Heen's challenge, Bums stiffly asserted:
[Jludge Tanaka and I conclude that as an appellate court we have the power to require
all family court judges to start their equitable distribution analysis from uniform starting
points. The primary purpose of categorization is to facilitate the uniform starting points
and the uniform decisional process. If there can be no uniform starting points, then
categorization and the uniform decisional process are exercises without any useful or
meaningful purpose. Therefore, we reaffirm the categories, the uniform starting points,
and the Muraoka decisional process.
Id. at 471, 810 P.2d at 244.
30 See Gussin, 73 Haw. at 473, 836 P.2d at 487.




332 See id. at 473, 836 P.2d at 487.
313 See id. at 476, 836 P.2d at 488.
314 See id.
315 See id.
316 See id. The estate also included assets in Kaneohe, Kona and Kauai which had been
husband's separate property. See id. at 477, 836 P.2d at 488. The during-marriage appreciation
of these properties amounted to $120,796. See id. The family court awarded 100% of the date
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Unlike Myers, which invalidated only the uniform starting point for values
accrued after DOFSICOD, Gussin presented the court with net market values
from a variety of categories, including premarital properties and their
appreciation, and jointly held property acquired during the marriage. Thus,
the court was in a position to cut a wider swath, and it did. Expressing the
same concerns it had in Cassiday, the high court voided all remaining uniform
starting points (i.e., for Categories 1 through 5) finding them to be "rebuttable
presumptions" that "undeniably restrict[ed] the exercise of the family court's
wide discretion. 317
Cognizant, however, of the purposes and goals of the ICA's scheme,318 the
high court advised the following:
To the extent that a certain degree of "uniformity, stability, clarity or predictabil-
ity" of family court decisions can be attained, while ... preserving the wide
discretion mandated by H.R.S. [section] 580-47, judges are compelled to apply
the appropriate law to the facts of each case and be guided by reason and
conscience to attain a just result.
319
The court then stated "we conclude that our acceptance of the 'partnership
model of marriage' provides the necessary guidance to the family courts in
exercising their discretion and to facilitate appellate review. 320
While gutting the ICA's uniform decisional process, the Gussin decision
affirmed the partnership model as a guiding model. However, it said little to
help judges and lawyers transform rhetoric into practical application. What
Gussin effectively did was return trial courts and attorneys to the pre-"general
rule" era when each judge was called upon to discern as many relevant factors
as he or she could, and to individually fashion a result that seemed equitable.
The reference to "partnership principles" appeared well-intentioned but
perfunctory without any cogent instructions to replace those created by the
ICA.32'
of marriage value (with an adjustment for inflation) of these properties to husband and split the
appreciation 85% to 15% in favor of the husband. See id. Wife objected to the application of
an inflation factor to the principal which effectively lowered her 15% share in the appreciation
to 12%. See id.
317 Id. at 482, 836 P.2d at 490. The supreme court noted that Bums' relabeling of "general
rules" to "uniform starting points" did not in any way resolve the high court's objections to
rebuttable presumptions as stated in its Cassiday decision. See id. at 481, 836 P.2d at 490.
318 The high court called the ICA's purposes and goals "commendable." See id. at 485, 836
P.2d at 492.
"9 Id. at 486, 836 P.2d at 492.
320 Id. (emphasis added).
321 In Gussin, Chief Justice Herman Lum wrote a dissent in defense of Bums' process of
uniform starting points. Lum wrote that in the interest of giving litigants some modicum of
predictability, the use of reference points from which to begin (and not end) an analysis was not
violative of the Hawaii Revised Statute section 580-47(a)'s grant of judicial discretion in the
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C. Tougas v. Tougas: A Begrudging About - (Saving) Face; Partnership
Gets its Imprimatur
The supreme court's sudden dismantling of a familiar and well-accepted
system of standards was predictably disruptive.32 In addition, the discordance
of seeing the court's support of partnership principles on one hand, and its
rejection of rules arising from those principles on the other, was
discomfiting. 323 Compelled by this, the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Tougas v.
Tougas324 made an apparent attempt to fill the void. While reaffirming its
resolution of property disputes. See Gussin, 73 Haw. at 494-95, 836 P.2d at 496 (Lum, C.J.,
dissenting). Ironically, it was Chief Justice Lum who authored the 1986 Cassiday decision
which reversed the ICA's "general rules." See Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 716 P.2d
1133 (1986).
3' Following Gussin, the Journal of Hawai'i Family Law, which represented the voice of
the practicing family law bar, predicted dire consequences:
The effect of Gussin is potentially quite adverse.
(a) Because the requirement of the preparation and presentation of balance sheets
detailing all family assets and liabilities under Muraoka v. Muraoka, 7 Haw. App. 432,
776 P.2d 418 (1989) has been effectively abolished by Gussin, there is a serious concern
that many Family court practitioners will no longer take the time, and divorcing clients
will no longer want to expend the resources required, to adequately organize and present
the financial aspects of their cases, the result being that many cases will now be
negotiated and tried without sufficiently comprehensive information regarding the nature
and extent of the marital estate.
(b) As a result of Gussin's invalidation of all of the guidelines that have heretofore
allowed attorneys and judges to predict a reasonable range of outcomes, fewer cases will
settle as each divorcing party will more likely believe that at least some judge unrestricted
by any guidelines will agree with their subjective view of what is or is not "just and
equitable" under the circumstances.
(c) Cases will cost more to prepare and present, given the increased uncertainty as to
what information is, or is not, essential or even relevant to the resolution of the economic
issues in the case.
(d) Outcomes will become more diverse, depending almost entirely on the individual
ethics, values, and morality of the particular judge deciding the case.
(e) Cases which are now pending in the family court may have to be delayed or
suspended to allow attorneys to assess whether the fact that Gussin has completely
changed the ground rules for dividing property incident to divorce requires an entirely
new presentation of facts in each case.
Special Edition, H.S.B.A. FAM. L. SEC. J. HAW. FAM. L. No. 7, Sept. 2, 1992, at 1-2.
323 See id. at 2.
324 76 Hawai'i 19, 868 P.2d 437 (1994). This case presented a richer fact pattern when
compared to Gussin. Ray Tougas had worked in the commercial underwater diving industry
prior to marriage. See id. at 22, 868 P.2d at 440. Carol Tougas completed graduate work in
public health administration prior to the marriage and had been a finalist for a position with the
Hawaii Medical Service Association. See id She went to work instead with husband who was
then manager of Isle Dive. See id. Soon thereafter, the parties pooled their resources to form
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rejection of the "hard and fixed" rules embodied in the ICA's framework of
uniform starting points, the Tougas court clearly but cautiously responded to
the confusion and discontent that followed Gussin.
First, the supreme court retained the ICA's five categories of net market
valuesa25 and affirmed the ICA's assignment of partnership terms to at least
three of the categories. Then, quoting a Bums-authored opinion, the court
approved the following description:
The NMVs [net market values] in Categories 1 [premarital property] and 3
[property acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance] are the parties' capital
contributions to the marital partnership. The NMVs in Categories 2 ["during
marriage" appreciation of Category 1] and 4 ["during marriage" appreciation of
Category 3] are the during-the-marriage increase in the NMVs of Categories 1
and 3 properties owned at DOCOEPOT ["date of the conclusion of the
their own commercial diving company with the wife in charge of administrative duties and the
husband conducting diving services. See id. This all occurred during the parties' period of
premarital cohabitation; living expenses were shared at the time. See id.
The parties' business flourished. The efforts of both contributed to the success. See id. The
parties married in 1979 after five years of living together. See id. Just prior to the marriage,
Ray purchased two condos. See id. The parties jointly bought a marital residence. See id.
After the birth of a child in 1980, Carol worked part-time, conducting business from home. See
id. at 22-23, 868 P.2d at 440-41.
During the marriage, the parties acquired additional properties and investments by way of
a real estate investment company owned by Carol's father, Calvin Bright of California. See id.
at 23, 868 P.2d at 441. Carol was also a partner/beneficiary of a partnership created by her
parents prior to the Tougas marriage; this partnership was intended to benefit Carol and her
siblings to the exclusion of spouses and significant others. See id. Ray signed a release of any
interest in the partnership. See id. The value of the partnership assets was apparently
significant. A second partnership was later created during the Tougas marriage and was
intended to benefit only the Bright children although no specific release was signed by Ray. See
id.
The parties separated in November of 1985 and Ray filed for divorce in January 1987. See
id Prior to trial, Ray filed a motion to compel discovery of the value of the Bright partnerships.
See id. He argued that knowing the values of Carol's separate holdings was essential to making
a fair and fully informed split of the marital estate, as well as, in correctly deciding child and
spousal support. This resulted in a series of court proceedings in both California and Hawai'i
which engendered full faith and credit issues. See id. at 24-25, 868 P.2d at 442-43. After a
California appellate court granted Ray's request for financial information, HawaiTs family
court concluded that information regarding Carol's separate holdings, including her partnership
holdings, was relevant to assessing her financial condition after the divorce and determining
child and spousal support. See id. at 29, 868 P.2d at 447.
The family court judge evenly divided the marital residence. See id. at 25, 868 P.2d at 443.
She also awarded Ray all of the premarital value of the diving business and 75% of the post
marital value. See id. Carol's interests in the two Bright partnerships were left intact and she
received the remaining 25% of the family business' post marital value. See id. Both parties
appealed. See id.
32 See id. at 27, 868 P.2d at 445.
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evidentiary part of the trial" - effectively, the date of divorce]. Category 5 is the
DOCOEPOT NMV in excess of the Categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 NMVs. In other
words, category 5 is the net profit or loss of the marital partnership after
deducting the partners' capital contributions and the during-the-marriage
increase in the NMV of property that was a capital contribution to the partner-
ship and is still owned at DOCOEPOT.
26
Referring to commercial partnership principles, under Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 425-118(a), the court acknowledged that "[e]ach partner shall
be repaid the partner's contributions ... and share equally in the profits and
surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied;
and must contribute towards the losses, ... sustained by the partnership
according to the partner's share in the profits. 3 27 The court then added "if
there is no agreement between the husband and wife defining the respective
property interests, partnership principles dictate an equal division of the
marital estate 'where the only facts proved are the marriage itself and the
existence of jointly owned property.""" This could be fairly read to
approach, if not endorse, the ICA's starting points for Category 1, 3 and 5; i.e.,
all things being equal, 100 percent of separate property to the owner spouse,
and an even split of the marital property.329
Then in a surprising turn, the court acknowledged that while family court
judges were accorded wide discretion, it was legitimate to expect a degree of
"uniformity, stability, clarity or predictability" in judicial decision making,
and that trial judges were therefore "compelled to apply the appropriate law
to the facts of each case and be guided by reason and conscience to attain a
just result.' 3, 3 The "appropriate law," declared the court, was the partnership
model.331
326 Id. at 27, 868 P.2d at 437 (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 8 Haw. App. 461, 467, 810 P.2d
239, 240 (1991)).
327 Id. at 27-28, 868 P.2d at 445-46 (quoting Gardner, 8 Haw. App. at 464-65, 810 P.2d at
242).
328 Id. at 28, 868 P.2d at 446 (quoting Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 484, 836 P.2d 484,
491 (1992)).
329 Less clear was whether Tougas provided guidance for the treatment of during-marriage
appreciation of separate property, i.e., Categories 2 and 4. In quoting commercial property
concepts, the supreme court left open the possibility that such appreciation could be considered
"profits" of the partnership and therefore be divided equally. However, this seems somewhat
discordant with the court's decision in Cassiday which capped at 50% an award of such
appreciation to the non-owner spouse. The Cassiday decision viewed an even split as one
extreme within a range of possibilities rather than a commonly expected result. This was
resolved in more recent decisions.
... Id. (emphasis added).
331 Id.
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In essence, the Tougas decision was a begrudging concession to the ICA.
Tougas acknowledged that partnership principles provided the foundation for
decision making in property division, but that deviation would be required if
these principles produced an unjust result. The high court cautioned against
perfunctory applications and required that reason and good conscience
determine the appropriateness of the partnership model.332 Thus, in indirect
terms, the court approved a process that provided a place from which decision
makers could start but then quickly detour if appropriate. Forced to expand
upon the partnership rhetoric of the Gussin decision, the Tougas court
ostensibly tried to meet the call for certainty, uniformity, stability and
predictability, while avoiding an embarrassing concession to the ICA's system
of uniform starting points.
D. Hussey v. Hussey: Burns Gets the Last Word (For Now)
While accepting the Hawai'i Supreme Court's "concession,"333 the ICA
clearly favored more clarity and precision than the Tougas decision provided.
Using Tougas and its explicit and more detailed endorsement of the partner-
ship model, the ICA began work on a new structure that in some respects was
more elaborate than the one voided in Gussin. Because its commitment to the
partnership model was already demonstrated in its string of decisions spanning
over a dozen years, this new structure was less an advancement of the model
than it was a pragmatic device to ensure the kind of clarity that the ICA sought
since the early 1980's.
The ICA was silent after Gussin. But seven months after the Hawai'i
Supreme Court's Tougas decision, the ICA was ready to launch its
response.334 The lob was at once cautious and bold; cautious in how it
threaded within the lines drawn by Gussin, bold in how it thrusted forward
using what it had (and maybe more). The ICA's response came in the form
332 See id.
133 Bums saw Tougas as an attempt by the high court to right its course. He described it as
a return to sanity, akin to passing through adolescence and headed toward full adulthood:
To me it's been like being involved with the growth of a child. Those of you who are
parents who have lived through that process will understand. Our child was a terrible teen
in 1992 when the Hawai'i Supreme Court's opinion in Gussin undid most of what had
been accomplished in the prior twelve years. It took fifteen months for our child to pass
through the terrible teen period, regain sanity and return to the path of maturity. That
happened when the Hawai'i Supreme Court in 1994 filed its opinion in Tougas. And our
child still has a way to go to becoming a mature child.
Chief Judge James Bums, Comments at the Family Law Section/HICLE Annual Divorce Update
(Dec. 7, 1995).
334 Tougas was decided on February 7, 1994. Hussey was issued on September 30, 1994.-
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of Hussey v. Hussey335 which set the tone and direction for all post-Gussin
ICA decisions to date.336
Benjamin and Rebecca Hussey were married on June 22, 1974, and had
three children who were ages 16, 15, and 13, at the time of the divorce
proceedings in May 1990" The parties separated in April 1990.338
The divorce decree, filed on October 21, 1991, awarded custody of the
children to plaintiff Rebecca and ordered Benjamin to pay $330 per month in
child support.39 At the time of the trial, Rebecca's gross income was $1,110
per month and Benjamin's was $1,216 per month.3 4°
On the issue of property division, the trial court ordered the following
awards which triggered Rebecca's appeal:
To Benjamin:
1. A residence at 3229 Ho'olulu Street in Kapahulu ("Kapahulu House").
Benjamin had inherited a remainder interest in the property subject to his
uncle's life estate in 1967, several years before the marriage."4 The uncle,
who was age eighty-one at the time of trial, lived in the structure with
Benjamin.342 At trial, the fair market value ("FMV") was set at $410,000, a
marked jump from a previous FMV of $84,500 in February 1977. 343 There
was no evidence of the FMV at the time of marriage.'
The Kapahulu House was the marital residence from the time of marriage
in June 1974 to the April 1990 separation." The property was used to secure
a $120,000 loan taken jointly by the parties and Benjamin's uncle.31 This
debt culminated a series of mortgage debts incurred during the marriage to pay
the parties' personal debts and family expenses."
335 77 Hawai'i 202, 881 P.2d 1270 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994).
336 At this writing, the ICA has reported four decisions after Hussey, including: Epp v. Epp,
80 Hawai'i 79, 905 P.2d 54 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995); Markham v. Markham, 80 Hawai'i 274, 909
P.2d 602 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996); Kreytak v. Kreytak, 82 Hawai'i 543, 923 P.2d 960 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1996); and Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai'i 319,933 P.2d 1353 (Haw. CL App. 1997). See
also infra note 433.
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2. A $5,100 truck subject to a $4,000 debt.34
To Rebecca:
1. A residence at 1478 Kaleilani Street in Pearl City ("Pearl City
House"). 49 Rebecca had inherited the property from her mother who had died
in 1983 but whose estate had not closed until 1989.31 The trial court received
no evidence regarding the FMV when Rebecca's interest vested in 1983.
3,
1
The date-of-trial value was $175,000 subject to Rebecca's mortgage debt of
$80,000, a part of which was used to make late payments on the debt secured
by the Kapahulu house.352
2. A $2,000 bank money market certificate inherited from her mother.353
3. The proceeds from the sale of her 1987 Mazda with an estimated value
of $11,000. 354 The court received no evidence on how much was received
from the sale.355
Cast in terms of the categories of net market values preserved in Tougas,
the award was as follows:
Rebecca Benjamin




Category 5 $11,00 $1,100356
What apparently triggered Rebecca's challenge was how the trial court
treated the "during marriage" appreciation of the Kapahulu House. The court
gave all $205,500W57 to Benjamin although: 1) the property had been used to
secure a loan that paid for marital and family debts; 35' 2) the loan was repaid





352 See id. at 204-05, 881 P.2d at 1272-73.




357 The $205,500 figure was derived by subtracting the FMV in February 1977 ($84,500)
from the FMV ($410,000 - $120,000 encumbrance) at the time of the divorce hearing. The
family court apparently thought that the February 1977 FMV was an adequate substitute for the
date-of-marriage FMV three years before. See id. at 204-05, 881 P.2d at 1272-73.
151 See id. at 204, 881 P.2d at 1272.
159 See id. at 205, 881 P.2d at 1273.
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the parties' seventeen-year marriage.' The court reasoned that the apprecia-
tion was largely a passive one to which Rebecca contributed little, if anything
at all.361 In addition, the trial judge thought it unfair to force the sale of the
home in order to apportion to Rebecca a share of the appreciation.362
For the ICA, this provided the fodder for its first foray since the Gussin-
Tougas decisions. It began by recounting the lines drawn by the high court's
decisions, including their clear reference to the use of partnership principles
to guide and limit the range of the trial judge's statutorily mandated
discretion.363
Then came the creative part. To start, the court defined three new terms:
1) Premarital Separate Property; 2) Marital Separate Property; and 3) Marital
Partnership Property."' Premarital Separate Property ("PSP") referred to all
property owned by each spouse immediately prior to marriage or to cohabita-
tion culminating in marriage.365 Upon marriage, all PSP converted to either
Marital Separate Property or Marital Partnership Property.36 The court
determined that Marital Separate Property ("MSP") did not belong to the
marital partnership and therefore could not be divided upon dissolution of the
partnership. 67 Correspondingly, the court found that only property belonging
to the marital partnership--i.e., Marital Partnership Property-could be
divided. 68
To determine what did not belong to the partnership, the ICA developed
three categories of excluded property. These included all property, belonging
to one or both spouses, that:
(1) was excluded from the marital partnership by an agreement in conformity
with Hawai'i's Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (Hawai'i Revised Statutes
Chapter 572D);36
(2) was excluded from the marital partnership by a valid contract;370 or
(3) was (a) acquired by gift or inheritance during the marriage, then (b)
expressedly classified by the donee/heir spouse as his or her own separate
property, and (c) after acquisition, maintained by itself and/or by sources other
'60 See id. at 204, 881 P.2d at 1272.
361 See id. at 205, 881 P.2d at 1273.
362 See id.
363 See id. at 206, 881 P.2d at 1274.
364 See id. at 206-07, 881 P.2d at 1274-75.
365 See id. at 206, 881 P.2d at 1274.
366 See id.
367 See id. at 207, 881 P.2d at 1275.
'6 See id.
369 See id.
3 0 See id.
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than one or both spouses and funded by sources other than MPP or marital
partnership income.37'
Anything that meets one of the above definitions is MSP, while all else is
MPP. The former is not divisible, the latter is. Where MSP conceivably
impacts the final division is how it contributes to "the respective separate
condition of the spouses. 372 For example, while MSP cannot itself be
divided, it may, as a matter of fairness, sway a court to consider a lesser award
of MPP to a spouse already in possession of a very large cache of MSP.
After determining what belongs to the partnership and is therefore available
for division, Hussey instructs courts to appropriately slot the properties into
the five categories of net market values. Tracking the Gussin-Tougas line that
"[e]ach partner shall be repaid the partner's contributions ...and share
equally in the profits and surplus remaining after [satisfaction of] all
liabilities, including those to partners," and drawing from Tougas the idea that
partnerships assume the equality of all valid and relevant circumstances, the
ICA advanced the following:
(1) That all Category 1 and 3 properties be considered "partnership contribu-
tions" and should therefore be repaid in whole to the contributing spouse; and
(2) That Category 2, 4 and 5 properties represent profits (or losses, if negative)
of the partnership and should therefore be attributed in equal shares to each
spouse.373
As with its earlier scheme, Hussey directed trial courts to deviate from this
division when all valid and relevant considerations are not equal.374
While cast in terms of the partnership model set forth by the Gussin and
Tougas decisions, Hussey, as a practical matter, was not a grand swing from
its pre-Gussin predecessors. Where valid and relevant circumstances are
equal, Category 1 and 3 net market values ("NMVs") continue to go to the
contributing partner spouse (formerly the "owner" or "donee" spouse) while
the Category 5 NMV is cleaved down the middle. The difference is in the
Category 2 and 4 NMV which went from 75-25 in favor of the owner or donee




373 Id. at 207-08, 881 P.2d at 1275-76.
374 See id. at 208, 881 P.2d at 1276.
375 Actually, this scheme is reminiscent of what existed before the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
Cassiday decision in 1986 which abolished the ICA's network of "general rules". The pre-
Cassiday general rules also prescribed a 100-0 split of Category 1 and 3 type property and a 50-
50 split of Category 2, 4 and 5 properties. See supra notes 252-53, 255 and 257 and
accompanying text.
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Having rebuilt its sand castle,376 the ICA was ready to go again. It seized
upon the family court judge's rationale for awarding all of the appreciation on
the Kapahulu House to Benjamin. Under the new scheme, the appreciated
value (Category 2) would be divided equally if all valid and relevant
considerations were equal.377
The fact that the trial court had chosen to direct no part of the appreciation
to Rebecca suggested that it found valid and relevant factors tilting against
her. As noted earlier, the family court judge determined that the marked
growth in the value of the Kapahulu House had been a passive one, a function
of local real estate conditions during the marriage.37 What the judge was
looking for was evidence of Rebecca's direct and specific contribution to the
increased value. For example, if some of the marital debts had been incurred
to improve the property, the trial court might have been inclined to make an
award to Rebecca.
3 79
The ICA rejected this, finding instead that:
A spouse's involvement or non-involvement in the existence of a Category 2
NMV is not a valid and relevant consideration for deviating from the Partnership
Model. The fact that the spouse-non-owner did not directly and materially
376 In my family law lectures, I have characterized the development of case law from
Woodworth to Hussey as sand castles continually being built, knocked down and rebuilt by
Bums. Like the building of sand castles, the new structure never quite looks like the one just
leveled. One rebuilds with what is available guided in part by a memory of the previous
structure's best reproducible features.
177 At the time of trial, Gussin and Tougas had not yet been decided. Thus, the guiding
principles at trial were derived from the ICA's line of decisions following the supreme court's
1986 Cassiday holding. Accordingly, the starting point for Category 2 net market values was
75% to the owner spouse (Benjamin, in this case) and 25% for the non-owner spouse (Rebecca).
See Hussey, 77 Hawai'i at 208, 881 P.2d at 1276. Awarding 100% of the appreciated value to
Benjamin meant that the trial court needed to have valid and relevant considerations for taking
the 25%, which would have otherwise been awarded to Rebecca, and giving it to Benjamin.
"Like the real estate in Hawaii, the home just being where it's at[,] irregardless [sic]
probably of the state that it's in[,J the appreciation worked on itself and it just built up just
because it was in Kapahulu in a nice location." Id. at 202, 881 P.2d at 1273.
179 The trial judge made the following statement:
[Ylou [Rebecca] make an argument that the property... was a marital asset and that both
parties contributed to the build up of the appreciation of the property. Unfortunately, I
cannot agree with that ... I didn't hear a shred of evidence that said that... [t]he only
testimony I heard was that the money was used to buy cars, pay off credit card loans, buy
clothes for the children and other household items... [s]o I cannot agree... that this
property was used ... for the building up of the property and the appreciation that has
gone with it.
Id. at 205, 881 P.2d at 1273.
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contribute to a Category 2 NMV is not a valid and relevant consideration for
awarding the spouse-non-owner less than one-half of that Category 2 NMV.3" °
The matter was then remanded to the trial court for reconsideration.38 '
With its Hussey decision, the ICA broke a two-year silence,382 returning
with a framework that, while employing different terms, functioned much like
the one used before the Hawai'i Supreme Court's Gussin 1992 decision. If
there was a major change, it was in how property could be designated as non-
partnership or "marital separate property" and therefore excluded from
division.3 3 The court required clear and definitive evidence proving the intent
310 Id. at 208, 881 P.2d at 1276.
381 See id. at 208-09, 881 P.2d at 1276-77.
382 This is not to say that the ICA was completely silent for the two year period between
Gussin and Hussey. It continued to issue decisions impacting aspects of domestic relations.
However, it was in Hussey that the court took its next significant step toward advancing the
partnership model.
383 The ICA stated that while one's marital separate property could neither be divided nor
serve as an offset against one's share of the marital partnership property, such property could
be used by a trial court to "alter... the ultimate distribution of [Marital Partnership Property]
based on the respective separate conditions of the spouses." Id. at 207, 881 P.2d at 1275
(quoting Tougas v. Tougas, 76 Hawai'i 19, 32, 868 P.2d 437, 450 (1994)). This ability to
glance back at marital separate property indicates that although the marital partnership model
derives certain principles from commercial partnerships, it is not a clone.
In delineating a category of property to be excluded from the partnership, the court
recognized the divide between the marriage as a partnership entity and the non-partnership
interests that the individual spouses might hold. This is consistent with commercial partnerships
in which partners maintain assets (and a life) outside the partnership. Upon dissolution, such
assets are not ordinarily subject to division and distribution to other partner.
On the other hand, the court leaves trial judges with the option to look at a spouse's non-
partnership holdings to help make an equitable distribution of the marital estate. See id. Thus,
a spouse with large marital separate property holdings might be awarded a smaller share of the
partnership pie. This is not ordinary business partnership practice. Taking its lead from
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47 and the Tougas opinion which noted that the family
court should consider the condition of the parties after the divorce, the ICA determined that, in
some cases, doing so meant having to look at a spouse's marital separate property. How a trial
court actually reviews and factors in marital separate property remains unanswered. How it
avoids effectively using marital separate property as a rough offset against a marital partnership
property award may pose a difficult challenge.
Notwithstanding this new conundrum, assessing each parties' condition after the divorce to
include a review of each parties' extra-partnership holdings highlights a presumed centrality of
marriage and curtails the erosion of marital sharing that occurs when spouses are permitted to
insulate certain properties from the partnership. Why do we care far less about the condition
of two parting commercial partners if their condition resulted from the application of a valid
agreement, the provisions of a partnership statute, or both? Could it be that we simply expect
much more of marriage partners, as well as, of marriages? Thus, we resist attempts to
contractually limit marital obligations because they reflect an individual self-interest that
contradicts our cultural expectation of altruism, compromise and mutuality within marriage.
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and act of insulating property from the partnership. How much and what kind
of evidence is needed to meet the court's standard of proof, at least where
intramarital gifts and inheritances are concerned,3  remains subject to debate.
The Hussey decision resurrects the structure - and with it, the certainty,
stability, predictability, and uniformity long sought by the ICA - that was
ostensibly leveled by the Gussin decision. By adding a mechanism for
excluding property from the partnership, the ICA drew a palpable boundary
between what belonged and did not belong to the partnership. In doing so, the
ICA gave the marital partnership model a more tangible and developed feel.
It was as if the ICA, having construed the Tougas decision as a "green light"
to proceed with the partnership model, found the verve to elevate the model
to another level. Whether this move actually goes beyond what the Hawai'i
Supreme Court intended may well be fodder for another appellate decision." 5
But more than resurrecting an analytical framework to guide the day-to-day
decisions of parties, practitioners and judges, the Hussey decision highlighted
the expectations of the partnership model. The next and final section
describes and discusses these expectations.
IV. HUSSEY AND HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS
The partnership model of marriage is seductive in its ideal of the egalitarian
marriage premised on equal power, sharing, and mutual commitment. It
attempts to integrate and promote current cultural ideals regarding marriage
and gender positions.
Apart from encapsulating these ideals, the model has a remedial aspect.
With the advent of at-will divorces, a method had to be devised to secure some
modicum of wealth for a dependent spouse (which more often than not meant
a female homemaker), who previously relied on long-term marriages as the
And so, while we may permit spouses to remove property from the partnership via agreement,
we may also hold them to an obligation to relieve need or compensate for losses arising from
the now-dissolved marriage. Looking at the size of extra-partnership holdings to help weigh
the post-divorce disruptions experienced by each partner signals the ICA's reluctance to fully
segregate the non-partnership sphere from the marital partnership.
'" Gifts or inheritances received during marriage can become marital separate property if
they are "expressly classified" by the recipient spouse as such. See supra note 371 and
accompanying text. What "expressedly classified" entails is an arguable point.
... One could argue, for example, that Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 580-47(a)(3), which
mandates the division of the parties' estate, "whether community, joint or separate," would
prohibit the "stashing away" of separate property. While courts and legislatures have long
recognized the right of spouses to make and enforce agreements among themselves, an
overextension of the right to exclude properties from the partnership may have the effect of
stepping back into the days of title-based property distribution.
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primary source of financial support." 6 Thus, the partnership model distanced
itself from title-based theories of property division which favored the spouse
who legally owned or funded property. It replaced these theories with one
which assumed that spouses contributed to the marriage in different but
equally powerful ways and were therefore entitled to an equal share of the
marital partnership property. This is not to say that the traditional
breadwinner-homemaker pairing is the dominant marital arrangement or even
a prevalent one requiring constant remediation. The partnership model should
be flexible enough to reach all combinations of divided labor within
marriages, but be particularly responsive to arrangements that have histori-
cally left one spouse at a severe disadvantage. To say that the model has a
remedial aspect refers to this capacity to respond when called to do so.
In Hawai'i, appellate courts never alluded to this remedial aspect but shaped
a version of the partnership model that promoted it. Spurred by Hawai'i
Revised Statutes section 580-47(a)(3), which mandated the division and
distribution of the parties' estate, "whether community, joint or separate,"
Hawai'i courts cast a wide net on what was at least theoretically divisible and
distributable.387 That the appreciation of separate property during the
marriage was also subject to distribution, at least on a limited basis,388 added
to the divisible estate. By maximizing the "size of the pot," Hawai'i courts
were positioned to increase the size and amount of property awards to a
316 See supra notes 41, 77, 111, and 159 and accompanying text.
387 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Hawai'i remains in the minority of states that
permits the division of non-marital property. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A
Review of the Year in Family Law: Children's Issues Take Spotlight, 29 FAM. L.Q. 741, 774
(1996).
388 In Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 716 P.2d 1133 (1986), the Hawai'i Supreme
Court affirmed the ICA's position that appreciation of separate property during marriage could
be divided and distributed to the spouse who did not own the principle property. See id. at 388,
716 P.2d at 1137. However, the high court capped the award at 50%. See id. at 389, 716 P.2d
at 1138. This remains the high court's position.
In Hussey v. Hussey, the ICA seemed to suggest that such appreciation should receive
treatment similar to Category 5 property; i.e., start with an equal division and allow deviation
if valid and relevant considerations justify it. 77 Hawai'i 202, 207-08, 881 P.2d 1270, 1275-76.
The court was strangely silent about the 50% cap. In its first decision following Hussey, Epp
v. Epp, the ICA again grouped Category 2 property with Category 5, finding that both
represented profits of the partnership to be divided equally. 80 Hawaii 79, 91-92,905 P.2d 54,
66-68 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995). The suggestion was that beginning with Hussey, Category 2 and
4 properties were to be treated like Category 5 without the 50% cap on awards to the non-owner
spouse. This, too, would have favored the maximization of property available for division.
However, in Markham v. Markham, the ICA clarified its position, realigning it with the 50%
cap set forth in Cassiday. 80 Hawai'i 274, 286, 910 P.2d 602, 614 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996).
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dependent spouse.389 However, the size of the pot is only relevant if adequate
and fair distributions are made. This is where the partnership model, as
rebuilt by the Hussey decision and its progeny,39 is ultimately tested.
Hussey did more than lay out a straightforward scheme which approximated
the property distribution provisions of Hawai'i's commercial partnership
statute. It reasserted expectations that exceeded those ordinarily held among
business partners.39' Having received an apparent albeit reluctant endorse-
ment from the Tougas opinion, the ICA leapt at the chance to spell "partner-
ship" in capital letters.
3a9 The ICA's focus on net market values rather than on individual items of property tends
to favor the marital partnership over individual ownership interests. For example, returning the
"date-of-marriage" net market value of premarital property to the owner spouse while splitting
the appreciation accrued during marriage, facilitates a disassembling of separate property. As
a practical matter, parties seeking to preserve an item of separate property may have to provide
some form of an equalization payment.
The courts also widened its net by adopting a liberal definition of what was "property." In
Linson v. Linson, the ICA construed the divisible and distributable "estate of the parties" to
include "anything of present or prospective value." 1 Haw. App. 272, 278, 618 P.2d 748, 751
(1980). The Linson case involved non-vested retirement benefits.
In addition, the courts' lengthening of the period of the marital partnership from the time of
non-marital cohabitation, assuming that the cohabitation led to marriage, Malek v. Malek, 7
Haw. App. 377, 768 P.2d 243 (1989), through the date of the divorce hearing, Myers v. Myers,
70 Haw. 143, 764 P.2d 1237 (1988), effectively maximized the period during which property
was deemed part of the marital estate.
The ICA also placed the burden of proof upon a party seeking to categorize property outside
Category 5. See Woodworth v. Woodworth, 7 Haw. App. 11, 17, 740 P.2d 36, 41 (1987). This
also had the effect of keeping property within the partnership rather than outside of it.
On the other hand, the Hussey court's decision to create a category of property that was
excluded from the partnership and not subject to division has the apparent effect of diminishing
the pot. However, this diminution may, in some cases, not be as great as it appears. See supra
note 383 and accompanying text.
One clearer instance in which Hawai'i courts appeared to protect separate property was in
the rejection of "transmutation," a process by which separate property is presumably
"transformed" to marital property when certain acts-such as the commingling of separate
property with marital property--occur. See Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 487, 836 P.2d 484,
492-93 (1992). Instead, the party who argues that a transformation occurred bears the burden
of proving the elements of a gift--donative intent, acceptance and delivery. See id. at 489, 836
P.2d at 494. It should be noted, however, that the rejection of transmutation had more to do
with the supreme court's aversion to "rebuttable presumptions" than protecting separate
property. See id. at 488, 836 P.2d at 493.
3 See supra note 336.
391 There have been concerns that the allusion of the supreme court and ICA to commercial
partnership law represent an undue attempt to constrain marital partnerships to the mold and
personality of business entities. See Yamauchi, supra note 16, at 441 (a quote from Charles
Kleintop, Chair of the Hawai'i State Bar's Family Law Section in 1992, suggested that some
of the assumptions in a business partnership were not transferable to a marital partnership, such
as the impersonal arms-length position between commercial partners).
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First, it strengthened the expectation that all premarital properties (Category
1) and gifts and inheritances acquired during marriage (Category 3) were
contributions to the marital enterprise for the purpose of advancing and
generating profits for the marriage. If a partner chose not to make the
contribution, he had to affirmatively act to indicate so. 392  Like capital
contributions or advances that commercial partners bring into a venture,
Category 1 and 3 properties are assumed to provide resources which may be
used to advance and fund the operations of the marriage. However, unlike
commercial ventures where partners decide what portion of their personal
resources are to be invested into the partnership, Hawai'i's marital partner-
ships start with the premise reversed. Consistent with the sharing aspect of
marital partnerships, spouses are presumed willing to contribute all premarital
properties, and gifts and inheritances acquired during marriage, to the
partnership.393 By placing the burden on a spouse to specifically exclude her
separate property from the partnership, the ICA created an expectation that
favored mutuality over individual self-interest.394
392 See Hussey, 77 Hawai'i at 207-08, 881 P.2d at 1275-76.
393 While the property is deemed a capital contribution, it remains the "separate" property
of the owner spouse unless it is clear that a gift to the partnership was made. This duality of
being contributed while remaining separate, finds its roots in the Spanish Civil Code which was
the primogenitor of the partnership model.
The Spanish law of community was one "of acquests and gains during the marriage" thereby
leaving property acquired before the marriage as the non-communal or separate property of the
owner spouse. See 1 WILLIAM QUINBY DEFuNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 149
(1943)(emphasis added). However, it was assumed under the civil code system "that each
spouse would bring into the marriage some property, and in the early days of a primitive society,
this was usually the case." MCCLANAHAN, supra note 30, at 40. The husband usually brought
land, and perhaps, money, cattle and agricultural or shop equipment, the wife usually brought
money, goods and chattels, and perhaps land. See id. This was the capital with which the
marital partnership was formed. See id.
Thus, the expectation was not that one's premarital property would lose its separate identity
and merge fully into the partnership but that it would serve as capital or the raw material with
which the partnership advanced itself financially and otherwise. It was the profits arising from
the use of such separate property that would become true marital property to be divided equally
among the spouses. See Epp, 80 Hawai'i at 92, 905 P.2d at 67 (quoting Gardner v. Gardner,
8 Haw. App. 461,464, 810 P.2d 239, 242 (1991)). The raw material itself would remain the
separate property of the owner spouse to give him or her some independent financial means after
family needs were adequately met. See Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership
Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558,
589 (1974).
Thus, it follows that on divorce, the owner spouse is returned his or her contribution if funds
remain after partnership debts are paid and no circumstance exist to justify awarding a share of
the property to the non-owner spouse.
394 If the sweetness and romance of most weddings are any indication, an assumption
favoring mutuality represents the norm more often than not. Newlyweds ride on hopes of
unspoken and unabridged commitments which include the sharing of premarital estates. It is
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The Tougas court's decision to continue using net market values helped
drive the point home. Free to deconstruct property into categories of values,
the ICA could assert once again that a contributing spouse could only expect
to recoup the value of his initial contribution and not the physical property
itself. This reinforced the fact that the property was indeed contributed.395
The ICA made the point again this year in Jackson v. Jackson.3% The court
was faced with the question of whether to give a spouse Category 1 credit for
the heat of a dissolving marriage that erodes the memory of once noble aspirations and remolds
parties to the self-interested positioning that more typifies business partners.
If the low incidence of written prenuptial agreements continues to be the norm, the Hussey
decision will tend to uphold the assumption that parties willingly contribute their separate
properties to the partnership.
In Hussey, for example, the trial court awarded to the spouses the real property that each
acquired as separate property. 77 Hawai'i at 204, 881 P.2d at 1272. Thus, the husband received
the marital residence to which he acquired title premaritally while the wife received the house
and land in Pearl City which she obtained by way of an inheritance during the marriage. See
i The family court seemed content that each spouse left the marriage with a home, and found
it fair (and probably convenient) to tie the award to the separate estate of each spouse.
The problem, however, was that the husband's Kapahulu House had, by the trial court's
finding, netted an appreciation of about $200,000 during the seventeen-year marriage while the
wife's property had not enjoyed any appreciation. See id. at 205, 881 P.2d at 1273 (actually,
the trial court had used several questionable premises for assessing value and appreciation,
premises that were left unaddressed by the appellate court). Thus, the family court's decision,
which was essentially a title-based one, left each spouse with homes of vastly different values
(husband's was worth about $285,000, wife's was valued at $97,000). See id.
The family court justified its decision by pointing out that much of the appreciation in
husband's Kapahulu House had essentially been passive and not due to any direct contribution
by the wife. See id. The trial judge also rejected the fact that the spouses had used the property
to secure a mortgage obtained to cover family debts. See id The judge indicated that he might
have felt differently had the mortgage been used to actively improve the property. See id. The
trial judge also found it unjust to force the husband to liquidate the property just to give the wife
her share of the appreciation. See id.
Writing for the ICA, Bums found that the trial judge had acted inappropriately. See id. at
206, 881 P.2d at 1273. Assuming that all valid and relevant considerations were equal, Bums
determined that each spouse should have recovered the date-of-marriage or date-of-acquisition
value of his or her separate property and been awarded a 50% share of the during-marriage
appreciation of such property. See id. at 207-08, 881 P.2d at 1275-76. Bums found nothing
in the trial court's reasoning to justify a deviation from this, and rejected the trial judge's
statement that it was unfair to order the sale of the Kapahulu House just so the wife could
receive a share of its "during marriage" appreciation. See id. at 208, 881 P.2d at 1276.
In fact, the Kapahulu House had been used as contemplated by the partnership model. While
remaining in the separate estate of the husband, it was offered and used as the family home for
sixteen years. Its equity was used to borrow money so the personal and household debts of the
spouses and their children could be paid. Similarly, wife had contributed her separate real
property to secure a loan, a part of which was used to cover the debt secured by her husband's
separate real property.
396 84 Hawai'i 319,933 P.2d 1353 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).
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premarital property that no longer existed at the time of the divorce. 397 There
had been a sense that if property did not exist at the time of divorce, its NMVs
could be ignored. 39' However in Jackson, the ICA affirmed that if premarital
property was contributed, but was no longer in existence for reasons other
than gifting (which would either place the property into a category other than
Category 1 or outside the partnership), the contributing spouse should have
restored to him the initial amount of the contribution.399 This decision goes
out on a limb to acknowledge the contribution by authorizing its return to the
contributing spouse, even while decreasing the amount of net market values
available for equal distribution."' In so doing, the ICA elevated the term
"contribution" beyond rhetoric and gave it a bite.
All things equal, it is the profits (i.e., net market values under Categories 2,
4 and 5) generated by these contributions that the marital partners should
expect to share equally regardless of who made the contribution or its nature,
extent and size." In a sharing relationship such as the one embodied by the
partnership model, spouses ideally give their all, not to enjoy a profit
commensurate with their individual effort, but to earn a gain that is brought
home for the benefit of the marital unit. n
97 See id. at 335-36, 933 P.2d at 1369-70.
398 In fact, husband stated that the family court had adopted an unspoken policy of denying
Category I credit if the subject property did not exist at DOCOEPOT. See id. at 335, 933 P.2d
at 1369 n.10.
399 The court actually stated, "[i]f a party does not own the Category 1 property at the
DOCOEPOT, that Category I NMV is a part of the total of the DOCOEPOT NMVs and is
subtracted from the Category 5 NMVs." Id. at 336, 993 P.2d at 1370.
4m An example in the Jackson case was the value of seventeen lots in Haiku, Maui which
were owned by husband's general contracting firm, Jackson Construction, which in turn, was
a subsidiary of husband's successful drywalling company Oahu Interiors. See id. at 323, 326,
336, 933 P.2d at 1357, 1360, 1370. The lots were valued at about $567,000 at the date of
marriage. See id at 336, 933 P.2d at 1370. Before the end of the marriage, the lots were sold
and therefore no longer in the marital estate at the time of the divorce. See id. at 326, 933 P.2d
at 1360. It is assumed that the proceeds of the sale were absorbed into the general assets of
Jackson Construction.
If the net market value of Jackson Construction increased during the marriage, that increase,
which could have included growth of the funds earned through the sale of the Haiku properties,
would have been placed into Category 2 which as a starting premise, could be divided 50-50.
The ICA's decision effectively secured $567,000 of the company's net market value at divorce
and credited it to the husband in recognition of his initial contribution.
"' The ICA stated the principle this way: "The legal principle that unequal contributions
by the partners to an equal partnership do not change the equality of the partnership applies to
unequal contributions at the start of the marital partnership and to unequal contributions during
the marital partnership." Epp v. Epp, 80 Hawai'i 79, 94, 905 P.2d 54, 69 (1995).
4o2 Thus, in both Epp, 80 Hawai'i at 94, 905 P.2d at 69, and Jackson, 84 Hawai'i at 333-34,
933 P.2d at 1367-68, the ICA rejected arguments that the size and extent of a party's Category
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Although we intuitively legitimize sharing of marital profits that appear in
the form of Category 5 net market values (such as that of the marital residence
acquired and owned jointly by the spouses or a joint bank account opened by
the spouses and funded by their marital earnings), doing so for the "during
marriage" appreciation (Categories 2 and 4) of separate property is less
automatic. In fact, states have run the gamut in viewing the appreciation of
separate property, ranging from those that define the growth in separate
property as "separate" to those that consider such growth to be the product of
marital labor and therefore "marital.,,
403
Even before the Hussey decision, Hawai'i's appellate courts tended to
weigh in on the side of awarding a portion of such appreciation to the non-
owner spouse.4°4 Hussey unequivocally reasserted this position, stating that
the Category 2 and 4 net market values (i.e., the "during marriage" apprecia-
tion of Category 1 and 3 properties respectively) were marital profits and
therefore belonged to the marital partners rather than to the owner spouse.4 5
By doing this, the ICA not only expanded the range of marital, as opposed to
separate properties, but emphasized the expectation that the toil of spouses
should always be turned toward the betterment of the marital enterprise.'
Thus, when a spouse spends time and effort during the marriage improving
property acquired premaritally, and the property increases in value, she should
understand that the appreciation belongs equally to her and her spouse. The
result would be the same even if she solely used other separate property to
1 contributions to the development of Category 2 and Category 5 NMVs entitled that party to
a larger distribution of those net market values.
403 Reynolds, supra note 30, at 286. Reynold's article contains an informative description
of this range.
' Recall that in Cassiday v. Cassiday, the Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected the ICA's use
of general rules, reasoning that such rules unduly burdened the trial court's statutorily mandated
discretion to fashion an equitable distribution of property. 68 Haw. 383, 388, 716 P.2d 1133,
1137 (1986). But even while (temporarily) putting an end to the ICA's practice of generating
rules, the high court stated its own rule: that a trial court could award up to one-half of the
appreciation of separate property to the non-owner spouse, if it was fair and equitable to do so.
See id. Although the one-half cap marked the court's regard for separate estates and their
identity, it also suggested the court's view that the intra-marital growth of separate estates could
be marital and therefore distributable to the "non-owner" spouse at divorce.
'05 Hussey v. Hussey, 77 Hawai'i 202, 207-08, 881 P.2d 1270, 1275-76 (Haw. Ct. App.
1994).
40' In referring to the Spanish civil code and Visigothic laws and customs as primogenitor
to American community property law, William DeFuniak wrote:
[A]lthough each spouse retained ownership of his or her separate property, each
unselfishly and unhesitantly had at heart the success and well-being of the marital union
and that, accordingly, the fruits and income of all property of each naturally were to be
devoted to the benefit of the marital union.
1 DEFUNIAK, supra note 393, at 180.
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produce the result and her husband did not directly participate in developing
the growth of the property.
The ICA labeled such effort "marital partnership activity" or a form of
marital labor.' 7 Using this "partnership" label, the court asserted that the
post-divorce sharing of the during-marriage growth in separate property had
little to do with the non-owner spouse's specific contributions to the growth. 8
In the past, courts struggled to find and roughly equalize contributions (i.e.,
homemaking vs. breadwinning, direct vs. indirect) to justify sharing the appre-
ciation.' This is no longer the case, at least not since Hussey."' Classifying
an owner spouse's efforts as a form of marital labor makes that spouse's
activity sufficient to create an entitlement for the entire partnership. The alter-
native would have been to follow the more intuitive path and describe such
efforts in terms of separate gain or self-interest. Choosing against this path
reflects the court's unflinching commitment to promoting the marital
partnership.
The court's path could also be a discomfiting one. For example, when the
ICA in its Epp decision wrote, "(d)uring a marriage, both partners enjoy the
consequences of one partner's successes, 411 did it intend to allow a slothful
partner to fully benefit from the toils of the other? The partnership model
' See Epp v. Epp, 80 Hawai'i 79, 91, 905 P.2d 54, 66 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995); see also
Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai'i 319, 333, 933 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).
o In a number of post-Hussey cases, the ICA summarily rejects as irrelevant and invalid the
argument that the owner spouse's skill and effort solely resulted in the growth of his separate
property. For example, the ICA in Epp ordered the trial court to reconsider its award of 100%
of Category 2 net market values to the owner-wife, rejecting the wife's argument that her
husband's involvement in the property was nil, that his involvement did not go beyond the bald
fact of the marital partnership, and that the couple operated in fact as a non-partnership. See
Epp, 80 Hawai'i at 92, 905 P.2d at 67. Because there appeared to be no evidence of any written
agreement regarding the separate properties in question, the court seemed prepared to assume
a legal and defacto marital partnership and to proceed from there. See id. at 92-93, 905 P.2d
at 67-68.
io In Cassiday v. Cassiday, although the supreme court still looked at specific contributions
from the non-owner spouse, it began to inch away from this kind of analysis and toward a new
partnership-centered theory which considered how the marriage itself contributed to the preser-
vation or accumulation of separate property. 68 Haw. 383, 387, 716 P.2d 1133, 1137 (1986).
410 In Hussey v. Hussey, the ICA announced that "(a) spouse's involvement or non-
involvement in the existence of a Category 2 NMV [net market value] is not a valid and relevant
consideration for deviating from the Partnership Model." 77 Hawai'i 202, 208, 881 P.2d 1270,
1276 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994). In determining the relevance of Rebecca Hussey's lack of direct
contribution to the "during marriage" appreciation of the Kapahulu home, the court wrote, "that
the spouse-non-owner did not directly and materially contribute to a Category 2 NMV is not a
valid and relevant consideration for awarding the spouse-non-owner less than one-half of that
Category 2 NMV." Id.
41 Epp, 80 Hawai'i at 92,905 P.2d at 67 (quoting Hatayama v. Hatayama, 9 Haw. App. 1,
12, 818 P.2d 277, 283 (1991)).
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should assume and encourage full commitment to the marital enterprise by
both spouses.4"2 Thus, while judges may no longer need to wrestle with how
a non-owner spouse specifically helped to increase the value of the other
spouse's separate property, they should hold fast to expectations that each
spouse strove to advance the family and the marital unit. Ideally, the marital
partnership is one which fosters acceptance of a 50% return on a 110% effort
by both partners.
Applying the label "marital partnership activity" to the work of an
individual spouse upon his separate property is consistent with the whole
partnership construct. If Category 1 and 3 properties have in a real way been
integrated into the partnership in the form of capital or an advance, it follows
that working on such properties to increase its value has a similarly integrated
quality. Also, if there is an overarching expectation of sharing, a partner who
expends efforts for individual gain does so at the expense of the marriage, an
expense that can be more easily recouped if the profits are deemed marital
rather than separate. To expect otherwise would work against the partnership.
If the marriage cannot exact a price upon the single-minded efforts of one
spouse to accumulate individual wealth while supposedly laboring under some
expectation of sharing, there would be no disincentive for pursuing the
development of one's separate estate to the detriment of the partnership. It
would diminish the meaning of Category 1 and 3 net market values as
contributions.
412 In Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai'i 319, 933 P.2d 1353 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997), the ICA
implied this expectation. In rejecting the argument that the wife was not entitled to a larger
share of the appreciation in husband's Category 1 property because of her non-involvement in
the growth of that property, the court wrote the following:
Marital partner B's during-the-marriage noninvolvement in the management and
maintenance of marital partner A's premarital investment property is no more a relevant
and valid factual consideration for reducing marital partner B's Partnership Model share
than marital partner B's preparing all of marital partner A's meals or doing all of the
housework are relevant and valid factual considerations for increasing marital partner B's
Partnership Model share.
Id. at 333, 933 P.2d at 1367.
That the court decided not to "bean-count" specific contributions to the growth of a particular
property or to the size of the marital estate did not mean that it stopped expecting each spouse
to apply some threshold of effort or resources to the advancement of the marital unit. This
threshold should at minimum reflect a good faith effort to contribute to the marital unit in the
many different and important ways that family members are called on to pitch in. Meeting that
threshold, whether a spouse's efforts occurred in the workplace, at home, or both, should
generally entitle the spouse to an equal partner's share of the marital estate.
If the court were to cease having high expectations of each spouse, a spouse could choose to
breeze through the marriage without "lifting a finger" then expect to collect his partnership
share of the marital estate at divorce. This would be an unfair result.
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The ICA provided a way to avoid these stringent expectations. By creating
a category of "marital separate property" into which spouses may affirma-
tively and clearly segregate separate property from the partnership, the court
allowed spouses to "switch off" the partnership rules for those properties.4"3
Those who feel strongly enough to buck the norms of marital sharing are
given both the method to, and the burden of, setting alternative expecta-
tions.4"4 Failure to act affirms the normative partnership.
Hussey and its progeny embrace heightened expectations of the marital
partnership and notions of sharing. If Karl Llewellyn was correct about how
divorce laws reflect our notions about marriage," 5 these cases place the state
of marriage in good stead. To the extent that laws project a desired set of
norms and values, and influence our expectations within marriage, these cases
set our sights in the right direction. Most would agree that we continue to
idealize marriage and families as core vessels for love, nurturance and mutual
obligation, and should permit spouses to hold each other to standards of
behavior consistent with this ideal. A model that strives to hold this ideal as
its premise cannot be too far afield.
Bred from this ideal, Hawai'i's incarnation of the marital partnership model
serves as a vehicle for redistributing property to spouses who may have come
into the marriage with relatively few assets or who, because of primary
caregiving duties within the marriage, developed a lesser capacity for
acquiring wealth independently. This is the model's remedial aspect. With
this in mind, we close with two cautionary notes, or perhaps, reminders.
413 See Hussey, 77 Hawai'i at 206-07, 881 P.2d at 1274-75.
414 However, should the norm of sharing and the expectations of the partnership model
articulated in Hussey and its progeny govern marriages that preceded these opinions? For
example, spouses who never anticipated these decisions, may not have thought to enter into a
premarital agreement in order to exclude certain premarital properties. While the parties may
have informally agreed to maintain separate estates and lives, the lack of a valid premarital
agreement would appear to bar them now from asserting a result consistent with their earlier
understanding. The concern is less for those who are willing to agree on a property division that
is consistent with those early understandings. The problem is where the parties cannot agree
in which case the partnership rules operate as a set of default provisions to produce a certain
result.
Maybe the question begs another: are the expectations of Hawai'i's incarnation of the
partnership model so reflective of commonly and deeply held beliefs that few could actually
complain about retroactive applicability? Recall the supreme court's reference to a "time-
honored proposition that marriage is a partnership." Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 387,
716 P.2d 1133, 1136 (1986)(emphasis added).
411 Or rather that "ideology of marriage" shapes divorce law. Llewellyn wrote: "(A)s we
turn to review the changes occurring in the ways by which single marriages serve their radiant
functions, we shall find also the social changes mirrored, distorted but unmistakable, in the rules
and practice of marriage dissolution." Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage:
A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689, 694 (1990).
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First, are we excessively seeing things as we wish and not necessarily as
they really are? The partnership model as finally operationalized in Hussey
essentially provides another set of starting points that favor sharing." This
premise is a legitimate and good one in view of the altruistic and high-minded
expectations most enter marriages with.
However, the cases that follow Hussey demonstrate a particularly strong
tethering to the partnership template, even when facts suggest that the
marriage at issue was not the equal sharing relationship contemplated by the
partnership model. Thus, attempts to show that a marriage was an unrelenting
episode of misery and isolation are foreclosed as an improper resort to fault-
finding.417 Likewise, the ICA has turned away attempts to show that a
marriage ceased being a partnership prior to the divorce, relying on the 1988
supreme court decision of Myers v. Myers.I' This tethering to partnership
416 Seen in another way, it provides a set of default provisions which looms over negotiating
parties, serving a constant reminder of what the result might be if parties neither settle on an
alternative vision nor convince a judge that a result other than one generated by partnership
rules is appropriate.
417 In Jackson v. Jackson, husband tried to prove that the marriage had been a short and
unhappy one and that, in some important respects, the parties maintained separate lives. See
Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Hawai'i 319, 333, 933 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997). The ICA
rejected the relevance of the bitterness within the marriage, finding it to be an undue resort to
fault-finding. See id. at 334, 933 P.2d at 1368. The court's long-standing policy has been to
consider fault irrelevant unless it can be shown that a spouse's misconduct actually resulted in
an erosion of the marital estate such as if one were to actively waste the estate in anticipation
of a divorce. See Markham v. Markham, 80 Hawai'i 274, 280, 909 P.2d 602, 608 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1996).
A small but growing call for the return of fault-based divorce as a response to the alleged
failure of no-fault divorce to eliminate the pain or bitterness of marital breakdown has occurred
in the past few years. See John Leland, Tightening the Knot, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1996, at 72-
73; Joe Frolik, Broken Homes: Our Ideas On Divorce May Be Wrong, HONOLULU STAR
BuuErm, Sept. 23, 1995, at B-1. Notwithstanding the growth of this movement, one must ask
whether we can and should isolate the role of fault in property division from the concern for re-
erecting fault as a barrier to divorce. See generally Morse, supra note 21.
41 In Markham v. Markham, the ICA stated:
(W)e observe that the family court's use of the separation date as the termination point
of the marriage relationship for the purpose of property division is incorrect. Under the
'partnership model of marriage we have accepted[,]' a "final division of marriage property
can be decreed only when the partnership is dissolved" and not "after a declaration by
either [spouse] that the marriage has ended[.]" Hence, the termination point of the
marriage partnership for purposes of property division is the conclusion of the divorce
trial.
80 Hawai'i at 286-87, 909 P.2d at 614-15 (quoting Myers v. Myers, 70 Haw. 143, 154, 764
P.2d 1237, 1244 (1988)).
The court, however, provided a safety valve by adding the following:
However, any award based on property acquired by a spouse or the appreciation of
property between the date of the parties' separation and the conclusion of the divorce trial
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principles would also explain the court's reluctance to recognize "spots" of
unpartnerlike behavior as a basis for awarding pieces of property to the
owners 419 Thus, whether looking at the whole marriage, periods within the
marriage, or conduct related to certain properties, the ICA has insisted on its
vision of marriage as a collaborative partnership, setting an ostensibly high bar
against rebuttal.420
While the remedial and redistributive character of the partnership model
might continue to justify this insistance, the court must be careful that its
reliance on fiction, no matter how noble its reasons are, adheres sufficiently
to the facts and circumstances within a particular marriage and to community
notions of fairness. To do otherwise would seriously undermine confidence
in the court and its decisions,42 and may exceed the supreme court's intent in
allowing the partnership model to guide divorce-related property division.422
Because it is the redistributive character of the partnership model that in
part fuels its existence, attention needs to be given to whether it actually
achieves its purposes. This raises the second note of caution. Commentators
have written on the perceived failures of the partnership model to achieve
is a matter left to the court's discretion in determining what "may or may not be just and
equitable when all the circumstances are considered."
Id. at 287, 909 P.2d at 615 (quoting Myers, 70 Haw. at 154, 764 P.2d at 1244).
419 See, e.g., Epp v. Epp, 80 Hawai'i 79, 92-93, 905 P.2d 54, 67-68 (1995); Jackson, 84
Hawai'i at 333, 933 P.2d at 1367.
420 The current edition of the Hawaii Institute for Continuing Legal Education's ("HICLE")
Hawaii Divorce Manual (5th ed., 1996) contains a section entitled "Summary of the Law"
written by William Darrah, Esq. Darrah listed twenty-one circumstances in which appellate
courts have determined that a deviation from partnership principles was or was not proper.
These were culled from cases spanning the period of 1980 to 1996. This relatively small
number of circumstances can be reduced to categories such as "Economic Misconduct and
Waste," "Acting Like Non-Partners," "Income Opportunities," "Spousal Contributions/Non-
Contributions," and "Invading Categories in the Name of Sharing." A review of these strongly
indicates the ICA's reluctance to deviate from the partnership model, at least when parties seek
to deviate on grounds of unpartnerlike behavior or over/under contribution to a particular
property. See 1 HICLE HAWAII DIVORCE MANUAL 1-16 to 1-18 (1996).
421 Not to mention making it difficult for practitioners to explain the law to unconvinced
clients.
422 The thrust of the supreme court's position in both Gussin v. Gussin and Tougas v. Tougas
was the preservation of trial judge discretion as mandated by Hawai'i Revised Statutes section
580-47. See Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 478-86, 836 P.2d 484, 488-92 (1992); see also
Tougas v. Tougas, 76 Hawai'i 19, 26-28, 868 P.2d 437,444-46 (1994). That the court added
(arguably as dicta) its acceptance of the partnership model to its analysis came as a rather
lukewarm response to the ICA's insistence for some kind of guidance in divorce-related
property division. See Gussin, 73 Haw. at 486, 836 P.2d at 492; see also Tougas, 76 Hawai'i
at 27-28, 868 P.2d at 445-46. An overzealous application of partnership-based rules during the
post-Gussin-Tougas period may be viewed by the Hawai'i Supreme Court as an undue
restriction upon the statutory discretion of trial judges.
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economic equity among divorcing parties.423 The focal point of these attacks
has been the inadequacy of the model's response to the plight of the spouse
who bore the primary caregiving responsibilities in the marital home and
irretrievably lost earning opportunities and capacity as a result. 4
Different mechanisms have been suggested to achieve more equitable
results.425 Some have suggested some form of increased sharing of post-
divorce income to take into account the one source of wealth-the primary
wage earner's earning capacity -which may have significantly increased but
423 See, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 553-60 (1990); Smith, supra note 415, at 730-40; Reynolds, supra note
209, at 896; Starnes, supra note 5, at 108-11.
424 In Hawai'i, a study was done by Heather Hammer, Ph.D. to determine the economic
impact of divorce. Looking at two random samples (in one sample, alimony was awarded, in
the other, no award was made) of 1989 divorce cases from the family court on the island of
Oahu, Hammer sought to measure the economic well-being of divorcing parties during the
marriage, at the time of divorce, during the period immediately following the divorce, and at
apoint four years post-divorce. Information for the latter period was to be culled from a
subsequent questionnaire mailed to the participants of the study in January 1994.
Hammer produced a preliminary report which detailed the first phase of the study. See
HEATHER HAMMER, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DIVORCE IN HAWAII-PRELIMINARY REPORT FOR
PHASE I OFTHE STUDY (1993)(copy on file with author). Phase II was to look at the period four
years after the divorce. However, because most of the 1994 questionnaires were not returned
and many of the original participants could not be located, drawing statistically valid results was
impossible. Interview with L. Dew Kaneshiro, Project Director of the Equality and Access to
the Courts Project, Office of the Administrative Director, Hawai'i State Judiciary (June 2,
1997).
The Phase I report was nonetheless revealing. It found that consistent with the research
findings in other jurisdictions, the per capita family income of women declined significantly
post-divorce and that the per capita family income of men increased. See HAMMER, supra at
5. In the Alimony Sample (i.e., where alimony was awarded to the woman), per capital family
income declined to 76.3% of their pre-divorce per capita income level. See id at 6. In the Non-
Alimony Sample, the dip was to 79.2% of the pre-divorce value. See id In contrast, men in the
Alimony Sample, enjoyed an average increase of 137.8% of their pre-divorce per capita family
income; for the Non-Alimony Sample, the increase was similar. See id.
Hammer also looked at the redistribution of net real property values among the divorcing
parties. There she found that certain groups of individuals, most often comprised of women,
experienced decreases from the pre-divorce levels. See id at 10. Of 17 groups with significant
declines in net real property values, 13 groups were comprised of women. See id. Groups of
women bore 76.5% of all significant declines. See id.
At the time the research sample was developed (1989), the partnership model was already
functionally in place. Thus, the results may have some nexus to the effectiveness of the model.
In any case, the results are troubling. No attempt was made to explain why the results turned
out the way they did. On the other hand, one might ask: "Are women faring better under the
model than without it?" Not that an affirmative answer would make things better, but it would
suggest that the model is a proper forward step upon which to pause and ponder the next step.
425 See supra note 423.
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not in an always visible way.426 While on one hand, this may harken back to
the days when one spouse was dependent upon the other, it also recognizes the
choices that the caregiving spouse made and avoids penalizing her for having
made them.427  The "clean-break ' 421 thrust of the UMDA remolded our
thinking about alimony, reducing it largely to a rehabilitative function.429 If
the court is in fact interested in wealth redistribution that accounts for
sacrifices in earning capability made by familial caregiving spouses, it must
continue to consider the role of post-divorce income sharing as an adjunct to
the partnership model.4 a° In doing so, the court should recognize that some
level of an individual's post-divorce need or loss may forever be rooted in the
now-dissolved marriage and that "clean break" notwithstanding, the party in
a better financial position may have an obligation that goes beyond a period
of rehabilitation.43'
426 See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91
Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 63-67 (1996).
427 Cf Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 144-45 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Kay Hill eds.,
1990)(describing how certain divorce rules might be desirable to help couples arrange for their
preferred allocation of marital roles).
4 "Clean break" refers to the finality sought in the break up of a marriage. See Brinig,
supra note 7, at 107.
429 See Regan, supra note 37, at 2314-15.
430 This does not disregard the fact that between divorcing parties, there is often too little
income and too few assets to ensure even minimal economic comfort much less an
approximation of the standard of living to which the parties became accustomed during the
marriage. But to the extent possible, property and income should both be on the table when it
comes to looking at what is available to meet needs and compensate loss attendant to the
divorce.
431 We already see this in cases where the marriage was lengthy and the homemaker spouse
was in no position to achieve a level of rehabilitation that could help her approach the standard
of living to which she was accustomed. But even for an individual who continues to maintain
primary child care and homemaking responsibilities while independently achieving a modicum
of self-sufficiency and wealth, there may be justification to continue some form of income
sharing as a fair reflection of an otherwise unrecoverable earning capacity (and of the increased
earning capacity of the party who had been the primary wage earning spouse) linked to the
decision to "tend the hearth" during the marriage.
The American Law Institute ("AU") is currently working to finalize its Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendation (hereinafter "Principles"). In
recognition of the fact that one divorcing party may have suffered an otherwise uncompensated
loss arising from the marriage, the proposed final draft of the ALI's Principles sets forth a
chapter entitled "Compensatory Spousal Payments" that goes beyond our current understanding
of need-based alimony. The chapter recharacterizes a proper remedy as "compensation for loss"
rather than "relief of need." A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OFTHE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS at 261 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Mar. 15, 1995). This reconceptualiza-
tion would justify a compensatory award even where the recipient did not demonstrate a need.
The award would respond not to a plea of need but a claim to entitlement. See id. at 262.
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V. CONCLUSION
The partnership model encapsulates a well-accepted ideal of marriage to
form a response to the challenge of fairly dividing property without undue
emphasis on whose name is on the title, or who contributed the funds to
acquire it. It recognizes that important contributions come in more than
monetary forms and that they often represent an accumulation of small,
mundane efforts that fuel a marriage and family life. Thus, it justifies equal
distributions of the marital estate even to spouses who stayed at home and
managed the domestic sphere. In Hawai'i, the model is particularly designed
to favor the marital estate and compels a party to affirmatively exclude
property from the marital partnership. The fact that it may not actually
accomplish its remedial goals or that it may be imposed on marriages that
never operated on the premises of the model (i.e., were not partnerships)
should provide at least two foci for further examination.
Although not perfect, Hawai'i's partnership model provides a good
conceptual framework to guide the work of the courts. It represents a modem
development in the long and ongoing movement away from firmly entrenched
patriarchal norms which engulfed Hawai'i soon after the arrival of the
missionaries in 1820. It is possible because of evolving social processes, the
same processes that will no doubt require retooling at a later time.
Professor Kastely said the following in an address to the Family Law
Section of the Hawai'i State Bar Association soon after the Gussin decision:
"The challenge of Gussin is the persistent, the permanent challenge of the
common law-to develop open and flexible ways to articulate the response to
the genuine claims of justice made by individuals."432 If applied with a
reasoned hand, the partnership model can provide one such response.433
Under the ALI's proposed principles, compensatory losses could include (1) an earning
capacity loss incurred during marriage and arising from one spouse's disproportionate share of
the care of children or to other individuals such as elderly relatives, (2) a loss which a spouse
incurs when a marriage is dissolved before that spouse realizes a fair return from his or her
investment in the other spouse's earning capacity and (3) in the case of a long marriage, a loss
in living standard experienced at divorce by the spouse who has less wealth or earning capacity.
See id. at 271-72.
432 Yamauchi, supra note 16, at 451.
433 Author's note: Just prior to publication, the ICA reported several additional decisions that
reflect its continued regard for the partnership model. These include Whitman v. Whitman, No.
20570 (Apr. 21, 1998) Kuroda v. Kuroda, No. 18913 (May 19, 1998) and Wong v. Wong, No.
19721 (May 22, 1998).
